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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem 
According to Pan-Arab nationalists, there is an Arab 
nation numbering more than one hundred million people. It 
occupies a contiguous geographical area and has a strong 
sense of common identity. Within it, they say, the idea of 
a single Arab nation-state is deeply embedded.1 The spatial 
framework of this Arab nation-state is illustrated by the 
speech of a Saudi Arabian delegate to the United Nations in 
which he said that "Arab nationalism will not give up a span 
of territory of the Arab fatherland from the Atlantic to the 
Arabian Gulf, and from the northern extremity of the United
1a number of writers have explored the theoretical as 
well as the practical aspects of nations and nationalism.
For example, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism 
(New York: ' The Macmillan Company, 1937), and The Historical 
Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Com­
pany, l94§); Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in
Its Origin and Background ÇHew York: The Macmillan Company,
l945) ; Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955); and Rupert Emerson, From 
Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian aîïT
African Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, i960).
2Arab Republic down to the southern borders of the Sudan in the 
heart of Africa.
As early as 1945, just at the close of World War II,
H. A. R. Gibb, a well-known historian of the Middle East, 
wrote that it was no longer a question of whether Arabs could 
unite, that rather the question was: "On what terms and in
2
what relation to the outer world will Arab unity be realized?" 
Confidence in the inevitability of Arab unity with the 
termination of Turkish, British, French, and Italian colonial­
ism was strongly expressed by Nejlah Izzeddin: "Unity is a
basic underlying norm in the life of the Arab peoples; their 
division in separate entities is a transient phase of recent 
intrusion."3 Payez A. Sayegh, an Arab political scientist, 
looking at the region in 1958, concluded: "The idea of Arab
unity is a primary fact of political life in the Arab world 
today.
Such Arab unity sentiments as those just expressed 
presumed that the Arab people’s sense of nationhood and 
territory would naturally lead to statehood. These assumptions,
Henry Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," The Middle 
East Journal, XVI (Winter, 1962), p. 48, quoting Ahmad 
Shugayri, Saudi Arabian Delegate to the United Nations, an 
address to the General Assembly, August 15, 1958.
1^1. A. R. Gibb, "Toward Arab Unity," Foreign Affairs, 
XXIV (October, 1945), p. 119.
^Nejlah Izzeddin, The Arab World (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1953), p. 314.
^Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment
(New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 213.
3however, overlooked some very important stumbling blocks 
along the road from nationhood to statehood. The Arab nation 
has not yet impressed the idea of cultural unity into the 
political landscape of the earth. The purpose of this disser­
tation is to examine the idea of one Arab nation-state, its 
genesis and development, and the factors which have tended to 
promote or obstruct the achievement of this ideal. An attempt 
will be made to provide an explanation for the delays in the 
realization of one Arab nation-state and to draw some meaning­
ful conclusions as to the future prospects for such a state.
This study begins with the presumption of the exist­
ence of one Arab nation, in the cultural sense of that term, 
and acknowledges the efforts in the direction of political 
unification as expressive of Arab nationalism.^ It is recog­
nized here that the desire for political unification, i.e., 
the drive to create a single Arab nation-state, is a viable 
force and that efforts toward this goal will continue in the 
future. It is not assumed here that all, or even most, of 
the existing Arab countries will be brought into one political 
union in the near future. In the midst of the recent turbu­
lence in the Arab World, it does seem that the situation is 
becoming more favorable to the one Arab state idea. Political
l'ayez A. Sayegh distinguishes three main objectives 
of Arab nationalism: emancipation from foreign domination,
socio-economic development, and political unification. Ibid., 
p. 5. The last-named objective, that of political unification, 
in the present context may also be called Pan-Arabism.
4scientists and historians have written at length about the 
divisive forces and the cohesive forces operating within the 
Arab nation, or Arab World. This study, while recognizing the 
reality of these forces, is focused primarily on the spatial 
aspect of the Arab unity problem. Some political geographers 
have differentiated between the terms "political area" and 
"political action area" in analyzing the state-idea. Accord­
ing to Cohen and Rosenthal, "political area refers to a part 
of the earth's surface that has location and content and is 
legally organized and bounded."^ For the purpose of this 
study the definition has been somewhat modified. As used 
here, the term political area will refer to a part of the 
earth's surface not necessarily enclosed by political bound­
aries but where there is a commitment of the people to a 
certain idea--in this case, the idea of unity. The area 
under study is an area bounded by the outer limit of a 
people's consciousness of their being Arab and within which 
there is a commitment to the idea of one Arab nation-state.
The political area thus refers to all the Arab-occupied terri­
tories where there is the potential for the unity idea.
The "political action area," again according to
Cohen and Rosenthal, "refers to the specific area on which
2
political transactions make their impact." In this study,
Saul B. Cohen and Lewis D. Rosenthal, "A Geographical 
Model for Political Systems Analysis," The Geographical 
Review, LXI (January, 1971), p. 31.
^Ibid.
5when referring to the political action area of the unity idea, 
the writer has reference to an area where until recently the 
idea had intense commitment from many of the people but no 
successful impact. At present, however, a more real political 
action area is evident in the recent establishment of the 
Federation of Arab Republics.
The potential for unification has been enhanced 
somewhat by new and changing realities in the Arab World, 
especially by the emergence of Egypt during the past twenty 
years as a strong leader among the Arab states and a potential 
primary core area for the Arab nation. The Arabs' improved 
understanding of their national ideology, their united stand 
against Israel, and the new economic conditions created by 
Arab oil wealth have brightened the prospect for unification. 
The creation of the Federation of Arab Republics by the 
governments of Egypt, Libya, and Syria in September, 1971, is 
the latest evidence of the potency of these new conditions.
Since the modern awakening of Arab national con- 
scousness in the late nineteenth century, the longing among 
Arabs for political unity has increased tremendously. Never­
theless, several attempts toward political unification have 
ended in essential failure. The first of these attempts, 
that of the Sherif of Mecca in leading a revolt against 
Turkey during World War I, was shattered by the secret 
Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In 1945 another unity attempt.
this one encouraged by the British Government, produced the 
Arab League, which so far has fallen far short of its long 
range objective of political union. The Arab League is still 
only a voluntary association of sovereign states agreeing to 
coordinate their policies towards the common good of all.
To fortify their anti-Israeli stance and ward off a 
potential anti-communist threat from within, Egypt and Syria 
merged their governments and formed the United Arab Republic 
on February 1, 1958. Within five weeks the Kingdom of Yemen 
was federated with the U.A.R. under an umbrella designation, 
the United Arab States. The changes set in motion by the 
creation of the United Arab Republic were of monumental 
significance to the aspiration of other Arabs for unity, but 
their hopes were soon marred by contradictory and self- 
defeating actions among the Arabs themselves. The Yemen link 
to the U.A.R. was never very meaningful, and after only three 
years, in 1961, the Syrian regime also broke away from its 
Egyptian ally. Egypt, however, retained as its official name 
the United Arab Republic for whatever usefulness it might have 
in the future. Somewhat in response to the Egyptian-Syrian 
merger, the more conservative governments of Jordan and Iraq 
declared unity under the term Arab Union on February 14, 1958.
A violent revolution In Iraq the following summer, overthrowing 
the dictatorship of the prime minister. General Nuri al-Said,
ended the Union in summary fashion and led to Iraq's with­
drawal from the anti-communist oriented Baghdad Pact.^
The Tangier Conference of April 1958 adopted a
Resolution for the Unification of the Arab Maghreb (Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria), but Algerian Arabs for the next 
several years were involved in a bitter war for independence 
from France, and nothing of substance came from the resolu­
tion. Since Algerian independence in 1962, relations have 
been fairly cool between the conservative monarchy in Morocco 
and the left-leaning republican regime in Algeria.
While the international arrangements just mentioned 
all demonstrated efforts at Arab political union, none of the 
federations survived. Another unification attempt was made in 
April, 1963, by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, when their leaders 
signed a Syrian proposal for a so-called federal union with a
common foreign policy and a unified system of defense. Once
again the forces of disunion overcame the desire for unity, 
and the proposed federation was never realized. The more 
recent federation of Libya, Egypt, and Syria, proclaimed in 
September 1971, is another attempt towards Arab political 
union. The various unity developments just mentioned clearly 
show that, even in the face of several failures, the idea of 
Arab political union is still a strong force. More efforts 
to implement the idea of one Arab nation-state can be
The Baghdad Pact was an anti-communist pact, directed 
primarily against the U.S.S.R., formed in 1955 by the United 
Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.
8anticipated, although the obstacles to their success are real 
and almost equally persistent.
Review of the Literature
There is a vast amount of general geographical 
literature on the Arab World, but most of it does not deal 
directly with the topic of political integration and will not 
be reviewed here. A number of the more important general 
works have, however, been included in the bibliography. Most 
of the scholarly research on Arab political unity and/or 
disunity has been done by historians and political scientists. 
The interface of politics and geography in the Middle East 
and North Africa has not been given much attention and, as a 
result, misleading conceptions are common even on the subject 
of what territories might be included within one Arab nation­
state .
A careful search of the available literature has 
revealed only a few publications which deal in some depth with 
the potentiality of one Arab nation-state. Perhaps the best 
of these is the previously mentioned book of Payez A. Sayegh, 
which traces the origin and development of the Arab unity 
concept up to 1958 in a very scholarly and interesting way.^ 
lacing a political scientist, Sayegh emphasized in his work 
the theoretical, or ideological, development of the idea of 
one Arab nation-state. For him the political idea of one Arab
^Sayegh, Arab Unity.
9nation-state was spatially coterminous with the cultural area 
of the Arab World. He failed to see, or chose to ignore, 
disconformities which exist between the political action area 
of the unity idea and the political area of that idea. The 
main purpose of his book seems to be the propagation of a new 
ideological basis for Arab nationalism. According to Sayegh, 
the traditional concept of an Arab nation-in-being is a static 
concept, and he chooses to replace it with the dynamic 
doctrine of a nation-in-becoming. He sees a theoretical 
weakness in the traditional concept of Arab political union, 
reflected in the attitudes of some of the local political 
leaders, and regards it as the main stumbling block in the way 
to political unification of the Arab World.
Harold W. Glidden, a historian, seems on the other 
hand to be much more aware of the disconformity that has 
existed between geographical extent of the idea of one Arab 
nation-state and its likely political action area.^ Glidden 
points out that from the very inception of the modern idea 
of one Arab nation-state, early in this century, any imple­
mentation would have resulted in at least two independent 
Arab states instead of one. He suggests that one of these 
might have been a constitutional monarchy including the 
entire area of present-day Iraq, Syria (with perhaps a special 
status for Lebanon), Jordan, Israel, and most of the Arabian
Harold W. Glidden, "Arab Unity: Ideal and Reality,"
The World of Islam, ed. James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder 
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1959), pp. 249-254.
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Peninsula. A second state, the Kingdom of Hijaz, would 
probably have remained an independent kingdom as a home for 
the Arab Caliphate.^ Husain, the Sherif of Mecca, in his 
correspondence with the British Government in 1915-16, based 
his demands on the above proposition. None of the North 
African Arabs were to be included within the two proposed 
states. According to Glidden, any strong desire for Arab 
political unity was largely confined to the Hijaz in the 
western fringe of the Arabian Peninsula. With the passage of 
time, however, Arab nationalism has extended throughout the 
Arab World, and the sense of Arab cultural identity has 
intensified. On the other hand, inconsistencies continue to 
exist between the sphere of the political idea and its likely
political action area in the near future.
During the time when there were still several Arab 
countries under colonial rule, some Arab nationalists 
thought that to achieve the Pan-Arab dream of political union 
all that was needed was the termination of foreign rule. Now 
that independence is a reality in all the Arab countries,
Arab nationalists are becoming more aware of their differences
and of the difficulties that lie on the way to political 
unification. Glidden puts it thus: "The reality is that
while the British and French action exacerbated Arab disunity, 
it did not create it. Similar views have been expressed by 
a number of authors, although they disagree somewhat on the
^Ibid., p. 251. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 249
11
relative importance of the main factors of disunity, depending
upon their academic field or special interest.
Henry Siegman points out the historical fact that
since 756 A.D. there never has existed political unity among
the Arabs.^ He sees it thus:
Arab nationalism postulates the existence of a collective 
Arab national consciousness which demands political 
self-realization in a single united state comprising all 
Arab lands. Arab history "argues against the existence 
of one Arab nation at any time."2
Although not arguing the unattainability of the goal of one 
Arab nation-state, Siegman sees it as important to bring the 
Arab nationalists back to reality so that "it may help to 
make the transition less painful."^
Payez A. Sayegh differs with Henry Siegman in 
assuming the existence of a spirit of political unity of the 
Arab World when nearly all of it (except for Morocco and the 
Sudan) lay within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.^
Sayegh does not regard the Arabs' urge for political unity as 
unique; rather, he sees it as "a normal desire, on the part 
of a given national community, for political unity in a world 
in which nationhood invariably strives for statehood."^ As 
noted earlier, to Sayegh the static concept of Arab national­
ism, i.e., the nation-in-being idea, is the main stumbling 
block to Arab political unity. The nation-in-being concept
^Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," p. 48.
^Ibid., p. 59. ^Ibid. ^Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 23.
^Ibid., p. 211.
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is similar to the European concept of nationhood, the determi­
nants of which are common language, history, culture, and 
territory. Sayegh writes that, based on this concept, some 
"Arab nationalists proclaimed the doctrine of an Arab nation- 
in-being," while the same concept was used "by other Arabs 
to vindicate particularistic ideologies of nationhood, to 
proclaim multiple nationhood in the Arab World, and to assert 
that the Arab World constituted not one nation but a family 
of kindred nations."^
H. A. R, Gibb regards "geography as the most important 
factor in the life of the Arab."^ As he sees it, "the 
seemingly compact block of Arab lands breaks up, on close 
examination, into series of narrow and often discontinuous 
fringes of cultivable land, grouped in the east around a
central core of desert and strung out in the west between a
?
still vaster desert and the sea." This geographical 
influence of the desert in isolating the Arab lands from each 
other is regarded by Gibb as responsible for each individual 
region's "developing a political life of its o w n . H e  
attributes to the environmental influence the development of 
two conflicting life styles, one nomadic, one sedentary. 
Nomadism is dwindling, however, as in the last decade great
^I b i d . ,  p . 86.
^H. A. R. Gibb, "The Future for Arab Unity," The Near 
East : Problems and Prospects, ed. Philip W. Ireland (Chicago :
The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 71.
^Ibid. 4ibid., p. 72.
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efforts have been made by the Arab governments to settle the 
wandering Bedouins and bring them more fully into the national 
scene.
In addition to the obvious settlement discontinuities 
associated with the desert environment, other divisive aspects 
of the Arab World have been noted by a number of writers.
Emil Lengyel, like Gibb, points to the natural frontiers in 
the Middle East, and economic disparities.^ Hans E. Tutsch 
calls attention to geopolitical problems resulting from local 
and regional nationalism and the presence of non-Muslim
9
minorities.^ Carlton S. Coon emphasizes sociological 
differences.^
Probably the most complete discussion of the divisive 
factors within the Arab World is that of Nabih Amin Paris 
and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn in their book published in 1955.  ^
These writers have given ample treatment to cultural, 
religious, and political factors, but have not adequately 
recognized the role of geographical discontinuities. Some of
^Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York:
The John Day Company, Inc., Publishers, 1Ô6Ù} , pp. 132-134.
^Hans E. Tutsch, "Arab Unity and Dissensions," The 
Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New YorTc: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 12-23, 26-27.
^Carlton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle
Hast (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, the., 1958),
p. 352.
^Nabih Amin Paris and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn, The 
Crescent in Crisis (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas
Press, 1955),
14
the divisive factors Paris and Husayn recognized in 1955 no 
longer exist. There is, for example, no longer any active 
foreign imperialism in the Arab World.
The prevailing view is that the major unifying factors 
in the Arab World are the common Arabic language, the Islamic 
religion and culture, much common history, and the vigorous 
nationalist outlook of some of the modern Arab leaders. Paris 
and Husayn stress also the improved communication links and 
gradually merging economic interests as other unifying 
factors. No writer, however, seems to have analyzed with any 
thoroughness the unifying force generated by the common Arab 
interest in gaining control of oil fields and raising revenue 
from oil marketing. The increasing need for an Arab common 
market as a stimulus to regional economic development is also 
a somewhat neglected theme.
After examining the existing literature on the topic 
of one Arab nation-state, it seems clear that the following 
aspects deserve further attention from political scientists and 
political geographers:
1. The spatial character of the one Arab state idea 
and the political action area of that idea.
2. The significance of the lack of a predominant 
core area for the one Arab state idea, at least until the 
Late 1950's.
15
3. The interplay of the specific divisive and 
unifying factors in the Arab World with particular attention 
to new emerging forces.
Justification
A study in depth of the idea of one Arab nation­
state is of great significance because, as Henry Siegman puts 
it, "the powerful reality of the goal and the forces 
straining in its direction" themselves produce tensions and 
conflicts in the region.^ It is in the interest of Arabs, and 
indeed of the world, to understand those tensions and conflicts 
and to be able to handle them in a peaceful way. For the 
Arabs, either future peace and orderly progress or dissension 
and retarded economic development among themselves is the 
future course--the one taken will depend on whether or not 
they understand the meaning of the competing forces. As for 
the developed world, Arab countries at peace can continue to 
supply the bulk of their demand for imported oil, without 
which the wheels of western industry would be brought to a 
halt. Strategically, the Arab World connects Asia, Africa, 
and Europe, making peace in this area of vital importance to 
everyone. The study which follows is an attempt to improve 
understanding of the geographical aspects of the problems of 
Arab political unity, without which there can be little 
political stability in the region.
^Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," p. 49.
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Approach
The study is basically an application of the political
geographic approach developed by Richard Hartshorne in his
Presidential Address to the Association of American Geographers
in 1949, modified slightly by the later related theories of
Jean Gottmann, Karl W. Deutsch, Stephen B. Jones, and Saul B.
Cohen and Lewis Rosenthal.^ According to Hartshorne, after
carefully identifying the underlying idea or raison d*être
of the state in the analysis of a state area, the
first concern is to determine the area to which the 
idea applies; then the degree to which it operates in 
the different regions, and finally the extent of 
correspondence of those regions to the territory actually 
included within the state.
On this basis, we may approach the most elementary 
problem in political geography--namely that of distin­
guishing within the legal confines of its territory, 
those regions that form integral parts of the state-idea, 
and those parts that must be recognized as held under 
control, in the face of indifference or of opposition 
on the part of the regional population.2
Many of the same ideas recur in the theoretical 
writing of Jones and of Cohen and Rosenthal. All of these 
writers agree with Hartshorne that political idea and
Richard Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Polit 
ical Geography," Annals M G , XL (March, 1950), pp. 95-130;
Jean Gottmann, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An
Attempt at Analysis," World Politics. IV (July, 1952), 
pp. 512-519; Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some
Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration,"
World Politics, V (January, 1953), pp. 168-195; Stephen B. 
Jones, "A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography,"
Annals AAG, XLIV (March, 1954), pp. 111-123; and Cohen and 
Rosenthal, The Geographical Review, LXI (January, 1971), 
pp. 5-32.
2
Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political 
Geography," p. 101.
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political area are not necessarily synonymous in extent. Jones 
uses the word "field" to express the political area where a 
given political idea actually operates. Cohen and Rosenthal 
use terms like "political action area" and "field of action" 
for the same concept. In applying the Hartshorne terminology, 
the whole Arab World from Morocco to Iraq becomes the politi­
cal area of the idea of one Arab state, and within it lie 
smaller areas possessing various degrees of identification 
with the one state idea. It is difficult to measure the 
precise degree to which the political idea of one Arab state 
is embedded in any given group of Arabs. It is hoped, 
however, that a detailed examination of geographic, historic, 
and economic considerations, of the distribution of non-Arab 
ethnic groups in the Arab World, of the constitutions of the 
Arab states, the speeches of important Arab political leaders, 
and recent events like the referendum held in Egypt, Libya, 
and Syria in 1971 on the question of federation, will together 
provide a basis for reasonable judgments.
The study of the state-idea will be followed by a 
critical examination of the core areas in the Arab World.^
The lack of focus, or central core, for the idea of one Arab
Derwent Whittlesey defines core area as "the area 
in which or about which a state originates"; see The Earth 
and the State: A Study of Political Geography (New York:
Henry Holt and Company , Inc., 1059) , p . 597. For a general 
theoretical discussion of core areas, see Norman J. G.
Pounds and Sue Simons Ball, "Core Areas and the Development 
of the European States System," Annals AAG, LIV (March, 1964), 
pp. 24-40.
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nation-state has greatly hindered its uninterrupted develop­
ment. Deutsch identifies eight uniformities in the growth of 
nations into states, one of which is "the social mobilization 
of rural population in core areas within them, and between 
town and c o u n t r y . I t  is helpful if a single core area is 
present around which a nation can be built into a state. 
Political geographers like Norman J. G. Pounds have observed
that "most states have grown from a central area," i.e., a
2
core area.
In the Arab World the development of several core 
areas prior to the emergence of the idea of one Arab state 
left the state-idea without a strong territorial focus. This 
deficiency was not corrected until the late 1950's when 
Egypt finally assumed an embracing Arab leadership and 
called through the voice of Radio Cairo for a closer Arab unity, 
Until recently, however, the idea of one Arab state was 
without an obvious core--as one writer put it, "around which 
other territories could build themselves up like the soft 
parts around the bones of a skeleton."^
In examining the state-idea and its important 
component part, the core area, the study analyzes those
^Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent
Patterns of Political and Social Integration," p. 172.
2
Norman J. G . Pounds, Political Geography (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19633 > P* TTTT
^Ibid., p. 171, quoting Lucien Febvre, A Geographical 
Introduction to History.
19
forces which have tended to bring the idea into the landscape 
(i.e., the centripetal forces) and those which have tended 
to keep the political divisions as they are or subdivide them 
further (i.e., the centrifugal forces), with particular 
emphasis on the new elements involved. The operative inte­
grative forces include nationalist movements, administrative 
centralization, a homogeneous population, common language, 
common religion, common history, sharing of economic interests, 
common cultural heritage, the external threat of a common 
enemy, a state-idea, and a powerful and influential core area. 
The forces just enumerated may be found singly or in various 
combinations. Almost every state, along with its binding 
factors, has some active disintegrative forces. These 
disintegrative forces may be regionalism, ethnic diversity, 
multiple languages, divergent economic interests, ideological 
differences, or physical geographic contrasts.^ The 
survival of a state, or the amalgamation of several political 
units into one larger state, depends on which of these sets 
of forces, disintegrative or integrative, proves the stronger. 
An attempt is made throughout the study to emphasize the 
dynamic character of the forces involved.
To achieve one Arab nation-state would mean the 
successful political integration of the several existing 
Arab states. Political integration, however, has meant
For a discussion of these integrating and disinte­
grating forces see Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in 
Political Geography."
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different things to different political theorists.^ A 
traditional view has been that even with a bare minimum of 
cultural and political homogeneity among the people concerned, 
well-designed supranational institutions would suffice to 
bring about the desired unity. An alternate view of political 
integration focuses its attention on the process of transfer­
ring loyalties to new political institutions rather than on 
the specific institution created.^ Following this point of 
view, political integration means a process leading to a 
condition where groups and individuals are more loyal to 
their central institutions than they are to their local ones.
A third meaning of political integration, perhaps best 
defined by Bruce M. Russett, is the "notion of responsiveness, 
or the probability that requests emanating from one state to
For further comparative discussion of the different 
meanings of political integration see Bruce M. Russett, 
"Transactions, Community, and International Political 
Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies, IX (March, 
1971), pp. 224^T4S:
2
This second view is illustrated in the work of 
Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, iSsSj. Other theoretical works with 
similar views are Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study 
of Political Integration," World Politics, XV (Autumn,
1962), p. 44; Leon Lindberg,The Political Dynamics of 
European Integration (StanforEl Stanford University Press, 
1063); and Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a 
Multi-Dimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multi-Variate Measure­
ment," International Organization, XXIV (Autumn, 1970), 
pp. 20-ITÎ
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another will be met favorably.”  ^ In a later publication 
Russett has introduced another related definition of political 
integration, that is, "unity of action in relation to the 
external system.” Still a fifth meaning of political 
integration is that given by Karl Deutsch. According to him, 
political integration is the avoidance of war under condi­
tions of continued voluntary association. Deutsch’s defini­
tion of successful integration is spelled out as follows in 
Political Community and the North Atlantic Area:
A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has 
become "integrated."
By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a 
territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions 
and practices strong enough and widespread enough to 
assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of 
"peaceful change" among its population.
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part 
of individuals in a group . . . that common social 
problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
"peaceful change."
By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social 
problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, 
without resort to large-scale physical f o r c e . 3
Russett, "Transactions, Community, and International 
Political Integration," p. 227. This idea was expressed by 
Russett originally in his two books Community and Contention: 
Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge:
M.Ï.T. Press, 1^63), and International Regions and the 
International System (Chicago : Rand McNally, 1967).
2
Russett, "Transactions, Community, and International 
Political Integration," p. 243.
Z
Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
195)), p . I~. For further discussion of political integration 
by Karl W. Deutsch see also his book entitled Nationalism and 
Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I960).
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A security-community, according to Deutsch, can be 
of two types. One type is the Amalgamated Security- 
Community, e.g., the United States of America, involving a 
"formal merger of two or more previously independent units into 
a single larger unit, with some type of government after 
amalgamation."^ The second type is the Pluralistic Security- 
Community in which the separate units retain their legal 
independence and amalgamation occurs without full political 
integration, e.g., the combined territories of the United 
States of America and Canada.
On examination of these five definitions of political 
integration, each seems to emphasize a different aspect of 
the integration process. No political integration can be 
achieved without supportive institutions, and neither can the 
institutions survive without the substantial loyalty of the 
people concerned. Likewise, political integration cannot be 
achieved when two or more political units are periodically 
engaged in warfare or under threat of warfare, any more than 
when they are lacking in mutual responsiveness or unity of 
action against an external threat.
For the purpose of this study, the achievement of one 
Arab nation-state would mean the political integration of 
Deutsch's theoretical Amalgamated Security-Community.
Although Deutsch uses the avoidance of war as his main
^Deutsch et al.. Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area, p . 2.
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yardstick of political integration, he gives considerable 
attention to more positive aspects of integration as well.
The writer has attempted to do likewise in the study which 
follows.
Chapter ii of this study deals with the origin and 
the dispersal of the Arab nation and brings into focus the 
important elements of the geography of the Arab World.
Chapter iii traces the origin and the development of the idea 
of one Arab nation-state, with particular emphasis on the 
idea and its political action area. Chapter iv concentrates 
on the evolution of multiple core areas in the Arab World 
and the effect of this evolution on the later development of 
the idea of one Arab nation-state. Chapters v and vi, 
respectively, analyze the unifying and the divisive forces at 
work within the Arab nation. Lastly, chapter vii draws some 
conclusions and introduces some speculation on the future of 
the one Arab state idea.
CHAPTER II 
THE ARAB NATION
Definition of the Arab People 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define 
an Arab, because an Arab nationality still does not exist in 
a legal sense. Citizens of Arab countries are still known 
as Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis, Jordanians, etc., in their 
passports. The recent federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya 
has given the people of these countries an Arab nationality 
in a legal sense, but this federation is an exeptional case 
within the Arab World.
The word "Arab” does not denote a universally 
recognized meaning. It is mainly a linguistic term, but it 
is also a term of cultural association.^ Racially, Arabs are 
of a heterogeneous stock which is dominated by a Semitic 
strain in Western Asia and a Hamitic strain in North Africa. 
Both Semites and Hamites are Mediterranean peoples. Sir 
John Glubb has identified six areas of racial grouping in the 
Arab World. Among the six, only Central Arabia is inhabited
^Izzeddin, The Arab World, p. 13.
^Sir John Glubb, A Short History of the Arab Peoples 
(New York: Stein and Day, 1969), pp. 15-16.
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by people predominantly of the original stock. In Lebanon, 
Syria, and Palestine, where there have been numerous foreign 
invasions, the Arabians from Arabia have mixed with Greeks, 
Persians, Romans, and people from other Mediterranean countries 
Modern Iraq is inhabited by people largely of Persian and 
other eastern origins, although the residents of Northern 
Iraq are a mixture of Kurds, Turks, other early Indo-European 
races, and Arabians. Egyptians, according to Glubb, were 
initially the descendants of the Pharaohs with an admixture 
of African blood which infiltrated northward down the Nile. 
Later, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, Albanians, 
and Circassians have mixed with the earlier population of the 
valley. The South Arabians, or Yemenites, differ from North 
Arabians in that they bear racial affinities to what Philip K. 
Hitti calls the Alpine-styled Armenoid type.^ The North 
African Arab region west of Egypt is inhabited partly by 
Berbers, but Greeks, Vandals, Italians, Byzantines, Spaniards, 
and Frenchmen have also contributed individual elements to the 
coastal population.
Perhaps the most acceptable definition of an Arab is
that given by George Antonius. In his words an Arab is,
a citizen of that extensive world . . . whose racial 
descent, even when it was not of pure Arab lineage, had 
become submerged in the tide of Arabization; whose manners 
and tradition had been shaped in an Arab mould; and most
Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs : From the
Earliest Times to the Present (9th ed.; New York: Macmillan
and Company, 1968), pp. 21-22.
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decisive of all, whose mother tongue is Arabic. The term 
applies to Christians as well as to Moslems, and to the 
offshoots of each of those creeds, the criterion being not 
Islamization but the degree of Arabization."!
The Antonius definition states clearly that the main 
criteria are language and culture--that is. Arabization, not 
the Islamic religion or the Semitic-Hamitic race. Gibb, 
however, prefers a definition in which religion is a major 
criterion. In defining an Arab, he says that "all those are 
Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of 
Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who in 
addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage
3
as their common possession.” This definition is being 
discarded at present by many of the Arab nationalists, but 
in areas like the Arabian Peninsula and certain parts of 
North Africa where religion is still very important, and 
national consciousness is still weak, the Gibb definition may 
be the more appropriate.^ For the purpose of this study, the 
Antonius definition is the more useful one.
■^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939), p . Ï51
2Arabization is the process of spreading the Arabic 
tongue, and Islamization is the spreading of the religion of 
Islam. These processes have acted often together, making 
the distinction between them very difficult.
^Faris and Husayn, p. 177, quoting H. A. R. Gibb in 
his pamphlet. The Arabs (Oxford, 1940).
^Faris and Husayn, p. 178.
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Most recent definitions of "Arab" are worded so as to 
include all Arabic - speaking peoples in the concept. The 
meaning of the word, however, has been changing steadily 
through time.l During the rather short period of the Arab 
Empire, the one formed in the seventh century, the term Arab 
was used to designate all the inhabitants of the Empire.
After the disintegration of the Empire, however, the word 
seemed to revert to an earlier meaning best symbolized by 
"nomad." Before the recent awakening of a general Arab 
national consciousness, the word Arab often meant simply 
nomad. Until the 1940's the word Arab was sometimes used by 
Egyptians and Iraqis in a derogatory way, as "denoting a 
shiftless nomad, someone to be looked upon with contempt by 
a people who had been settled cultivators from time immemo­
rial."^ Not until 1943, in the second edition, did the Guide 
to the Egyptian Parliament refer to a given member of the 
Parliament as a "Shiekh of the Bedouins" instead of a 
"Shiekh of Arabs" as was done in the first edition.^ By the 
time of World War II the word Arab had become respectable and 
inclusive of all Arabic-speaking people. Now the Arab World
^See Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London; 
Hutchinson's University Library, lÔSO), pp. 0-1/.
^Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1962), p. 52.
3lbid.
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includes, perhaps with the exception of Mauritania and Chad, 
the residents of all of the predominantly Arabic-speaking 
states (Figure 1 and Table 1).
Origin, Dispersal, and Nucléation of the Arabs 
Although the term "Arab," for the purpose of this 
study, has been defined, the question remains as to how a 
group so heterogeneous in ethnic character ever came to be 
known as "the Arabs." Who Arabized all those who live 
outside the Arabian Peninsula? To answer this question with 
any satisfaction, one must examine briefly the ancient 
history of the Arabian Peninsula, the territorial cradle of 
the Semitic people.^ Most of Arabia is desert, but there is 
a narrow margin of habitable land along portions of its 
coast. Any increase in population beyond the normal, limited 
supporting capacity of the land, a disaster like the destruc­
tion of the Ma'rib Dam of Yemen (by a flood sometime around 
the middle of the sixth century A.D.),^ or a periodic decline 
in trade forced the surplus population to migrate. Such 
factors as these have produced many waves of migration, almost 
always along or out from the east or west coast of Arabia, for 
the center of the peninsula is blocked by a nearly impassable 
desert. The earliest known of these migrations took place 
around 3500 B.C. from the area of al-Yaman, or modern Yemen 
(Figure 2). One wave moved along the Red Sea coast of
^Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 8. ^Ibid., p. 64
FI9.1
THE ARAB WORLD
The Arab World
-
Arabic Speakers In Non-Arab Countries 
Mauritania- 76.4 per cent
Chad 28 6 • *
SomaN 15 • '
N )
lO
The data for this map is taken from Bruce M. Russett, 
et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, pp. 
Elisa Daggs, All Africa, p. 223.
132-137;
30
TABLE 1
SPEAKERS OF ARABIC AS PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
Country^ Percentage^ Year
Egypt 98.0 C 1942
Syria 92.1 A 1956
Tunisia 90.5 C 1946
Libya 90.0 c 1942
Algeria 78.1 B 1948
Morocco 77.4 C 1942
Mauritania 76.4 c 1942
Sudan 53.4 c 1942
Chad 28.6 c 1942
Somali Republic 1.5 B 1969
In Iraq the proportion of Arabic speakers is thought 
to be around 90 per cent of the population. In other Arab 
countries not listed in the above table, it can be assumed 
that the proportion of Arabic-speaking people is close ro 
100 per cent.
^A--mother tongue, B--language currently or usually 
spoken in the home, C--ability to speak.
Sources: Except for the Somali Republic, Bruce M. Russett,
et al.. World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press,
l964), pp. 132-137. For the Somali Republic, Elisa 
Daggs, All Africa (New York: Hastings House Pub-
lishers, 1970), p . 223.
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Arabia northwestward through the Hijaz (Hejaz) and Sinai into 
Egypt, where Semites mixed with the local Hamites and 
produced the Egyptians of history. Another wave went up along 
the east coast of the peninsula and merged with the sedentary 
people of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. This mixture of 
Yemeni nomads with non-Semitic Sumerians became the Babylo­
nians, later famous for their skill in irrigation, architecture, 
and writing. Approximately one thousand years later, around 
2500 B.C., another wave of Semites called Amorites, including 
tribes subsequently known as Canaanites and Phoenicians, 
occupied Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Between 1500 and 
1200 B.C. a surge of Aramaic people (the Arameans) moved into 
Syria and the Hebrew tribes entered Palestine. Approximately 
another millennium elapsed before there is mention of Arabs 
from the south appearing in some numbers in the "Fertile 
Crescent" as raiders and settlers. It was also about the 
fifth century B.C. that the Arab-Nabataeans settled in the 
northeastern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Although these 
waves of Semitic migrants in various period of history have 
been known by different names, they all had common roots, 
originating from about the same place and the same basic Arab 
stock. The successful deciphering of the cuneiform writings 
of the pre-Christian era had been helpful in fixing the early 
Arabs in time and place.^ The Najd (Nejd) in the central
^Anthony Nutting, The Arabs : A Narrative History
from Mohammed to the Present (New York: Clarkson N. Potter,
T m j T j r T .------------
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highlands of the peninsula or al-Yaman (Yemen) in southern 
Arabia seem the most likely original home of the Semitic 
people.^
So far in this brief history of Arabia the term Arab 
has been used indiscriminately for both North and South 
Arabians. A distinction, however, should be made. Hitti, 
the historian, points out that a traditional differentiation
is made by the Arabs themselves between North Arabians and
2
South Arabians. North Arabians are called Arabian Arabs 
(aribah), and South Arabians are called Arabicized Arabs 
(musta'ribah). This difference, according to Hitti, sur­
vived even after the religious unification under Islam.
Among the South Arabians the earliest kingdom, whose 
date is put at around 3500 B.C., was that of the Sabaeans.
The Sabaean Kingdom was located in al-Yaman with Ma'rib as 
its capital. This was the meeting place of the trade routes 
connecting the frankincense and myrrh lands of al-Yaman and 
Hadramawt (Hadramaut) with the Mediterranean ports, particu­
larly Ghazzah (Gaza) (Figure 2). According to Hitti, the 
Sabaeans were the first of the Arabs "to step within the 
threshold of civilization."^ They were a sedentary farming 
people domiciled in Yemen, Hadramaut, and along the neighbor­
ing coast. They spoke their own Semitic language, which was 
quite different from Arabic. Their early development is
^Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 13. 
^Ibid., p. 32. ^Ibid., p. 44.
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attributed to the fertility of the land, its proximity to the 
sea, and its strategic location on the route to India.^
From about 115 B.C. onwards the Himyrites succeeded 
the Sabaeans and formed the Himyrite Kingdom, carrying on 
the commercial civilization which lasted until about 300 A.D. 
This Himyrite Kingdom prospered as long as it monopolized the 
maritime trade route through the Red Sea to India. It served 
as an entrepot, collecting the products of the local area, 
as well as those of East Africa and India, and carrying them 
by land routes through Makkah (Mecca) to Syria and Egypt.
The opening of the Nile-Red Sea Canal by Ptolemy II (285- 
240 B.C.), however, and the beginning of Egyptian shipping 
through it had already sowed the seeds of the decline of the 
Himyrite civilization. Later, Roman control of Egypt and the 
canal, and the resulting further increase in shipping, sharply 
accelerated the decline of the Himyrites. The decline in 
trade encouraged the displacement of some of the South 
Arabians to Syria, Iraq, and Abyssinia (Ethiopia). In 
Islamic literature this displacement is associated with the 
breaking up of the Ma'rib Dam in Yemen, which is also a 
symbolic expression of the cumulation of a long process of 
decline. The Abyssinians came to rule al-Yaman in 525 A.D., 
but they were ousted fifty years later. They built their 
capital at San'a which still continues its administrative 
function today.
^Ibid., p. 49
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With the birth o£ Islam in the seventh century, the 
center of historical interest moves north to ai-Hijaz from 
al-Yaman. Unlike the South Arabians, the North Arabians, 
including the Hijazis of al-Hijaz, and the Nejdis of Nejd in 
Central Arabia, were nomadic. They spoke Arabic and developed 
the script used in the Koran. These North Arabians first 
became prominent around 500 B.C. The Nabataeans were the 
first of them to establish a kingdom. It stretched from 
Aqaba in the south to Damascus in the north by the first 
century A.D. In this period their capital city, Petra, gained 
commercial supremacy over much of Arabia. The development of 
Petra is attributed in part to its strategic setting, for it 
is encircled on all sides by precipitous cliffs with only a 
narrow winding entrance through them. For early travelers, 
it was the only spot between Jordan and South Arabia with 
plenty of pure water. Most important of all, Petra's promi­
nence relates to the patronage given it by the Romans.
Before attaining its supremacy, it had been one of the links 
on the commercial route established by the Sabaeans and 
Himyrites. The gradual shifting of the east-west caravan 
trade to a more northerly route, and the north-south trade to 
a more easterly path (corresponding approximately with the 
present Hijaz Railway route), and the Persian conquest of 
Mesopotamia all contributed to the decline of Petra and the
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Nabataean state.^ The new conditions favored the more 
northerly situated town of Palmyra which next assumed promi­
nence .
The Kingdom of Palmyra, established in the Syrian 
Desert to the north of the Arabian Peninsula, rose to its 
height between 130 A.D. and 270 A.D. The city of Palmyra was 
favored with an abundant supply of water and served as a 
connecting poinc for east-west trade as well as the north- 
south trade with South Arabia. The city flourished under 
Roman vassaldom, but circumstances led to an uprising of the 
residents against the Romans in 270 A.D. The Romans then 
destroyed Palmyra, leaving it in complete ruins.
With the fall of Palmyra, Busra in Hawran and other
2
Ghassanid towns became prominent. The Ghassanids claimed to 
be descendants of the South Arabians who had fled al-Yaman 
at the breaking up of the Ma'rib Dam. According to Hitti, 
their capital at first was a movable camp, but may later have 
become fixed at al-Jabiyah in the Jawtan, and for some time 
was located at Jilliq.^ The Ghassanid Kingdom had its 
relative (of South Arabian origin) and rival in al-Hirah, the 
Kingdom of the Lakhmids. Both attained their greatest 
importance during the sixth century A.D.
Contemporary with and related to these two kingdoms 
was a third rival, the Kingdom of Kindah in Central Arabia. 
The Kindah Confederacy failed because it lacked inner
^Ibid. , p. 74. ^Ibid. , p. 78. ^Ibid.
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cohesion.^ Hitti makes the comment that "Kindah's rise is
interesting not only in itself but as the first attempt in
inner Arabia to unite a number of tribes around the central
2
authority of one common chief." By the sixth century 
Arabian tribes had developed a common language, Arabic, quite 
different from some of the tribal dialects, uniting the Arab 
tribes into a single tradition with a shared, orally- 
transmitted culture. To the development of the common 
language, the Kingdom of Kindah contributed significantly.^ 
During the second half of the sixth century, the 
Euphrates Valley-Persian Gulf route was rendered difficult by 
the constant warfare between the Byzantine and Persian empires 
The alternative route through the Nile Valley and Red Sea was 
also out of use because of disorder in Egypt.^ The main 
course of trade consequently reverted back to the old, 
difficult, but peaceful route from Syria through Western 
Arabia to the Kingdom of Yemen, Yemen itself, however, had 
fallen under foreign rule. The Kingdom of Palmyra and the 
Nabataean Kingdom retained only the glory of the past. This 
combination of circumstances created a very favorable condi­
tion for Mecca to become the new trade center in Arabia.
llbid., p. 96. ^Ibid.
^Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 31, 
4lbid., p. 33.
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It was in this milieu that the religion called Islam 
was founded by the Prophet Mohammed (570-632 A.D.) in the 
seventh century. The hostility of the Meccans to Mohammed's 
preaching, however, forced him to leave for Medina, a lesser 
town some 200 miles to the north. In Medina the Islamic 
movement transformed itself into a militant polity, and 
Medina became the first Islamic Arab state.^ Within a short 
period of time the Northern Arabs under the banner of Islam-- 
almost at once a symbol of Arab unity and victory, according 
to Bernard Lewis --carried out their remarkable conquest. In 
the last and the final phase of the great Semitic migrations, 
they extended their control to the Atlantic in the west and 
to the Desert of Sind and the Indus Valley in the east 
(Figure 3).^
Internal organization of the expanding Islamic Arab 
Empire was enormously handicapped by distance and weak 
communications. In 660 A.D. Damascus in Syria was made the 
capital of the Arab Empire by the Umayyad dynasty. The 
geographical limit of the Empire grew until 732 A.D. when 
Christian forces, marshalled by Charles Martel, defeated the 
"Moors" at Tours in what is widely regarded as one of the 
great turning points of Western history. In 750 A.D. the
^Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 117 
^Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 56.
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Abbas id dynasty took control of the Arab Empire and moved the 
capital to Baghdad on the Tigris River.
By 756 A.D., however, the Arab Empire had already 
started to disintegrate with the establishment of a separate 
Umayyad Caliphate at Cordoba in Spain (Figure 4).^ Within 
the Empire, the Ismailites organized themselves into what was 
essentially an independent political state in Yemen as early 
as 760 A.D. In Morocco an independent kingdom was established 
by the Idrisids in 788 A.D. In the year 909 A.D. the Fatimid 
Caliphate in Egypt was established as a direct challenge to 
the Abbasids in Baghdad.
By the sixteenth century, virtually the whole of the 
Arab World was under the rule of the Ottoman Turks (Figure 5). 
Expressions of Arab nationalism during the Ottoman period are 
discussed in chapter iii. Long before the Ottoman Empire 
disintegrated in 1918, some of the Western powers, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy, had established large colonies in 
the Arab domains of North Africa. After 1918 the former 
Arab province of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was 
divided among the colonial powers under the League of Nations 
mandate system.
The Arab Empire after 756 A.D. never again was able to 
achieve unification. Although the Arabs as a people failed to
The title of "caliph" (variously spelled calif, 
kalif, kaliph, and khalif) was used by Mohammed's successors 
for the secular and religious head of Islam. The domain 
under the caliph's control was the caliphate.
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sustain their political unity, the process of Arabization and 
the expansion of the Arab World was a great cultural triumph 
which today has evolved into an Arab nation striving for 
statehood.
Political Divisions of the Contemporary 
Arab World
The vast area now inhabited by the Arab nation is 
often designated by geographers and other scholars as the 
Arab World. According to the Arab League's booklet, The 
League of Arab States: A Hope Fulfilled, the Arab nation
"extends from Casablanca on the Atlantic Ocean in the West 
to Basra on the Arab Gulf [Persian Gulf] in the East and from 
the Mediterranean Sea and the upper reaches of the Euphrates 
in the North to Central Africa and the Indian Ocean on the 
S o u t h . A s  so delimited, the Arab nation occupies an area 
of 4,869,518 square miles and has a total population of about 
110 million.2 Twenty-four different divisions characterize 
the contemporary political landscape (Figure 6).^ All of
^  ^  ^  ^  1  ^ ^  ^  ^  ^  A mm ^  T ^  ^  ^  m Im J  m m ^  ^  mm ^  Jt ^  m .m
(AA V  XJl&w X  Civao SJ. X l i  U I X O  i~VX CLU <rviiXC.il U C W C X U ^ C U .  V  Li L. L/X
^The Arab League, The League of Arab States: A Hope
Fulfilled (October, 1962), p . T~.
The figures have been compiled from the Statesman's 
Yearbook 1970-71 (London: Macmillan and Company, St. Martin's
PTiss: T?70).---
^These are Algeria, the states included in the 
Federation of Arab Republics (Egypt [the United Arab Republic], 
Libya, and Syria), the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
the Sultanate of Oman [formerly Muscat and Oman], and the 
Trucial States [Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras
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the Alexandria Protocol of 1944.  ^ Membership in the League, 
a loose-knit consultative body formed during the stressful 
period of World War II, has been considerably expanded 
during the past two years. Qatar, Bahrain, and the Sultanate 
of Oman all took membership in the League in the latter part 
of 1971, although still under British protectorship at the 
time. In December of the same year, six of the seven Trucial 
States, all except Ras al-Khaimah, formed a new confederation 
called the Union of Arab Emirates and joined the League. Ras 
al-Khaimah took membership in the Union and the League a few 
weeks later, in February, 1972.
Not only is the Arab World presently divided into 
several independent political entities, but it is also 
characterized by a variety of forms of government. Broadly, 
the Arab countries can be divided into two groups, the 
republican states and the monarchial states, the latter group 
including kingdoms, sultanates, shiekhdoms, and emirates. 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, the United Arab Republic, the Sudan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and South Yemen are all repub­
lics, while Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and all the Gulf 
States political units are monarchies.
al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain]j, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(South Yemen), the Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the 
Sudan, and Tunisia.
^The Arab League is the organization of the independ­
ent Arab states.
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Algeria has a constitutional government with a 
national assembly whose members are all nominated by a single 
political party, the National Liberation Front. In the Arab 
Republic of Egypt an organization called the Socialist Arab 
Union, generally headed by the national president, governs 
the country. South Yemen is also governed by one political 
party, the National Liberation Front, through a five-man 
Presidential Council. Similarly, Yemen is governed through a 
top leadership of three men comprising the Republican Council. 
Tunisia is governed by the only political party in the country, 
the Neo-Destour Party. Similarly Iraq and Syria are ruled by 
one party, the Ba'th Party, with in each case some support 
from the army. Libya and the Sudan are each currently 
governed by a revolutionary council dominated by military 
personages. Jordan and Morocco are constitutional monarchies 
in which ultimate authority is retained by the king, and 
Saudi Arabia is governed by a traditional monarch with 
absolute power. Only Lebanon can be termed truly democratic 
with a responsible and effective parliament. Kuwait, a 
sheikhdom, seems to be heading towards a parliamentary system 
of government. Apart from Kuwait, all of the Gulf States, 
including the Sultanate of Oman, arc governed by traditional 
monarchial systems.
The republican Arab states generally have three 
things in common, a one-party system, a socialist ideology, 
and a strong feeling of Arab nationalism. The degree of
47
commitment to socialism, however, as well as the intensity of 
the nationalist feeling, may vary from one country to another, 
The monarchial states, other than the Sheikhdom of Kuwait, 
are all traditional and ultraconservative in outlook. These 
states are anti-republican and anti-socialist. Within them, 
insofar as it can be judged, the sense of participation in a 
greater Arab nationalism is either non-existent, as in some 
of the smaller Gulf States, or very slight as in the case of 
Saudi Arabia.
No political unit in the Arab World, with the excep­
tion of the island state of Bahrein, enjoys the security or 
the convenience of natural boundaries.^ Over much of the 
Arabian Peninsula the boundaries have never been demarcated 
to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned (i.e., 
the boundaries between Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and South Yemen).
To use Jean Gottmann's term, the development of the iconog-
2
raphy of the Arab countries is still in a fluid state. No 
deep identification with any particular regional iconography 
has taken place. A brief discussion of symbolism as seen in 
Arab flags is included in chapter vi.
^Stephen H. Longrigg, The Middle East: A Social
Geography (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1Ô70), p. 13.
^Gottmann, "The Political Partitioning of Our World," 
pp. 512-519, Professor Gottmann applies the term iconography 
to all those visible, oral, or written symbols (flags, songs, 
mottoes, etc.) which reflect the national feeling of a people,
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Physical Diversity in the Arab World 
The Arab World, which extends approximately 3,000 
miles from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, across one huge 
continent and part of another, naturally exhibits a wide 
variety of physical environment. Broadly, three different 
types of environment can be recognized: (1) desert and semi-
desert, (2) fertile river valley, and (3) seasonally humid 
with dry summers.'
The desert is the single most important physical- 
geographic influence in the Arab World. With the exception of 
Lebanon, there is not a single country which does not share 
this desert environment, and several are totally dominated 
by it. West of the Nile is the Sahara, shared by Egypt, the 
Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. East of the Nile 
lies the Sinai Desert and the Arabian deserts of Nefud and of 
Rub al-Khali, the "Empty Quarter," shared by Saudi Arabia, the 
Gulf States, South Yemen, and Yemen. Between Damascus, Amman, 
and Baghdad lies the Syrian Desert. The nomadic Bedouin 
culture, which has traditionally existed and continues to 
survive to some extent from Morocco to Iraq, is a traditional 
human response to this desert environment.
The Nile River in Egypt and the Tigris-Euphrates in 
Iraq, with their abundant year-round supply of water, have 
turned these two great basins in the desert into cradles of 
early civilization and regionally prominent agricultural 
development. The irrigation environment with its sedentary
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culture contrasts sharply with the desert life style of 
nomadism. Regular contact between the two, either by trade 
or by war, has been part of the long history of the Arab 
World. The ancestors of many of the people now settled in 
the irrigated lands were once nomads themselves.^
Most of the dry subtropical, or Mediterranean, 
climate regions in the Arab World are found along or near the 
coast. These humid to semiarid coastal tracts, generally 
narrow in extent, are present in Morocco, Algeria, Northern 
Tunisia, sections of Northern Libya, Lebanon, and Syria. In 
these areas the climatic regime is Mediterranean, with hot, 
dry summers and mild, somewhat rainy winters. Other rain- 
favored lands exist in limited areas of higher elevation 
such as the Asir Plateau of Yemen, parts of the Hadramaut, the 
Green Mountains or Jabal al-Akhdar in the Sultanate of Oman, 
the Imatong Mountains in the Southern Sudan, the Kurdistan 
Mountains of Iraq, and the Jebel el-Ansariye in Syria.
Overall, the vast empty spaces of desert contrast 
sharply with the green and densely-populated basins of the 
Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, the narrow but fertile coastal 
areas, and the occasional scattered oases. Everywhere there 
is a strong contrast in population density between the
For a broad-gauge study of nomadism as a social 
phenomenon, sec Douglas L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism: 
A Comparative Study of Pastoral Migration in Southwestern 
Asia and Northern Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago,
Department of Geography, Research Paper 118, 1969).
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intensive tillage areas and the regions of nomadic herding.
In some of the Arab countries (cf. Morocco, Syria, and Yemen) 
the extent of highlands is such as to modify the temperature, 
precipitation, and vegetation patterns for some millions of 
people, but over most of the Arab World heat and aridity 
are the overriding physical characteristics. Even with some 
contrast in their climatic environments, a strong sense of 
the desert predominates throughout the Arab lands. The 
enormous expanses of desert between the populated areas act 
as barriers to movement and obstacles to the political unity 
of the Arab nation. Only the massive application of capital 
and technology in such areas as transportation and communica­
tions can overcome these barriers.
CHAPTER III 
THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB NATION-STATE
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origin 
and development through time of the idea of one Arab nation­
state, with particular attention to the disconformity between 
the political action area and the political area of the unity 
idea as those terms are used in chapter i. Every government, 
even every law, has a definite area of operation. If a 
government fails to function effectively within a defined 
territory, it is termed a failure. The area defined here as 
that of the one Arab nation-state idea is the whole Arab 
World, but due to a number of reasons the idea’s actual field 
of operation has been limited. (1) There was controversy 
about the geographical extent of the Arab nation from the very 
beginning of the unity idea until 1945. (2) The Arab movement 
for unification has not reached to the whole of the Arab 
World (Figure 7). (3) There are non-Arab nationals in geo­
graphically concentrated locations, such as the Kurds in 
Iraq, the Southern Sudanese in the Sudan, and the non-Arabized 
Berbers in the mountain pockets of Morocco and Tunisia.
(4) The Jews of the Arab World, now largely concentrated in 
the coastal enclave state of Israel, obviously have no
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interest in a Pan-Arab movement. (5) Among the people in all 
of the Arabian Peninsula, except perhaps in Kuwait and South 
Yemen, a strong feeling for the Pan-Arab idea is lacking.
(6) Lastly, the peoples of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, 
although predominantly Arab, have never markedly identified 
with the idea.
Origin of the Idea
The Arab Empire created by the Umayyads after the 
death of Mohammed (632 A.D.) reached its geographical limit 
in 732 A.D. The Empire retained its political unity only 
until 750 A.D. In that year the Abbasids captured the cal­
iphate, moved their capital from Damascus to Baghdad, and 
sowed the first seed of political disintegration. In 
756 A.D. a survivor of the Umayyad family established an 
independent caliphate at Cordoba in Spain. This secession 
was later followed by that of several other areas, shattering 
the brief political unity of the early Arab Empire.
With the reawakening of Arab nationalism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new movement 
found a basis for its unity idea in the former short-lived 
Arab Empire. Revival of the Pan-Arabic movement seemed 
feasible because the early political disintegration was not 
accompanied by much cultural disintegration. On the contrary, 
the process of cultural unification, or Arabization, continued 
in spite of the political disunity of the Arab World. This
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process of Arabization by the end of the nineteenth century
had successfully transformed nearly all of the population of
the present-day Arab states into one cultural group. They
were Arabs speaking the Arabic tongue. The reawakening of
the Arabs as a nation was accompanied by tremendous pride in
past Arab glory and a nostalgic desire for a modern version of
the old Arab Empire--one Arab nation-state.
Arab nationalist writers began to promote the idea that
the Arab people are the primary political entity, and that
since the Arabs are a nation they must therefore become a
state.1 Négib Azoury published his idea of one Arab state
in 1905 in Paris. There are traces of the Pan-Arab idea in
the manifesto written by members of the Decentralization
Party and disseminated from Cairo at the beginning of World 
2
War I. A statement by the Arab National Congress in 1931 
asserts that "the primary objective of (this cause) is to 
achieve unity and independence of Arabs. . . . "  In a speech 
in 1938 Amin al-Rihani called on all Arabs to practice
^Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 36.
For the text of the manifesto, entitled "Announcement 
to the Arabs, Sons of Qahtan," see Haim (ed.), Arab Nation­
alism, pp. 83-88, presenting an English translation of Ahmad 
Izzat al-Azami, al-qadiyya al-arabiyya (The Arab Question), IV 
Baghdad, 1932), pp. 108-117.
^Document Number 3, "Statement by the Arab National 
Congress, Jerusalem," (December 13, 1931), in Muhammad Khalil, 
The Arab States and the Arab League : A Documentary Record,
Vol. m  International Affairs (Éeirut: Khayats, 1962),
p. 8.
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"Arabism before and above everything.”  ^ Edmond Rabbath of
Aleppo in 1937 wrote; We must make [the Arab race] a founda-
2
tion of the State and glory on it.” The concept of one Arab 
nation-state found easy acceptance among many Arab national­
ists, but the controversy over what constituted the Arab 
nation's territory was a long time in being resolved. For a 
considerable time the idea was relevant only to its cradle or 
cultural hearth, namely, the Fertile Crescent in the eastern 
part of the Arab World.^
Development of the Idea 
The military conquest by the Arabs in the seventh 
and eighth centuries was accompanied by a combined process 
of Islamization and Arabization. The religion known as Islam 
was originally designed by the Prophet as a national faith for 
the Arabs. The new faith did succeed in exalting national 
unity among the Arabs who, although already somewhat conscious 
of their common ties of origin and language, were still 
utterly disorganized and recalcitrant to every move toward 
political unity.4 Later, as Islam spread over both Arab and
^Haim (ed,), Arab Nationalism, p. 36, quoting 
al-Qaumiyyat (Essays on l^ational Questions) (Beirut, 1956), 
IÏ7 p T60'. ---- ^ ^ --------
2Ibid., p. 37, quoting Edmond Rabbath, Unité 
syrienne et devenir arabe (Paris, 1937), p. 43.
^Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 62.
^Francesco Gabrieli, The Arab Revival (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. TGI
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non-Arab lands, it modified its national character to a more 
universal one. With this change there developed a basic 
contradiction between Arab pride and the sense of Islamic 
universalism. The supra-national spirit of Islam naturally 
had its strongest appeal among the non-Arabs within the Arab 
Empire, but it was shared by many Arabs too.^
As described earlier, a struggle developed between 
Umayyads and Abbasids, both equally Arab, but there was a 
difference in that the latter had the support of some non- 
Arab elements. The Abbasids came out on top in the power 
struggle. This victory marked the beginning of the decline 
of unified Arab political leadership and eventually led to 
the breakup of the Arab Empire. In the Abbasid Period 
(750-1258) the emphasis was definitely on religious and 
cultural hegemony rather than political unity.^ As a conse­
quence, in spite of the political decline, there was a 
tremendous Arab cultural upsurge during this period. In 
spite of the cultural triumph of the Arabs, the Abbasid 
Period seems tc have been marked by a decline in Arab 
national pride, for the rising universal Islam bluntly 
condemned local pride,^ Emphasizing the universal character 
of Islam, non-Arabs found acceptance as political leaders so 
long as they were devotees of the Islamic faith. This empha­
sis made possible the growing power of the Turks who finally
^Ibid., p. 12. ^Ibid., p. 14. ^Ibid.
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gained control of virtually all of the Arab Empire. It 
likewise facilitated the extension of the Islamic faith to 
broad areas in South and Southeast Asia and to a number of 
cultural communities beyond the Sahara in Africa.
The historian George Kirk states that under the
continued erosion of Arab pride, which lasted until the late
nineteenth century,
the idea of nationality was unknown; all were subjects 
of the Padishah, but no one thought of himself as belong­
ing to a Syrian or an Iraqi, still less an Arab nation. 
Instead men were distinguished by their millet, or by the 
town of their origin: as Sunni Moslem, Orthodox, Jew,
Druze, Armenian or Shi'i; as Baghdadi, Halabi (Aleppine), 
Shami (Damascene), or Misri (Cairene).1
The First Attempt--Search for an Arab Empire
Although the real drive for one Arab nation-state 
did not develop much vigor until the early twentieth century, 
Muhammad Ali's^ attempt to unify all the Arabs in the Middle 
East under his rule in the nineteenth century could perhaps 
be termed the first modern effort to achieve an Arab nation­
state. Muhammad Ali was not an Arab, but an Albanian- 
Egyptian, and he could not even speak the Arabic language. 
Thus the attempt by him and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to create 
an Arab Empire is not regarded by historians as truly
^George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, l964), p. 99.
Muhammad Ali, born in Macedonia, was a young 
Albanian officer in the Turkish army. He was made Pasha of 
Egypt in 1805 and retained power there until his death in 
1849.
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nationalistic in its nature.^ His driving motive in subduing 
the Wahhabis of Central Arabia and in his diplomatic intrigues 
with France is now interpreted as personal ambition, and his 
desire to revive the Arab Empire is viewed primarily as a 
desire to acquire a larger family domain. Whatever Muhammad 
Ali’s motives were, some of his successes can be attributed 
to the rudimentary existence of an Arab nation and to surviv­
ing memories of a great Arab Empire. Had his efforts been 
successful, a real Arab nation-state might have come into 
existence one hundred fifty years ago. According to the 
British Consul-General at Alexandria, writing in January 
1832, the plan of Muhammad Ali was as follows:
His immediate object is to establish his authority firmly 
in the Pashaliks of Acre and Damascus; after which to 
extend his domain to Aleppo and Baghdad, throughout the 
provinces, where Arabic is the language of the people, 
which he calls the Arabian part of the Empire.2
The plan failed to materialize mainly because of two factors,
the low level of national consciousness among the Arab masses
and British opposition. By Muhammad Ali's time, the unifying
spirit of Islam, the perennial sustainer of political passion
among Arabs, had been worn away by the division of the faith
into several opposing sects. Arabs had yet to realize
Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 3; Antonius, The 
Arab Awakening, p. 27; and Kirk, A Short History of the Middle 
East, p~ 09.
^Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 25, quoting Public 
Record Office, F. Ol 7Ô/218.
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themselves as a nation.; and the idea of one Arab nation-state 
subsided until almost the beginning of the twentieth century.
The First Publication Proposing an Arab State
The concept of one Arab nation-state as an ideology 
and as a force in Arab politics is primarily, then, a recent 
development. In the modern period, the potentiality for one 
Arab nation-state was hardly conceived before the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Not until after the First World 
War did the real drive begin to constitute one Arab state out 
of all the Arabs.
According to Sylvia Haim, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi 
(1849-1902), writing in the late nineteenth century, was the 
intellectual precursor of modern secular Pan-Arabism and the 
first to declare himself without ambiguity as the champion of 
the Arabs against the Turks. Concerning Kawakibi, Haim 
writes: "In his praise of Arabs there were no half tones:
the Arabs were better people than the Turks and ought to have 
the primacy."^ This was a clear break from earlier times 
when national pride was bluntly condemned in favor of Islamic 
universality. Kawakibi went as far as to suggest an Arab 
Caliphate but not quite so far as to propose an Arab Empire. 
He made a clear argument for the role of the Caliph as a 
spiritual head, devoid of political power. Kawakibi is even 
supposed to have taken a long journey on behalf of the
^Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 27.
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Khedive of Egypt, exploring the possibility of establishing
the Khedive as the temporal head of the Arab Empire.
Marmaduke Pickthall reported in 1914:
In the year 1894-1896, I was in Syria "living native," as 
the English call it. I can remember hearing Muslim Arabs 
talking more than once of what would happen on the down­
fall of the Turks. They looked to Egypt, remembering the 
conquest of Mahmet Ali, and the gospel of an Arab Empire 
under the Lord of Egypt which Ibrahim Pasha preached in 
Palestine and Syria. That gospel, I gathered, was still 
being preached in secret by missionaries from Egypt. . . .
I gathered then and subsequently that the Sherif of Mecca 
was to be the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm . 
of El Eslam, the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head. . . .
The Pickthall report clearly shows that the idea of one Arab
Empire propounded earlier by Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim
Pasha had survived at least among some of the more politically
conscious Arabs.
The idea of al-Kawakibi was given more precision by 
Négib Azoury (Najib al-Azuri), writing in 1905.  ^ He went 
further than al-Kawakibi by proposing for the first time in 
modern history an Arab Empire "stretching from the Tigris and 
the Euphrates to the Suez Isthmus, and from the Mediterranean
7
to the Arabian S e a . A z o u r y ,  it should be noted, excluded 
Egypt from his proposed Arab Empire. He reasoned that
^Ibid., p. 28, citing The New Age [London), November 
5, 1914, pTT.
7
Négib Azoury, Le Réveil de la nation arabe dans 
l'asie turque en présence des intérêts et des rivalité"des 
puissances étrangères, de la curie romaine et du patriarcat 
oecuménique (Paris, IpOS), pp. 245-247, presented in English 
translation by Haim (éd.), Arab Nationalism, pp. 81-82.
^Ibid.
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Egyptians are not really Arabs, and that Egypt is separated 
from the true Arab World by the natural frontier of the Suez 
Isthmus. According to Azoury's plan there would be a reli­
gious Caliph for the whole of Islam who would also rule over 
an independent political state including "the whole of the 
actual vilayet of Hijaz, with the town and the territory of 
Medina, as far as A q a b a . T h e  religious Caliph would have 
moral authority over all the Islamic people of the world. 
Another and larger political area including the territories 
of Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, and the rest of the Saudi 
Arabian Peninsula (except for an autonomous Lebanon) was 
proposed by Azoury as another Arab state.
The Azoury book has been called the first publication 
proposing the idea of one Arab nation-state. Had Azoury's 
idea been carried out, however, it would have resulted in two 
politically independent states instead of one. Furthermore, 
Egypt was excluded as non-Arab, and so were all the other 
countries of North Africa. The exclusion of the North Afri­
can Arab regions was a clear indication of the state of Arab 
consciousness at that time. The Arabs as a larger nation had 
not yet awakened, and the frontiers of the Arab nation were 
still undefined. Even within the confined area of Azoury's 
proposed Arab Empire, the consciousness of the Arab masses 
and their desire for a truly Arab nation-state could hardly be
llbid,
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taken as pervasive or emotionally profound. On the contrary, 
the idea was still largely confined to a few members of the 
intellectual class. The contradictions and limitations evi­
dent in Azoury's scheme have hampered the idea of one Arab 
nation-state for a long time.
Pan-Arab Societies and Organizations in the 
Early Twentieth Century
The early years of the twentieth century were 
characterized by several Arab efforts to organize and popu­
larize the ideas of Arab nationalism through creating special 
societies for that purpose. The Young Turks' Revolution of 
1908, which ended the despotic rule of Abdul-Hamid, Sultan of 
the Ottoman Empire, was instrumental in the organization of 
some of these Arab societies. For instance, the Young Turks 
helped to form a society called al-Alkh' al-Arabi al-Uthman 
(the Ottoman Arab Fraternity), whose purposes were to promote 
the welfare of the Arab provinces, to spread education in the 
Arabic tongue, and to preserve Arab customs. This society 
aroused tlie hopes of Arabs for greater freedom and autonomy. 
Only eight months after its formation, however, it was dis­
solved to the utter disappointment of participating Arab 
nationalists. During the latter months of 1909 al-Muntada 
al-Adabi (the Literary Club) was founded in Constantinople.
Its objective was limited to providing a meeting place for 
Arab visitors, but it exerted a good deal of political 
influence as a recognized intermediary in negotiations between
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the Arabs and the Young Turks.^ Toward the end of 1912 another 
society was founded in Cairo, this one under the name of the 
Ottoman Decentralization Party. Its objective, as the name 
suggests, was the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and 
the mobilization of Arab support for this decentralization.
This open-membership society exerted continuous pressure over 
a period of years for greater public recognition of Arab 
cultural and political identity. Meanwhile, two secret 
societies came into being, one towards the end of 1909 called 
al-Qahtaniya,^ another called al-Fatat^ founded in Paris in 
1911. The goal of al-Qahtaniya was to turn the Ottoman 
Empire into a dual monarchy.^ The Arab provinces were to 
form a single kingdom with its own parliament and local gov­
ernment and with Arabic as its lingua franca. The kingdom 
was to be a part of a Turco-Arabic Empire similar to the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman Sultan in Constantino­
ple would wear, in addition to the Turkish crown, the crown of 
the Arabs. The society died of willful neglect after a 
year’s existence.^ The objective of al-Fatat was to regain
^Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 108.
2
This society was named after Qahtan, one of the 
legendary ancestors of the Arab race.
^The full name is Jam’iyat al-Arabiya al-Fatat, mean­
ing The Young Arab Society.
^Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 110.
^Ibid., p. 111.
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independence for all the Arab countries from any alien 
domination, Turkish or otherwise.
The Abortive Attempt to Create One Arab State 
after World War I
The First World War provided a favorable opportunity 
for Arab nationalists to take advantage of the situation.
It was in the interest of Britain to keep the routes to India
open and free from Ottoman interference. To achieve this
objective, the British Government saw an opportunity to
encourage the Arabs to break with Turkey and form an autono­
mous state, or chain of states, friendly to Great Britain and 
extending all the way from the Mediterranean seaboard in the 
west to the Persian frontier in the east. Such an Anglo-Arab 
line, it was felt, could check the Turko-German advance in 
the direction of the Persian Gulf. The interests of the 
British were, on the surface, entirely compatible with the 
Arab nationalists’ desire to create an independent Arab state, 
although Britain was still secretly hoping to gain colonial 
control of them. Tlic wartime situation, with Turkey an ally 
of Germany and the Hapsburg Empire, encouraged Husain, the 
Sherif of Mecca, to attempt, with the help of his sons, to 
end Turkish domination and bring about the fulfillment of 
the Arab nationalists’ desire. Consequently, King Husain 
submitted to Britain a proposal which was drawn up jointly by 
al-Fatat and al-Ahd (the Arab Military Officers’ Organization),
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stating the conditions under which they would cooperate with
Britain. The conditions were the following:
The recognition by Great Britain of the independence 
of the Arab countries lying within the following fron­
tiers :
North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37°N and thence
along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat 
(Ibn’Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden
whose status was to be maintained);
West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to
Mersin.
The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted 
to foreigners under the capitulations.
The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great 
Britain and the future independent Arab state.1
The above proposal was accepted by Britain with some
reservations, and the government pledged its support in
O
establishing an independent Arab state. With the British 
pledge on hand, Husain led the famous Arab Revolt of June, 
1916. On the second of November, Husain proclaimed himself 
the King of the Arab countries. By 1917 Ottoman control in 
the Arab regions had broken down completely. The Pan-Arab 
dream of one independent Arab state seemed to be coming true, 
but a rude awakening came at the end of World War I with the
"The McMahon Correspondence: The Sharif Husain's
First Note to Sir Henry McMahon, Mecca, July 14, 1915," in 
Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 414-415. This is a 
translation by Antonius of the original Arabic text which was
lent to him by the late King Faisal.
The British expressed an objection to the inclusion 
of the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and to portions 
of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns,
Hama, and Aleppo. In the exchange Husain gave up on the
districts of Mersin and Adana as not being purely Arab, but 
stood fast on other areas objected to by Britain.
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disclosure of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain, 
France, and Russia. The agreement was a scheme to divide the 
lands formerly under Ottoman control. According to the 
agreement, most of the Arab lands were to be divided between 
Britain and France (Figure 8). The spheres earmarked for 
Russia fell outside the regions peopled by Arabs. The actual 
division of the Arab lands, similar to the scheme devised in 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was imposed forcefully upon the 
Arabs in 1920 by Britain and France under the mandate system. 
The arrangement was later approved by the League of Nations 
in 1923 (Figure 9).
In the struggle for independence from the Turks, 
Husain's son, Emir Faisal, was one of the most active leaders 
In a memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference on 
January 1, 1919, Faisal wrote, in support of his father's 
demand for independence, that "the country from a line 
Alexandretta-Persia, southward to the Indian Ocean is inhab­
ited by 'Arabs'--by which we mean people of closely related 
Semitic stocks, all speaking the one language Arabic. . . . "  
He further added that "the aim of the Arab nationalist move­
ment . . .  is to unite the Arabs eventually into one 
nation[-state]."^
Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the 
Emergence of Arab NationaTTsm (Beirut, Lebanon: KChayats,
19Ü8J, p. 125, quoting "Document 250" in D. H. Miller,
My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris, 1918-1919 (New
York", i5'2-4),™nr;- pp. 297-299.-------------- ------------
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It is clear from the above discussion that both 
Husain and Faisal were assuming the existence of the Arab 
nation and asserting its right to statehood. However, their 
concept of the boundaries of the Arab nation was far smaller 
than the reality. The demand made by Husain and Faisal on 
behalf of the Arab nation in fact was confined to the Fertile 
Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula (Figure 10).
Perceptions of the Extent of the Arab Nation
The ease with which the Allied Powers succeeded in 
dividing the Arabs into several political units after the 
First World War demonstrated the lack of strength and organi­
zation among the Arab nationalists. Haim notes that "it was 
not until the 1930's that a serious attempt was made to 
define the meaning of Arab nationalism and what constitutes 
the Arab nation."^ Outlining the extent of the Arab nation 
naturally brought with it the problem of defining its fron­
tiers. In referring to the confusion of the 1930's and 1940's, 
Nutting wrote concerning the Arab frontiers: "People even
argued as to what constituted the frontiers of the Arab 
nation, let alone which of its constituent countries should 
be the leader."^
In 1931 the first Arab National Congress, held in 
Jerusalem, showed some realization that all the North African
^Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 35. 
^Nutting, The Arabs, p. 402.
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states were also an integral part of the Arab nation. A 
statement by that Arab National Congress proclaims that the 
Arab nation is "no less than 70 million people and situated 
in the world's most favored regions of Asia and Africa.^ 
Although the statement does not spell out clearly the exact 
areas involved, the 1931 Congress semms to have made the first 
attempt to include the North African Arab states in the 
national movement of the Arabs. In the covenant adopted by 
the Arab Congress the first article states: "The Arab
countries constitute an indivisible unit; the (Arab) nation
does not acquiesce in any sense to the fragmentation which it
2
has been undergoing." According to the published statement, 
the primary objective of the Arabs was to be the achievement 
of the unity and independence of all the Arab states. This 
statement, however, did not end the confusion as to what 
areas constituted the Arab nation. Neither did a coordinated 
movement for political unity and independence emerge from the 
Congress and spread throughout the Arab nation.
For several more years, the perception of the Arab 
World remained a restricted one. As late as 1937, Amin 
al-Rihani, a noted Arab nationalist and thinker, expressed
Document Number 3, "Statement by the Arab National 
Congress, Jerusalem," (December 13, 1931), in Khalil, The 
Arab States and the Arab League, p. 8.
^Ibid.
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adherence to the same boundaries as had Sherif Husain.^
Shakib Arslan, another noted nationalist, in an address he
2
gave at Damascus in the same year, expressed a like opinion.
He envisaged an Arab union among Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Palestine, and Transjordan which the emirates of the Arabian 
Peninsula would eventually also join. About Egypt he said:
"We do not think she would hesitate to link herself with this 
great Arab nation, with firm military and economic links."
He further added: "Our unity [with North Africa] is no more
than religious, linguistic, cultural, and social."^ It was 
not until the 1940's that Sati' al-Husri, a noted nationalist 
and writer, since credited with being the man who popularized 
the idea of nationalism among the literate classes, undertook 
in his writing to drive home the points that (1) Egypt is 
part of the Arab nation, and (2) Pan-Arabism neither contra­
dicts nor is inimical to Islam.^ Sati' al-Husri did not, 
however, suggest that the other North African states were 
within the Arab nation.
Even with the unceasing efforts of ai-Husri, the 
conclusion that Egypt was part of the Arab nation was brought 
home very slowly, both to Egyptians and to other Arabs. In
^Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 45, citing Anis 
Sayegh. al-Fikra al-arabiyya ti Wisr (The Arab Idea in Egypt) 
(Beirut, T9-59); -p.'TS'J ----------
2
Ibid., citing Shakib Arslan, al-wahda al-arabiyya 
(Arab Unity) (Damascus, 1937).
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 43.
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the 1940's the attempts of Emir Abdullah, King of Transjordan, 
and Nuri al-Said, the Premier of Iraq, to create an independ­
ent Arab state still excluded Egypt and the other North 
African states. Their scheme was confined to the area of the 
Fertile Crescent.
It was early in the year 1943 that Nuri al-Said 
announced his Fertile Crescent Project, from which he excluded 
both the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. His reasons for exclu­
sion were expressed as follows:
The states of the Arabian Peninsula have an economic 
system which differs from our own, though they are very 
close to us in respect to language, customs, and reli­
gion. On the other hand, Egypt has a bigger population 
than that of backward states. It has also its (own) 
problems in the Sudan and elsewhere. Because of this, I 
have assumed that these states are not inclined to join 
an Arab Federation.!
According to Nuri al-Said's scheme, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
and Transjordan would be united into one Arab state called
Syria. An Arab League would be created immediately with Iraq
and Syria as a nucleus, while the other Arab states would be
free to join the League in the future if they wished.
Emir Abdullah, King of Transjordan, proposed two 
alternate arrangements, both somewhat similar to that of 
Nuri al-Said. His project was divided into two parts. First,
Document Number 4, "Nuri As-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent 
Project," (1943), in Khalil, p. 10, translating Nuri As-Sa'id, 
Istiqlal al-'Arab wa Wahdatuhum: Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyya
al-'Arabiyya (Arab Independence and Unity: Memorandum on the
Arab Cause; (Baghdad: Government Press, 1943), pp. 19-22.
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the Allied Powers should declare "the independence of Syria 
in its natural boundaries," and a unified Syrian state should 
be formed consisting of the territories of northern Syria, 
Transjordan, Palestine, and Lebanon.^ Next, immediately after 
the establishment of this unified Syrian state, an Arab 
federation should be created by merging Iraq and Syria, i.e., 
the whole of the Fertile Crescent, allowing other states to 
join the federation later if they wished. In case the pro­
posed unified state could not be achieved, the King's second 
proposal provided for the establishment of a Syrian federal 
state with Damascus as its capital.
In summary, the development of the idea of one Arab 
nation-state until late in World War II was limited geograph­
ically to the Fertile Crescent. The Arab nationalists who 
started the movement assumed that Arab nationhood should be 
transformed into Arab statehood, but their view of the extent 
of the Arab nation was a restricted one.
The Concepts of Nation and Nation-State 
in Arabic Terminology
The confusion that existed concerning the concept of 
an Arab nation can be judged by this quotation from Abd 
al-Latif Sharara who wrote in 1957:
Document Number 5, "Political Memorandum Concerning 
the Settlement of the Arab Question in General and the Syrian 
Question in Particular, Submitted to Amir Abdullah by a 
Number of Transjordanian Dignitaries," (Amman, March 6, 1943), 
in Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 13.
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There are four words which people confuse prodigiously 
when they talk of nationalities. These are: nation
(umma), fatherland (watan), people (sha'b), and state 
(daula). They frequently use the word "state" when they 
mean "nation" and talk of "fatherland" to signify "people" 
or speak of "people" when they intend the "nation," 
without distinction between the meaning of these vocables, 
or precise realization of what they denote, or a firm 
grounding in the differences among the respective con­
cepts . 1
Traditionally, the word umma had denoted the politico- 
religious community of Islam, but in contemporary usage it 
denoted the whole Arab nation and was completely secular in 
meaning. Arabs used to thinking of politics in terms of 
religious divisions were naturally confused and perplexed by 
the new concept of an Arab nation. Similarly, the use of 
quamiyya, loyalty to the whole Arab nation (i.e., Arab nation­
alism) , in contradistinction to wataniyya, attachment to 
fatherland, was equally perplexing to the Arab masses. The 
word quam had denoted "the unit--in Bedouin usage [the unit] 
to which one belongs and to which allegiance is owed specially 
in the time of war."^ The gradual change in the scope of the 
meaning of quam to encompass the whole Arab nation was
Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 227, presenting an 
English translation of Abd al-Latif Sharara, Fi'1-qaumiyya 
al-arabiyya (On Arab Nationalism) (Beirut, 1957), pjpl lO -16.
2
For a detailed discussion see Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam 
and the Theory of Arab Nationalism," The Middle East in 
Transition, ed. , Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1958), pp. 280-311.
^Ibid., p. 296.
76
difficult to grasp for people who in the past had never looked 
beyond tribal loyalty.
The Arab League--A First Step Toward Unity 
The pursuit of the Pan-Arab goal by Arab nationalists 
resulted in the creation of the Arab League on March 22, 1945. 
According to the pact of the League of Arab States, the pur­
pose of the new organization was the "strengthening of the 
relations between the member states; the coordination of 
their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them 
and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a 
general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab 
c o u n t r i e s . T h e  announced purpose fell far short of the hope 
of the Arab nationalists, that is, the political unification 
of the Arab countries.^ On the contrary, in Sayegh's words, 
"it consecrated the principle of state sovereignty and 
enthroned it. Nevertheless, the Arab League provided a 
forum for the discussion of Arab problems and, by enlarging 
its membership to include any independent state claiming to 
be Arab and desiring membership in the League, eliminated the
^Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (New 
York: The Arab Information Center,105S) , p. TÜ*!
Flic Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," 
The Middle Fast in Transition, ed., Walter Z. Laqueur (New 
York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 102.
^Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 109.
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controversy as to what constitutes the frontiers of the Arab 
nation.
The Ba’th Party and Modern Pan-Arabism 
The Ba'th Party emerged as an officially constituted 
political movement in Syria after the departure of the French 
in 1946. It was the first political party dedicated to 
bringing about the political unification of the entire Arab 
nation. The basic principle to which the Ba'th Party has 
continued to adhere is that, "the Arabs are one nation having 
a natural right to live in one state and to be free to direct 
its affairs.Therefore, the Ba'th Party considers that 
"the Arab homeland is an indivisible political and economic 
unity." The party resolves to keep its activities away from 
individual country policies, except when they affect the 
higher interests of the Arab nation. By so doing the party 
aims to free itself from petty state squabbles and to work on 
the unification of the whole Arab nation. In recent years, 
the Pan-Arabic coal of the Ba'th Partv to achieve comnre-
Document Number 155, "Constitution of the Arab 
Renaissance (Ba'th) Socialist Party," trans. Department of 
Political Studies and Public Administration, American Univer­
sity of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, in Muhammad Khalil, The Arab 
States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, VoTl Tl
Constitutional Developments (Beirut: Khayats, 1^62), p. 663.
^Ibid., p . 664.
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hensive Arab unity has become the goal of all the Arab 
nationalists.^ Even President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in spite of 
many specific disagreements with the Ba'th Party, once wrote 
in a letter to Husain, King of Jordan: "We believe in Arab
nationalism as a true and geniune current moving towards 
comprehensive Arab unity." However, except in Iraq and 
Syria, where it still holds power, the Ba'th Party has not 
been able to extend its organization. Although the ideology 
of the Ba'th movement is shared by many, the party itself 
seems unable to cross the boundaries of Syria and Iraq to 
other Arab countries. Nevertheless, its efforts have been 
the first attempt by a political party to build a unified 
movement throughout the lands of the Arab nation for the 
political unification of all Arabs, and it has succeeded at 
least in providing some ideological uniformity among a large 
number of Pan-Arab leaders.
Present Territorial Extent of the Idea 
As has been pointed out, membership in the Arab 
League does not mean that all the territories of the member 
countries can automatically be included within the political
Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of
Post-War Arab Politics, 194^-1958 [London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 15È.
J
Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the 
Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964),
^  20Ô, citing Al-Ahram, March 31, 1961.
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action area of the idea of a single Arab state. In fact, 
among the member states, only Egypt, Libya, and Syria are 
presently included in the political action area of the idea.
Egypt under the leadership of Nasser changed its 
name to the United Arab Republic and has been in the fore­
front of the Pan-Arab movement since the mid 1950's.
Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, changed the name of the
state to the Arab Republic of Egypt, but its new constitution
of 1971 remains firmly committed to the Pan-Arab goal. The 
constitution states: "The Egyptian people are part of the
Arab nation and strive to bring about its over-all unity.
The change in name seems to be merely an attempt to make it 
consistent with the new Federation of Arab Republics. Libya 
under the dynamic leadership of Muammar Ghadhafi, and with 
the confidence that comes from newly found oil wealth, has 
played a vital role in constituting the present political 
union of Egypt, Libya, and Syria.^ Since the beginning of 
his reign Ghadhafi has dissociated Libya from the Maghreb 
states on the grounds that a separate block of North African 
countries would be harmful to greater Arab unity. The Libyan 
constitution of 1969 declares Libya to be a democratic and
The Permanent Constitution of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt," trans. Peter B. Heller, in Albert P. Blaustein and 
Gisbert H. Flanz, (ed.). Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World, IV (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.,
TWT), p. 1.
^Arnold Hottinger, "Colonel Ghadhafi's Pan-Arab 
Ambitions," Review of Swiss World Affairs, XXI (June, 1971), 
pp. 22-24.
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free Arab Republic, whose objective is comprehensive Arab 
unity. The new Syrian constitution declares that, as a part 
of the Arab nation, Syria's continuing goal is the realiza­
tion of a wider Arab unity. The Ba'th political party which 
rules this country has as its specific objective the political 
unification of the whole Arab nation. The unity referendum 
taken in the Federation of Arab Republics in September, 1971, 
received an affirmative vote of 99.9 per cent in Egypt,
98.0 per cent in Libya, and 96.4 per cent in Syria. This 
degree of unanimity amply demonstrates that the territories 
of these three countries are the present political action 
area of the unity idea.
Iraq and the Sudan share a common problem in that 
each has within its boundaries areas inhabited by non-Arab 
nationalities to whom the idea of Pan-Arabism is irrelevant.
In Iraq the territory inhabited by the Kurds has long been an 
insurgent area demanding its own independence.^ Only recently, 
on March 11, 1972, it was reported that an agreement had been 
reached between the Iraqi government and the Kurds' Democratic
Kurdestan, the territory inhabited by the Kurds as a 
more or less homogeneous community constituting a majority of 
the population, is today divided among Iran, Turkey, Iraq, 
and Syria. In Syria, because of their small number, the 
Kurds do not present a problem. For a recent review of the 
Kurdish problem, see C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationals," 
Journal of Contemporary History, VI, No. 1 (1971), pp. 87- 
107. A more detailed out somewhat older survey of the Kurd­
ish situation is Dirk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdestan 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
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Party for a ceasefire, with the granting of some form of 
autonomous status for Kurdestan.^ The presence of a non-Arab 
Kurdish minority is regarded by Binder as Iraq's greatest 
obstacle to unity with other Arab states. In any case, the 
Iraqi state is ruled by the Ba'th Party, shares its ideology 
with Syria, and has a constitution which looks forward to a 
"comprehensive Arab unity," the stated goal of almost all 
the modern nationalists. Iraq can be said to have been first 
in its initiation of political Pan-Arabism after the First 
World War.^ Except for its Kurdish territory, then, Iraq 
lies within the political action area of the Arab unity idea, 
but since it is not included in the Federation of Arab 
Republics, it will be considered in this study as only a 
highly potential area of the idea.
It seems necessary at this point to clarify somewhat 
more the immediate circumstances associated with the forma­
tion of a three-way Arab union in 1970. On November 8, 1970, 
the heads of state of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan, all Arab 
socialist-nationalist countries, announced in Cairo their 
intent to form a federation. By the time the Federation of 
Arab Republics came into official existence on September 1, 
1971, the Sudan had dropped out of the projected plan. Syria,
^"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Spring, 
1972), p. 168.
p . 20.
3
^Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East,
Ibid., p. 270
8 2
however, had meanwhile decided to join the Federation with 
Egypt and Libya. The failure of the Sudan to join the Feder­
ation was a result of the violent opposition of the Sudanese 
Communist Party and the ongoing civil war between the Northern 
and the Southern Sudan. The internal conflict brought on a 
pro-Communist military coup in August, 1971, to be followed 
almost immediately by a counter-coup.^ The turmoil within the 
country has kept the Sudan, at least temporarily, out of 
the Federation. But the determination of the leadership of 
the government of Sudan to join the Federation of Arab 
Republics has not diminished. Al-Sayyad, one of Beirut's 
newspapers, on January 9, 1972, reported Ja'far Numeiri, the 
President of the Sudan, as saying that the Sudan's commitment 
to join the Federation "is absolute" but that it may take 
"several months, a year, several years."
It should be noted, however, that approximately the 
southern half of the Sudan is non-Arab, black, part Christian 
and part animistic in religion, in contrast to the lighter­
skinned Arab Moslem region in the north. The cultural and 
racial difference is significant enough that at times the 
Southern Sudanese have demanded independence from the North.
^Arnold Hottinger, "Numeiri's Changing Policies," 
Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXII (August, 1972), p. 17.
^"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Winter, 
1972), p. 42.
^Oliver Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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The struggle for independence by the Southern Sudanese 
resulted in a long and bloody civil war. The war was finally 
brought to an end by the signing of a peace agreement in 
Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, between the Southern Sudanese 
Liberation Front and the Sudanese Government on February 26, 
1972. The agreement provides for a Southern People's Council 
to govern regional matters while the central government is to 
handle national defense, foreign policy, trade, currency, 
transport, communication, and economic planning.^ Obviously, 
the idea of one Arab nation-state finds enthusiastic appeal 
in the North, but to the people of the South it looks like 
a plan which would bring increased Arab oppression.
Lebanon is an Arab state, but unlike any of the other 
Arab states, has a large Arab Christian population existing 
in a precarious balance with the Moslems. Because of the 
dual culture of its people, a special status of Mutesarrifate 
(autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire) was estab­
lished for Lebanon in 1861.  ^ After its detachment from the 
Ottoman Empire, Lebanon retained its special status under the 
French until the termination of the mandate in 1946 gave it
^"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Summer, 
1972), p. 303.
Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle 
East, p. 19.
^Kamal S. Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," Journal of 
Contemporary History, VI, No. 1 (1971), p. 86.
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independence. Many of the books and articles published about 
Lebanon have emphasized its uniqueness among the Arab states. 
In a recent article, Kamal Salibi argues that Lebanon contin­
ues to become more and more distinct as a Lebanese nation.^ 
His conclusion is at least debatable. It could be argued 
that the influx of many Palestinian Moslem refugees has made 
it more Arab rather than more Lebanese. Still, it can not 
be denied that Lebanon is unique, and all of the previous 
unification plans have acknowledged this fact. As an Arab 
state in the midst of other Arab countries, however, if 
political unification does come to the Fertile Crescent, 
Lebanon for economic reasons will most likely choose to be 
part of it. The growing popularity of secular Arab national­
ism enhances the probability that Lebanon will one day be 
incorporated into a greater Arab nation-state. Therefore, 
despite its special religious character, Lebanon is as much 
within the highly potential area of the Pan-Arab idea as 
is Iraq.
Jordan, like Lebanon, is a country in the Fertile 
Crescent whose constitution fails to express a commitment to 
the goal of Arab unity. But unlike Lebanon's constitution, 
which does not even mention the country as a part of the Arab 
nation, Jordan's constitution does so very strongly. In 
Jordan, where the majority of the residents are now
^Ibid.
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Palestinians, there is a highly politicized group of leaders 
whose cause is the general Arab cause, and for whom the sense 
of common bond with the Arab nation is very strong. Even 
before the influx of the Palestinian refugees, in the early 
and mid-1940's. King Abdullah, father of the present Jorda­
nian monarch, campaigned vigorously for the unity of Greater 
Syria. The greatest obstacle to political unification with 
the larger Arab nation-state comes from the present monarchial 
leadership, which is fearful of losing its throne and 
privileges.
The Arab states in the Arabian Peninsula, to the south 
of the Fertile Crescent, with a few exceptions, are charac­
terized by a lack of written constitutions, recognized 
political parties, and mass participation in the political 
process. The low level of politicization of the whole penin­
sular population makes it a little difficult to assess the 
status of the one Arab nation-state idea in this area.
However, with the information that is available it is possible 
tu jiiakc ac least some tentative political judgments about the 
Peninsula.
In Saudi Arabia, the largest of the peninsular Arab 
states, political consciousness is beginning to appear, but 
it is still confined to a small sector of the population.^
Lack of experience with foreign aggression since the departure
^George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its
Society, Its Culture (New Haven : HRAF Press, 1959), p. 91,
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of the Turks has hindered the development of Arab nationalism 
or Pan-Arabism. For most Saudi Arabians the important dis­
tinction is still between Moslems and non-Moslems, rather 
than between Arabs and non-Arabs.^ This traditional attitude 
is changing, however, although only very slowly. The inces­
sant broadcasts from the powerful Cairo radio station, the 
Voice of the Arabs, on the importance of Arab unity reach an 
ever-increasing number of listeners among the Saudi Arabians. 
Egyptian newspapers with the theme of Arab unity are being 
read to an increasing degree by the literate Saudi Arabians. 
Teachers, businessmen, and officials from other Arab coun­
tries, especially from Egypt, arrive and stay for varying 
periods of time in Saudi Arabia, and no doubt have contrib­
uted to the general feeling of belonging to one greater Arab 
community. The idea of one Arab nation-state is a rather new 
concept in Saudi Arabia, however, and it is also contradic­
tory to the spirit of Islam which puts its emphasis upon the
universal community of the faithful rather than national 
%
groups." Islam, since Saudi Arabia is its birthplace, 
naturally has a very strong hold on the population. In Saudi 
Arabia written constitutional law is rudimentary, consisting 
mainly of a set of Organic Instructions established in 1926 
for al-Hijaz, and a decree of October, 1953, setting up a
llbid. , p. 311. 4bid. 4bid.
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council of ministers.^ Otherwise, all the national laws are
derived from the Koran and other related Islamic writing.
Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, is the original home of
the Arabs, and its people are proud of their Arab status.
The first nationalist, armed revolt of 1916 was led by
?Husain, Sherif of al-Hijaz. The present ruling family of 
Saudi Arabia has continually shown its willingness to iden­
tify with the larger family of Arabs and various Arab 
causes.^ The expression of solidarity with other Arabs and 
their cause is not the same, however, as the acceptance of 
the Pan-Arabic goal of comprehensive Arab unity. The ruling 
family in Saudi Arabia is not at all receptive to the Pan- 
Arabic political goal, and political awareness on the part of 
most of the people is still to come. Hence, Saudi Arabia 
cannot be included within the highly potential area of the 
unity idea as can Jordan, Iraq, and the Sudan. But there 
still remains a real possibility that the people of Saudi 
Arabia will become receptive, even enthusiastic, to the idea 
as their political consciousness increases.
The situation in the peripheral states of the Penin­
sula is very similar to that in Saudi Arabia but with some
^Ibid., p . 106.
2
In 1922 the Husain family was driven out of Saudi 
Arabia by the Saudis.
^Saudi Arabia, along with Libya and Kuwait, agreed 
to provide $135 million a year to help support the poorer 
countries of Egypt and Jordan after the 1967 war with Israel
8 8
variations. In the Persian Gulf States the political aware­
ness situation was described by Fahin II Qubain as follows:
The conception of nationality is a western contribution 
and a new arrival in the Persian Gulf. . . .  It is still 
a vague idea and certainly has not replaced to any degree 
the existing loyalties. It manifests itself in two ways: 
first, negatively in a desire to expel the foreigner,
. . . and second, positively, in a confused ideal of pan- 
Arab, pan-Islamic union. No clear distinction is drawn 
between the two . . . and the terms are used interchange­
ably [but] the pan-Arab aspect of the ideal predominates. 
This new spirit of nationalism has had effect of creating 
a greater emphasis on unity among the native population.!
Although this was written in 1955, the statement still holds
true, for change comes slowly in these small countries. The
obvious awareness of some individuals in the Persian Gulf
States of being part of a larger Arab nation, and occasional
government pledges to strengthen ties with other Arabs,
certainly show a potential for the operation of the idea of
one nation-state. In the Provisional Constitution of the
recently formed Union of Arab Emirates, Article 6 states:
"The union is a part of the Greater Arab Homeland bound with
ties of religion, language, history and common destiny. The
people of the union is one people and is a part of the Arab 
2
Nation." Among the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, only
Fahim I. Qubain, "Social Classes and Tensions in 
Bahrain," The Middle East Journal, IX (Summer, 1955), p. 273. 
The terra "existing loyalties" as used here refers to tradi­
tional tribal loyalties to a person rather than to territorial 
allegiances.
7
"The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab 
Amirates," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Summer, 1972), 
p. 308.
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Kuwait possesses a constitution which expresses a commitment 
to the furtherance of Arab nationalism.^
Four years before the Republic of Yemen became a 
republic, it joined Egypt and Syria in the Union of Arab 
States. More recently, Yemen experienced a long, bloody 
civil war (1962-1967) in which Egypt (on the republican side)
and Saudi Arabia and Jordan (on the royalist side) fought
2
each other by proxy. Some observers have interpreted the 
civil war in Yemen as part of a continuing conflict between 
progressive and traditional forces which is going on through­
out the Arab World. In any case, the civil war has brought 
some changes to the basically backward tribal society of 
Yemen. The traditional tribal allegiance is breaking down, 
the mobility of the people has increased, and Egyptian 
influence through radio broadcasts of the Voice of the Arabs
is pervasive. Many Yemenis seem to have become discontented
3
with conventional social and legal restrictions. Reflecting 
these changes, a new Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab 
Republic was announced on December 28, 1970. The very first 
line of the Preamble begins : "We the Yemenis are an Arab and
"The Constitution of the State of Kuwait," trans. 
Eric B. Blaustein, in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H.
Flanz (ed.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, III 
(Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, ïnc., 1971),
p. 5.
^Edgar O'Ballance, The War in Yemen (Hamden, Connect­
icut: Archon Books, 1971) ^
^Ibid., pp. 208-209.
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Muslim people. . . Article 1 of the constitution states 
that "the people of Yemen are a part of the Arab Nation," but 
Article 5 pledges only to realize Yemeni unity, i.e., unity 
between the Republic of Yemen and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).^
The situation in South Yemen is different in that 
there the Pan-Arab feeling is more predominant. This more 
developed political consciousness of South Yemen can be attri­
buted largely to the struggle for independence against the
British, whereas the territory of North Yemen was never
2
colonized in the modern period. On December 1, 1967, Qahtan
3
as-Shaabi, leader of the South Yemeni revolution, told a 
cheering crowd at al-Ittihad that the major policies of his 
government would be socialism at home, non-alignment abroad, 
Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine, the support of 
national revolutionary movements, and the "reunification of 
the Arab people in North and South Y e m e n . I f  South Yemen
^"Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic," 
The Middle East Journal, XXV, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), p. 389.
2
The Ottoman Empire was nominally sovereign in Yemen 
from 1517 to 1918, but there appears to have been little 
interference in local affairs.
In 1958 Qahtan as-Shaabi chose voluntary exile in 
Cairo in order to oppose the British sponsored Federation of 
Aden Protectorates. In 1962 he went to North Yemen to help 
the revolution, and for a time was a minister in the Republic 
of Yemen.
^Tom Little, South Arabia: Arena of Conflict (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 181.
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were contiguous to any of the Arab countries in the Fertile 
Crescent, or to Egypt or Libya, it could be included within 
the highly potential area of the unity area. The Constitu­
tion of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen adopted 
November 30, 1970, however, does not call for the unity of 
the entire Arab nation, but limits its objective only to 
Yemeni unity, as is the case with the Republic of Yemen. 
Article 1 of the constitution makes its commitment "to bring 
about a united, democratic Yemen.
Until recently. North and South Yemen, with the 
common objective of unification, have found themselves 
involved in armed conflict, each accusing the other of trying 
to impose unity by force. In October, 1972, after four 
weeks of armed clashes, both countries agreed in a meeting at
Cairo to provide for seven committees to prepare plans within
2
a year to merge all institutions in the two countries.
The three remaining Arab states, Morocco, Algeria, 
and Tunisia, even with a rather well developed political 
consciousness among the people, have failed to adopt and 
popularize the Pan-Arabic goal of comprehensive Arab unity. 
Rather, these countries conceive themselves as constituting a
"Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen," trans. David M, McClintock, in Blaustein and Flanz 
(ed.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, IV, p.2.
^The Daily Oklahoman, October 24, 1972, p. 6.
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separate regional Arab entity known as the Maghreb--the Arab
West. Morocco's constitution of December 14, 1962, states;
The Kingdom of Morocco, a sovereign Muslim State, whose 
official language is Arabic, constitutes a part of the 
great Maghreb.
As an African State, moreover, it espouses the 
realization of African unity as one of its objectives.^
Not only does the Moroccan constitution not claim Morocco to
be a part of the larger Arab nation; it looks instead in the
direction of African unity. If the constitution gives any
indication of the state of thinking in Morocco, as it probably
does, the idea of one Arab nation-state clearly does not
apply there.
The Algerian constitution of September 10, 1963, like 
that of Morocco, recognizes the geographical reality of its 
location on the continent of Africa. But, unlike Morocco, 
Algeria does not seem to aim for an all-African unity, and 
does recognize itself to be a part of the Arab World.
Article 2 of the constitution states that the Algerian nation 
"forms an integral part of the Arab Maghreb, of the Arab
World and of A f r i c a . "2 Because Algeria was one of the latest
African states to gain independence from the French, and 
has been geographically apart from the main stream of Arab
^Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations, Vol. I: 
Africa (3rd ed. rev. Dorothy Peaslee Xydis; The Hague: M.
Nijhoff, 1965), p. 562.
^Ibid. , p , 6.
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political movements for a long period of time, it is doubtful 
that there exists any substantial desire there for one Arab 
nation-state. Gallagher writes: "Algeria is the example par
excellence of a dual economy and a dual society."^ The 
nation has been influenced by French culture more than any 
other area in North Africa. French has been used as the 
major language of instruction and higher thought over such a 
long period that many young writers were and are unable to 
express themselves in decent Arabic. Houari Boumedienne, 
current President of Algeria, was the first Algerian leader 
who could speak good Arabic. All these factors indicate a 
distinct Algerian national identity scarcely favorable to 
the development of ideas of political union with other Arab 
countries.
The Preamble to the Tunisian constitution of June 1, 
1959, pledges the nation "to remain faithful to the teaching 
of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, to its 
membership of the Arab f a m i l y . A r t i c l e  1 of the constitu­
tion further states; "The Tunisian Republic is part of the
Charles F. Gallagher, "Report on North Africa," 
Middle East Report 1950, ed. William Sands (Washington, D.C, 
The Middle East Institute, 1959), p. 63.
^Ibid.. p. 62. ^Ibid.
^Constitution of the Tunisian Republic (Tunis: 
Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, 
March, 1968), p . 5.
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Greater Maghreb and shall work for its unity, within the 
framework of common i n t e r e s t s . L i k e  the Moroccan and 
Algerian constitutions, the Tunisian constitution does not 
mention Africa or African unity. It does acknowledge the 
nation's membership in the larger Arab family, but its commit­
ment is clearly limited to working for the unity of the 
Maghreb. Therefore, one can only conclude that the idea of 
one Arab nation-state encompassing all of the Arabs does not 
as yet apply to Tunisia. President Habib Bourguiba, in an 
article written for Foreign Affairs in 1957 stated:
Tunisia's policy is determined by its history and by its 
geography. Because Tunisia is a part of Africa, it tends 
to identify firmly with other North African nations, 
whose interests it shares. As a member of the Arab com­
munity, it has brotherly relations with the Arab countries 
to the East. And because it is situated in the "West" 
and is a neighbour to Europe, and in particular to France, 
it looks for security and economic progress in a close 
alliance with the free nations of the West. It is along 
these three lines that our foreign policy must develop.2
In a speech in 1965, Bourguiba, commenting on Middle East
relationships said: "Tunisia freed herself centuries ago
from the ties that bound her to Baghdad and Damascus. . . .
If Bourguiba expresses the general sentiments of his people,
which seems likely because of his demonstrated domestic
^Ibid.
2
Habib Bourguiba, "Nationalism Antidote to Communism," 
Foreign Affairs. XXXV (July, 1957), p. 653.
^Ronald Steel (ed.), North Africa (New York: The
H. W. Wilson Company, 1967), ^  97, citing "The Atlantic 
Report: Tunisia," The Atlantic (November, 1965), pp. 24-27.
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popularity, he considers Tunisia to be a western nation, and 
part of the Arab World only by geographical accident rather 
than vocation.^
Among the North African Arab countries, the increas­
ing distance from the Arab cultural hearth in the east seems 
to be reflected in their regional identification. Tunisia, 
the easternmost country of the Arab West, recognizes its 
cultural links with the larger Arab nation, but commits 
itself only to the unity of the Maghreb. Algeria, the middle 
country of the Arab West, acknowledges that it is a part of 
the Maghreb, the Arab World, and Africa, but in that order. 
There is no Algerian pledge to the unification of the Arab 
West as in the case of Tunisia. The westernmost country of 
the Arab West, Morocco, recognizes itself to be a part of the 
Maghreb, but also aims for African unity as one of its 
objectives.
In summary, the territories of the Arab nation can 
be divided into four different categories; (1) the political 
action area of the Pan-Arab unity idea, comprising Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria; (2) the high potential area of the idea, 
consisting of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and the Sudan; (3) the 
low potential area where the idea could be expected to spread 
if there were changes in political leadership, including all 
of the Arabian Peninsula; and (4) areas which are within the
llbid,
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political area of the idea but where the Pan-Arab goal of one 
Arab nation-state seems to have the lowest potential, that 
is, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Obviously, there exists 
the Jewish state of Israel which has no potential for the 
political action area, but which geographically finds itself 
almost surrounded by the Arab World (Figure 11).
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CHAPTER IV 
CORE AREAS OF THE ARAB WORLD
In political geography the concept of core area was 
first discussed by Friedrich Ratzel. According to Ratzel, 
nation-states commonly evolve from small units which he chose 
to call Zellen (cells) or Raumzellen.^ What Ratzel termed 
the cell, Whittlesey called the nuclear core, "the area in 
which or about which a state originates." Today, as noted 
by Andrew Burghardt, there exists a great deal of confusion 
in the use of the term core area. For the purpose of this 
study, three different types of core area are recognized. 
Nuclear core will be used as defined by Whittlesey, implying 
organic growth from some smaller beginning. Original core 
will be used as defined by Burghardt to mean "the original 
core area of greatest political and/or economic importance," 
but which did not serve as the base for continued accretions
Andrew Burghardt, "The Core Concept in Political 
Geography: A Definition of Terms," The Canadian Geographer,
XII (Winter, 1969), p. 340, citing F . Ratzel, "Gesetze des 
raumlichen Wachstums der Staaten," Petermann’s Metteilungen, 
1896.  —
^Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, p. 597.
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of territory.^ Contemporary core will be used to designate
the area "which is currently of greatest political and/or
2
economic significance. By itself the term core will be 
used in a general sense to include all three of these concepts.
This chapter will show that there was no dominant 
core area to provide a focus for the development of the one 
Arab nation-state idea until the mid-1950's. It appears that 
the idea of one Arab nation-state preceded the emergence of 
a core area, unlike the process of historical development in 
most of the nation-states of Western Europe.^ In the discus­
sion which follows, the core areas of the Arab World will be 
identified as original, nuclear, or contemporary (Figures 12 
and 13). Because a country with a true nuclear core generally 
experiences historical continuity over a period of several 
decades, and not infrequently over several centuries, it 
develops distinct characteristics which make it difficult 
to unite politically with other areas.
The Arab Empire of the seventh and eighth century 
seems to have lacked a durable nuclear core, while more 
recently the coining into being of several core areas has 
hindered the one Arab nation-state idea from evolving into
^Burghardt, "The Core Concept in Political Geography,"
p. 350.
^Ibid.
^See Pounds and Ball, "Core Areas and the Develop­
ment of the European States System," pp. 24-40.
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reality by depriving the region of a common focus. Instead, 
there has been competition among core areas, each seeking 
influence over and control of the intervening territories.
At times this competition has led to interregional hostilities 
Most states that developed before the twentieth 
century evolved naturally from and about a nuclear core.
Italy grew from Rome, China from the Wei Ho Valley, the
United States from the Atlantic coastal region, England from 
the Thames Basin, and France from the île de France.^ In 
most, if not all, of the above cases, it is apparent that the
idea of the state followed the emergence of a core area. In
the case of the Arab World, however, the emergence of the 
modern idea of one Arab state, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, took place without any supporting 
core area and, hence, without a focus.
In the evolution of a state, the people and institu­
tions of the core area typically play a vital part in keeping 
the state viable. Once the nuclear core emerges into a 
coherent unit, Hartshorne writes:
It has marked strength, whether of influence or direct 
power, over adjacent regions less effectively integrated; 
it has the power to grow, to expand geographically not
Lucile Carlson, Geography and World Politics 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958),
p. 76.
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merely as a political realm, but as an area of coherent 
political integration.!
In assessing the role of a core area in the evolution of a
state, Hartshorne writes:
A core area is neither sufficient nor essential to the 
evolution of a nation or state. What is essential is a 
common idea that convinces the people in all the regions 
that they belong together. Historically in certain 
states a core area may have played a major role in spread­
ing that idea to other regions and it may continue today 
as in France, Argentina, or Mexico, to focus the interest 
of the regions on itself as the center of what has become 
a functioning unit, but the common idea for a state may 
develop where no core area exists.2
Although the Arab countries have not become a functioning
unit, most Arabs are aware of a "sense of common belonging"
and have an obvious desire for a nation-state. This common
sense of belonging, according to Hartshorne, should have been
sufficient to have set in motion the evolution of one Arab
nation-state. Perhaps it would have been sufficient if
foreign powers had let the evolution take its natural course
and had not divided the Arabs into several political units
and then tried to perpetuate the division. Since this was
not the way things evolved, the Arab unity idea needed help
in the form of a core area, a territorial base from which to
propagate and promote the idea among the Arabs. Modern
federation attempts, beginning in 1958, may be said to have
^Richard Hartshorne, "Morphology of the State Area,"
Essays in Political Geography, ed. Charles A. Fisher (London: 
Methuen and Co", Ltd., 106%), p. 31.
7
Hartshorn;
Geography," p. 116,
^ ne, "The Functional Approach in Political
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been the result of Egypt’s acceptance of itself as an integral 
part of the Arab nation. The emergence of a Pan-Arab core in 
Cairo, with an influential radio transmitter and an inter­
national press has done much to foster the idea.
The Historical Core Areas of the Arab Empire
Pre-Islamic al-Hijaz had three urban areas, al-Taif 
(Taif), Mecca, and Medina, all frequently visited by Bedouins 
for the purpose of exchanging goods (Figure 13). Of the 
three centers, Mecca, although situated in an inhospitable 
and barren valley with an unattractive climate, was the most 
important, being the sanctuary and religious center of North 
Arabia.1 In addition to being the home of many pagan gods, 
Mecca was the place of the Ka'bah, which later became the 
Palladium of Islam. The pilgrimage to Mecca became one of 
the most important religious practices of the Bedouin nomads. 
The frequent trips of the Bedouins to Mecca, particularly 
during the four months of Holy Truce (the first three months 
for religious observances and the fourth for trade), incul­
cated in them the local beliefs, the rites of the Ka'bah, 
and the practice of offering sacrifices.^ Thus, even before
 ^Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 101.
2
The Prophet Mohammed destroyed the pagan images of 
the pre-Islamic era and built in their place the Ka'bah, a 
cube-shaped stone structure, and declared that the Prophet 
Abraham had erected it and made it the focal point of a pil­
grimage required of all the faithful.
^Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 102.
105
the rise of Islam, Mecca was functioning as a unifying 
element among the Arabian nomads. The situation of Mecca 
midway between Ma'rib and Ghazzah on the old Spice Road, 
greatly enhanced its function as a religious and commercial 
center.^
A little to the east of Mecca, al-Taif, "nestling 
among shady trees at an altitude of about 6000 feet, a bit 
of Syrian earth," was as it still is, the summer resort of 
the Meccan aristocracy. Among the products available at 
al-Taif were honey, watermelons, figs, grapes, almonds, 
peaches, and pomegranates. Although also situated along the 
old trade route between Ma'rib and Ghazzah, al-Taif did not 
assume the regional prominence of Mecca. Its special 
character was that of a resort rather than a religious center.
The town of Medina did not assume any particular 
prominence until the rise of Islam. Situated in the desert 
about 300 miles north of Mecca, it was simply known as 
another station on the Spice Road. Nature, however, was more 
favorable to Medina than to Mecca. It was known as a 
veritable oasis, well-adapted to the cultivation of date 
palms.^
The Prophet Mohammed, although born in Mecca, was 
rejected by the Meccans and was forced in 622 A.D. to escape
^Ibid. ^Ibid. h b i d . , p. 104.
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to Medina where he was received by the Medinese as an honored 
chief.^ Mohammed quickly took political control of Medina 
and soon transformed it into an Islamic state. Having estab­
lished himself firmly in Medina, he soon began to carry out 
an expansion program based on his teachings concerning the 
mission of Islam. In 630 A.D. Mohammed and his followers 
conquered Mecca, an accomplishment essential to success in 
their missionary effort. In pre-Islamic days, as we have 
seen, Mecca was a very important power center with consider­
able influence on the Bedouins, and without taking it 
Mohammed probably could not have succeeded in gaining the 
allegiance of the Bedouins as easily as he did. The fall of 
Mecca initiated the "year of delegations" (630-631 A.D.) when 
many Bedouin chiefs from all over the Arabian Peninsula came 
to offer allegiance to the Prophet. By 632 A.D., the year 
of his death, the Prophet Mohammed's domain extended over the 
entire Peninsula. Although Mecca was the original core, it 
was clearly the Medina community which formed the nuclear 
core of the new Arab Empire.
Medina, however, did not remain for long as the 
nuclear core of the growing Arab Empire. In 656 A.D., 
thirty-four years after Mohammed's arrival at Medina, the 
accession of Ali to the Caliphate led to his removal of the
^Ibid., p. 116. 
^Ibid., p. 119.
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capital to al-Kufa in Iraq.^ This move was regarded as 
essential, since far-flung conquests had shifted the center 
of gravity of the Empire farther to the north. Medina and 
Mecca never resumed their previous political importance and 
remained predominantly religious centers within the extensive 
domain of Islam. The selection of al-Kufa as the capital 
instead of Damascus generated envy in Damascus, and the 
result was a power struggle between leaders in the two 
centers. In 661 A.D., with the assassination of the Caliph 
Ali, Damascus emerged as the capital and the seat of the 
victorious Umayyad dynasty.
Damascus at this point assumed the functions of a 
nuclear core for the expanding Arab Empire. Vast new 
territories were brought under its domain, including 
Tunisia and Morocco in the west, Spain in the north, and 
the Indus valley in the east (Figures 3, 14, and 15). The 
Arab character of the state was emphasized by changing the 
language of the public registers in Damascus from Greek to 
Arabic, and from Pahlavi to Arabic in Iraq and the eastern 
provinces. A new coinage with Arabic inscriptions was 
created for use throughout the Empire.
Originally al-Kufa was a military camp built by 
order of the Caliph in 638 A.D. It was built not far from 
the ruins of Babylon and the Lakhmid capital of al-Hirah.
2
Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 180.
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The capital of the Arab Empire was returned to al-Kufa 
with the overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate by the Abbas ids 
in 750 A.D. Al-Kufa was soon replaced by al-Anbar as the 
seat of Abbasid power, although this too was a temporary loca­
tion, and in 762 A.D. Baghdad was finally made the capital of 
the Arab Empire of the Abbasids.^ Such frequent relocation of 
the capital within the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was possible 
because of the developed state of the whole area, which had 
served as the seat of several ancient civilizations. Here 
had flourished the thriving capital city of Babylonia as early 
as the third millennium B.C., and much later, in the seventh 
century B.C., the nuclear core of the Assyrian Empire, Nineveh 
on the upper Tigris. The Arab Empire centered in the Tigris- 
Euphrates Valley did not show any organic grmrth after 
750 A.D., and hence Baghdad can not properly be designated as 
a nuclear core. The defeat of the Arabs, the so-called 
"Moors,” at Tours on the Loire River, it will be recalled, 
was eighteen years earlier, in 732 A.D. The Tigris-Euphrates 
basin, however, is certainly an original core with regard to 
the formation of the early Arab Empire.
Within the vast, mostly desert domain of the Empire, 
competing dynasties made their appearance. During the time 
of the Abbasid Caliphate several new core areas emerged, and
Gaston Wiet, Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid
Caliphate, trans. Seymour Eeiler (Norman, Oklahoma: Univer­
sity of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 12.
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some of them established their independence. In 788 A.D. the 
Idrisids declared their own independent state in Morocco, and 
from this time on Morocco was never effectively ruled by 
either the Abbasid Caliphate centered in Baghdad or its 
successor, the Ottoman Caliphate in Constantinople. The 
later Fatimid dynasty ended the rule of the Baghdad Caliphate 
over Egypt in 969 A.D. , and that Nile basin state remained 
independent until the Ottoman Turks came in 1517. What was 
left of the Baghdad Caliphate was finally overthrown by the 
Mongols, a new force out of eastern Asia, in 1258 A.D.
The Mongols, however, did not remain as effective 
rulers. The end of the Baghdad Caliphate in 1258 led to the 
breaking up of the medieval Arab Empire into several unstable 
political entities, a condition which continued until the 
sixteenth century when the Ottoman Turks took over at least 
nominal control of all the territories of the Arab Empire 
except Morocco. The core area of the Ottoman Empire was in 
Turkey, at Constantinople, in a non-Arab region, and it 
remained there until the twentieth century.
The process of dividing the Arab-Turkish lands among 
the European colonial powers started long before the First 
World War (Figures 16 and 17). European interest in the 
lower Nile basin and the Sinai Peninsula area was obvious 
during the period of the Napoleonic wars. The occupation of 
Algiers by French troops in 1830 marked the beginning of an 
aggression that eventually extended throughout North Africa
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and involved no less than four European powers. The defeat of 
Turkey, which fought on the side of the Central Powers in 
1914-18, saw the separation of the Arab portion of the Turk­
ish domain into several political entities under the rule of 
the French and British governments as provided for by the 
League of Nations mandate system. Since then, a number of 
core areas have appeared in the Arab World, competing with 
each other for prominence and influence over the intervening 
territories. Independence has not brought an end to this 
competition.
Core Areas of the Modern Arab States
North Africa 
Morocco
During Idrisid rule in the northwestern highlands of 
Africa, as early as the eighth century, the town of Fez 
emerged as an important commercial center and a flourishing 
capital. Fez stands at the crossroads of two important routes 
of communication, both influenced somewhat by local features 
of the terrain.^ One of these routes runs from the Mediterra­
nean to the Sahara and beyond, the other from the Atlantic to 
the Eastern Maghreb. The city itself is located in the center 
of an arable and fertile region. The relative importance of
Roger Le Tourneau, Fez in the Age of Marinides, 
trans. Besse Alberta Clement (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1971), p. 3.
2
Ibid., p . 5.
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the Idrisids declined after the death of Idris II in 828, but 
their capital city saw the completion of the great Karaouine 
mosque with its fourteen gates. The university at Fez was the 
foremost intellectual center in the Maghreb throughout the 
Middle Ages.
A competing center of early political and cultural 
prominence in the western Arab World was Cdrdoba, on the 
banks of the Guadalquivir River in southern Spain, Under 
the Umayyad dynasty it prospered as a prominent cultural 
center for nearly three centuries, but after its conquest by 
Ferdinand III of Castile in 1236 its great mosque became a 
Christian cathedral. Although there are many architectural 
remains of the Moorish period in Cordoba, Seville, Granada, 
and other Spanish cities, Spain as a whole has been separated 
from the Arab World for nearly five centuries. Following 
the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in Cdrdoba in 1031 the 
Almoravids, Berber nomads from the western Sahara, became 
prominent and consolidated their rule over much of northwestern 
Africa. The Almoravids' first power base was in southern 
Morocco. They established Marrakesh in 1062, made it their 
capital, and extended their conquest toward the north, 
occupying Fez sometime soon after 1075. They made the city 
of Fez a base of operation for their military campaigns in 
northern Morocco and in central Algeria.^ In 1145 another 
Berber tribe, the Almohads from the Atlas Mountains, unlike
^Ibid.p. 9
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the Almoravids a settled people, came into prominence on the 
Moroccan scene.^ Like the Almoravids they kept Marrakesh as 
their capital and used Fez as a base of operations in the 
north. Under the rule of both the Almohads and the Almoravids, 
Fez flourished as a commercial, cultural, and military center. 
In the thirteenth century the city came under the control of 
the Marinids who made Fez, their capital, one of the most 
important Islamic centers in the Arab World. Fez maintained 
its prosperity until the middle of the sixteenth century 
when it was conquered by the Sa'adians. Marrakesh was once 
again made the capital, and from this point on Fez was subor­
dinate to it. In 1603 a conflict within the Sa'adian family 
led to the division of Morocco into two parts, the southern 
half ruled from Marrakesh and the northern half from Fez.
This division among the Sa'adians was exploited by the 
Alawites whose rule was subsequently established over all of 
Morocco, and which has continued until today subject only to 
the French protectorate of the early twentieth century 
terminated in 1956. The Alawites made Meknes, thirty-three 
miles west of Fez, their capital. Fez, however, remains an 
important center of Moroccan political life since its atti­
tudes reflect the interests of the urban Arabs and sedentary 
rural population in the interior north. Since it was from 
Meknes that the Alawites expanded their state, Fez-Meknes may
Ijamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197lj, p. lïïS,
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be said to constitute the nuclear core of Morocco.^ The
contemporary core, however, is on the coast and includes
2
Rabat (1969, pop. 435,000), the present administrative 
capital, and Casablanca (1969, pop. 1,320,000), the great 
French-developed commercial metropolis. In line with the 
terminology adopted at the beginning of this chapter,
Marrakesh can properly be called the original core of Morocco.
Algeria
After the overthrow of Carthage in 146 B.C. the
Romans formed a North African province corresponding more or
less closely to present-day Tunisia. About the same time, a
Numidian Kingdom controlled by the great Berber Chief
Massinissa and his successor Jurgurtha for the first time
constituted a united and independent realm corresponding
approximately to modern Algeria.^ The capital of the Numidian
state was Cirta (Constantine). The Romans conquered Numidia
in 46 B.C. and then divided their Maghreb domain into several
4
administrative Tinits. The Roman conquest was followed by 
that of the Vandals in the fifth century, and the Byzantines 
in the sixth century. In the seventh century, the Arabs
^Ibid. , pp. 224-236.
^All the population figures used in this section are 
derived from the Demographic Yearbook 1969 (New York: United
Nations, 1970).
3
Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa (The 
Maghrib) (London; Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 295.
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 32.
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arrived. At the time the Arabs overran it, the whole of North 
Africa west of the Nile was still a great rural region inhab­
ited mostly by nomadic shepherds with little in the way of 
towns.^ Following the seventh century conquest, the territo­
ries of present-day Algeria were nominally under centers of 
authority in either Morocco or Tunisia. This situation 
prevailed until the thirteenth century when the Zayanids, 
one of the Berber tribes, succeeded in establishing their own 
independent state with a capital at Tlemsen. This state 
extended over the entire present coastline of Algeria, from
the Mulawiyya River on the west to the Summam (Wadi-al-Kabir)
2
on the east. During the period of the Zayanid state,
Tlemsen, situated a short distance in from the coast at an 
altitude of about 800 meters, with cool dry air and a 
favorable position for commercial activity, flourished as 
the capital and commercial town, with a population of perhaps 
100,000. Before the founding of the Zayanid state in the 
thirteenth century, within the present limits of Algeria, only 
Oran seems to have had any outside commercial contacts. 
Established by Andalusian sailors in the tenth century, Oran 
had been frequented to some extent by merchants of Genoa,
Pisa, Marseilles, and Barcelona.^
^Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 209, 
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 152. 
^Ibid. , p. 153.
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Although frequently attacked and temporarily occupied 
by other tribes, the Zayanid state survived until the Turkish 
conquest in the sixteenth century. The survival capacity of 
the Zayanid state over a period of some three centuries has 
been attributed by historians less to its own inherent 
strength than to the power balance between the Turks to the 
east and the Spaniards to the west which prevented either 
party from annexing Tlemsen.^ Much of the time, it appears, 
the real control of the Zayanid state did not extend beyond 
the limits of the capital.
The coming of the Ottoman Turks in the early six­
teenth century shifted the Algerian power center from Tlemsen 
northeastward along the coast to Algiers. Under Turkish rule 
Algiers was transformed from a small and relatively unimpor­
tant seaport into a flourishing and prosperous capital. From 
Algiers the Turks gradually extended their control to the 
interior and eventually came to rule an area more or less the 
size of present-day Algeria. Their control was effected 
through a military type of administration. The country was 
separated into three administrative divisions with their 
repective provincial capitals, Oran, Constantine, and Midea. 
Although the countryside was little affected by Turkish 
administration, the extension of Moslem customs and laws
^Ibid., p . 167 . 
^Ibid., p . 176.
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created some homogeneity among the various tribes.^ Clearly, 
the present territorial unit of Algeria took its shape during
the time of Turkish rule. In Barbour's words, in this period,
2
"Algeria entered history as a distinct entity." French 
colonization of Algeria in the nineteenth century did not 
bring much change to the territorial extent of the state, 
although under the French the present-day boundaries were 
demarcated, and the tribal Algerians were transformed by 
their hostility to the French into staunch nationalists. The 
history of Algeria shows clearly that the original core of 
Oran-Tlemsen did not act as a nuclear core. It was Algiers 
(1966, pop. 903,000) which served that role and which has 
given its name to the country. Today the contemporary core 
of Algeria extends all along the densely settled coast.
Tunisia
A few miles from Tunis, the modern capital of Tunisia, 
is the site of Carthage. For thirteen centuries in antiquity, 
Carthage served as a capiLal cicy under rhe Phoenicians, the 
Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines.^ 
The prosperity of Carthage, founded by merchants from Tyre in 
the ninth century B.C., was especially evident during the 
time it served the Carthaginians as capital of their vast
^Ibid.
2
Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 211, 
^Ibid., p . 295.
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empire just prior to the Roman conquest in 146 B.C. Around 
500 A.D. a partially rebuilt Carthage was a capital city for 
the Vandals, and for a brief period in the sixth century it 
was in control of the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, even 
before the Arab conquest the northern plains around Carthage 
had assumed the character of a core area. The recurring 
emergence of an independent state based on this core is a 
characteristic feature of Tunisia's long history.
During the Arab campaigns in the Maghreb the Berbers 
of Tunisia resisted for a time, but eventually they were 
subdued, opening the way to the western Maghreb. In 705 A.D. 
a few miles southwest of Carthage, Arabs founded the city of 
Tunis, which was to become the base of the Arab fleet and 
which eventually gave its name to the nation of Tunisia.^ 
Following the conquest, however, the Arabs were not able to 
maintain complete control of the Tunisian territory. Until 
909 A.D. the Aghlabids, ruling most of Tunisia from their 
base, Qairawan (Kairouan), maintained their autonomy in 
relation to the central government of the Arab Caliphate in 
Baghdad. At the beginning of the tenth century the Ismailis, 
descendants of Fatima, daughter of Mohammed, established their 
own independent state centered in Tunisia.^ Between 958 and
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 70.
2
Qairawan was one of the military camps established in 
an earlier Arab campaign.
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 80.
1 2 2
969 A.D. the Ismailis extended their rule westward over 
Morocco and eastward to Egypt where they built al-Qahira 
(Cairo) as their administrative center. Having chosen 
al-Qahira as their principal capital, the Fatimids left the 
Zirids to rule in their name a stable state area consisting 
of all of present-day Tunisia and part of adjacent Algeria.^
The Zirids declared their independence from the 
Fatimids in 996 A.D., but by this time their state was 
already in decline. In the twelfth century Tunisia fell 
under the control of the Moroccan Almohads, but from 1207 to 
1221 the Hafsids, another Berber tribe, ruled Tunisia inde­
pendently of Marrakesh. By 1258 the Hafsids were successful 
in establishing a fully independent and relatively stable 
state with Tunis as its capital. Commenting on the Hafsid 
Kingdom, Nevill Barbour writes:
In general, the Hafsid Kingdom seems to have had a more 
specifically Tunisian character than its predecessors and 
may be thought of as foreshadowing the Tunisian state of 
today, though the dynasty, and with it the independence 
of Tunisia, collapsed at the end of the fifteenth century 
under simultaneous blows from the Spaniards and Llic 
Ottoman Turks.2
Hafsid rule lasted until the Turkish conquest in the
fifteenth century. Under the Turkish regency the local rulers,
the Husainids, after about 1705 assumed the characteristics of
^Ibid., p . 85.
^Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 296.
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independent sovereigns.^ Turkish domination for all practi­
cal purposes became non-existent. From Tunis, the Husainids
developed an effective, centralized administration of the
2Tunisian territories. Under the French protectorate, 
established in 1881, the Husainid beys at Tunis retained 
considerable authority.^ The city of Tunis, then, has 
definitely functioned as the nuclear core of Tunisia. Tunis 
(1966, pop. 468,997), along with nearby Carthage, could be 
termed the core of Tunisia in every sense of the word-- 
original, nuclear, and contemporary.
Libya
From the seventh century, when it was invaded by the 
Arabs, through the fifteenth century, when it was taken over 
by the Turks, Libya was nothing but a passageway for conquer­
ors, merchants, and pilgrims. Sheer desert except in the 
semiarid northwestern corner and the Jebel el Akdar platform, 
it had a predominantly nomadic population. Local and tribal 
particularist feelings were very strong. The regional history 
of the area forming present-day Libya begins only with 
Ottoman rule in the middle of the sixteenth century.^ Except
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 183.
^Ibid. , p. 313.
^Under Turkish rule the northwestern part of Africa 
(Ifriqiya) was divided into three regencies, Tripoli, Tunis, 
and Algiers, and the frontiers of the divisions have remained 
more or less the same up to the present.
^Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 189.
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for the brief period between 1931 and 1939, when the Italians 
who had taken over from the Turks in 1912 subdued the Senussi 
tribesmen in the Kufra oases, Libya had not had the experience 
of living under a common political authority in an effectively 
united state.^ Tribalism and the inhospitable desert expanses 
separating the few minor urban settlements made the achieve­
ment of a centralized administration beyond the means of the 
conquerors either from the east or the west. After the defeat 
of Italy in World War II and a period of British and French 
occupation, the present Libyan state was assembled by the 
United Nations by joining Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan 
in 1951. The ruler of the Senussi tribe in Cyrenaica was 
proclaimed king, but he was overthrown in 1969 by a Revolu­
tionary Council. Thus, there is no real nuclear core. The 
coastal plain around Tripoli, however, could be called the
O
contemporary core of Libya. The modern city of Tripoli has 
a fairly good harbor, controls an important east-west coastal 
route, and is a point of departure for trans- Saharan caravans. 
The discovery of oil a few years after independence has 
provided Libya considerable wealth in the recent period. 
Bengazi is the main outlet and market center for the more 
prosperous western and northern part of Cyrenaica. That
^Ibid., p. 378.
2
Harm J. de Blij does not show any kind of core in 
Libya in his book Systematic Political Geography [New York: 
John Wiley  ^ Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 398.
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Tripoli and Bengazi currently serve as twin capitals is 
further evidence of the lack of a nuclear core in Libya.
Sudan
The ancient kingdoms that sprang up in the Middle 
Nile valley, in what is now the Sudan, are today of little 
more than historic interest. The first Kingdom of Kush came 
into being in 750 B.C. and lasted until 250 A.D., with its 
first capital at Napta (Napata) and a later one at Meroe to 
the north of Khartoum, both by the side of the Nile (Fig­
ure 13). By 540 A.D. the successive Christian kingdoms of 
Nubia, with their capitals of Dongle (Dongola), Aloa, and 
Soba, had come and gone, leaving hardly any traces. Another 
Sudanese power arose in the sixteenth century, the Fung 
Sultanate of Sennar (1504-1821) which, with its base of power 
in the Gezira region between the White Nile and the Blue Nile, 
was able to assemble a loose confederation of several tribes. 
The tribal alignment and, more importantly, the gradual 
adoption of Islam brought about by this confederation is still 
evident in the cultural pattern of the northern Sudan. The 
confederacy eventually disintegrated in internal strife, 
however, and Mohammed Ali of Egypt was taking advantage of 
this situation when he captured Sennar, the capital. Never­
theless, it is fair to say that the future shape of the Sudan 
was laid under the Fung Sultanate of Sennar located in Gezira, 
the most fertile land in the middle Nile region. Gezira
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clearly seems to have performed the function of a nuclear core 
in bringing the various parts of the Sudan under its rule. 
Egyptian administration, which lasted until 1885, gave the 
Sudan a better organized structure under a single ruler. 
Following the Mahdist revolt, Egyptian troops were forced to 
evacuate Khartoum in 1885, but in 1898 the Mahdist dervishes 
were subdued and the Sudan was ruled under an Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium until 1955. During this period of Anglo-Egyptian 
rule, Khartoum (1968, pop. 194,000), which lies on the north­
ern edge of Gezira at the confluence of the White and Blue 
Nile, was made the capital, and the city continues in this 
function today. The contemporary core and the nuclear core 
of the Sudan are the same area.
Egypt
Of all the Arab countries, only Egypt has enjoyed a 
substantial continuity in culture and political institutions 
from antiquity. This historical continuity, according to 
Harris, is the result of "the dependence of agriculture upon 
a single source of water, the Nile," and, "the required highly 
centralized control of the river, a pattern of authority 
which was carried over into the political sphere."1 The 
state system that developed to supervise the distribution and 
use of Nile water was highly centralized under the Pharaohs
^George L. Harris (ed.), Egypt (New Haven, Connect­
icut: HRAF, 1957), p. 11.
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in the Lower Nile Valley of Egypt.^ As the seat of this cen­
tralized state system, the Lower Nile Valley since ancient 
times has been the most densely settled and the most populous 
area in the whole Arab World. This concentration of popula­
tion, together with the experience of thousands of years of 
centralized administration, has produced a more homogeneous 
population than in any other part of North Africa and the 
Middle East. The Lower Nile Valley with its millions of 
people, its productive agriculture, historical continuity, 
and developed administration served as a nucleus for Egypt 
long before the practice of demarcating boundaries came into 
existence. Clearly, as De Blij puts it, "the core area of 
Egypt requires no elaboration, as it is one of the best 
defined in the world.
Because of Egypt's location at the crossroads between 
East and West, it has been plagued by many foreign rulers.
The first important foreign occupation of Egypt was that of 
the Persians in 525 B.C. Since then, Greeks, Romans, Byzan­
tines, Arabs, Turks, Albanians, and Circassians have ruled 
Egypt. But despite these foreign regimes, and much recent 
pressure from Western Europe and the Soviet Union, the basic 
life patterns of the Nile Valley of Egypt were never destroyed.
^Wood H. Jarvis, Pharaoh to Farouk (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1955).“p^ 31
^De Blij, Systematic Political Geography, p. 398.
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and the state of Egypt has evolved with little interruption 
in the great valley where it originated.^
The first capital of the Pharaohs was Memphis, a few 
miles south of Cairo. Later it was moved to Heracleopolis 
(ca. 2445 B.C.) and from there to Thebes three hundred miles 
south of Memphis. Alexander the Great built Alexandria 
(present pop. 1,803,900) on the western margin of the delta 
as his capital of Egypt, and it remained here under the 
Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. With the coming of the Arabs 
a new Egyptian capital was built in al-Fustat. The Fatimids 
in 969 A.D. selected a site near al-Fustat and founded Cairo 
(present pop. 4,225,700) (al-Qahira), which now for more 
than a thousand years has performed its function as a great 
capital city.
The core area of Egypt, following the terminology 
employed in this study, is at the same time a contemporary 
core, an original core, and a nuclear core. Only the spe­
cific administrative center has been moved. However, with 
the emergence of Egypt, renamed in 1958 the United Arab 
Republic and in 1971 the Arab Republic of Egypt, as leader of 
the Arab countries and as the nucleus of the recently formed 
Federation of Arab Republics, the real possibility has been 
raised that the Nile Valley of Egypt may be assuming the role
^Harris (ed.), Egypt, p. 11.
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of a nuclear core for a much larger and still evolving Arab 
state.
Arabian Peninsula 
Saudi Arabia
The core area of Medina-Mecca in the Hijaz is not the 
nuclear core of the modern state of Saudi Arabia. With the 
end of Turkish rule in Arabia after World W/ar I, five states 
came into being, the Kingdom of Hijaz, the Sultanate of Nejd, 
the Imamate of Yemen, the Territory of Asir, and the Princi­
pality of Shammar. These five states covered all the inhab­
ited areas of the Peninsula with the exception of the Aden 
colony, the Aden Protectorate, and the Persian Gulf princi­
palities. The tribesmen of the state of Nejd were adherents 
of Wahhabism, a puritanical and conservative Islamic movement, 
and were still not affected by the larger national aspirations 
of the early twenties.^ Ibn Saud was the head of the vigor­
ous Wahhabi movement whose missionary activities reached 
beyond Nejd into surrnunding states. Leading this vigorous 
and powerful religious surge, Saud conquered all the states 
except the Imamate of Yemen, and from the vast territories 
under his control formed the new state of Saudi Arabia. Thus, 
the region of Nejd, and particularly the area around Riyadh 
(1965, pop. 225,000), the capital, situated in Wadi Hanifa at 
an elevation of 1700 feet above sea level, could be designated
^Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 328.
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as the nuclear core of Saudi Arabia. Mecca-Medina, with 
regard to the modern state of Saudi Arabia, is only the 
original core. The contemporary core is on the west coast, 
centered on the port of Jiddah (1969, pop. 250,000), fifty 
miles from Mecca.
Yemen
Yemen has a long historical record of existence as 
an independent kingdom. Around 3500 B.C. Yemen was the 
center of the Sabaean Kingdom with Ma'rib, located along the 
ancient Spice Road, as its capital (Figure 2).^ The Himyrites 
succeeded the Sabaeans in 115 B.C. and shifted the seat of 
power to the town of Zofar in the highlands of Yemen, along 
the Spice Road and near the present Yemeni city of Yarim.
The coming of the Abyssinians (525-575 A.D.) shifted the seat 
of power to San’a, which has since remained the capital of 
Yemen. In the seventh and eighth centuries the peoples of 
two Islamic sects, the Zeidis and the Shafeis, settled in 
Yemen. Generally, the Zeidis established themselves on the 
high plateaus, in particular at Sada and San'a, while the 
Shafeis inhabited the southern lowlands and the coastal 
plains.^ For a period of time the power struggle between
^Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. ZTO.
^Ibid., p. 239.
^Eric Macro, Yemen and the Western World since 1571 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1Ô68), p . xiv.
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these groups remained undecided. In 893 A.D. the first Zeidi 
Imam founded the Rassid dynasty, which ruled an independent 
Yemen from San'a with varying success until modern times.
Only in 1919 did the Rassid dynasty become successful in 
controlling the greater part of the territory from its power 
base in San'a. So it is San'a (1956, pop. 60,000) that must 
be designated the nuclear core of the Republic of Yemen, a 
nation which in recent years has been much torn by civil war 
and external pressures.
South Yemen
The present People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is 
an outgrowth of British colonization efforts in the southern 
part of the peninsula between 1839 and 1967. Under the 
British, the territories now included in the People's Demo­
cratic Republic of Yemen were known as the Crown Colony of 
Aden, a strong point guarding the south entrance to the Red 
Sea, and the Aden Protectorate, sometimes divided into the 
Eastern and Western Protectorates. The Eastern Protectorate 
covered the picturesque valley and plateau of the Hadramaut, 
with seven main treaty areas.^ The Western Protectorate, 
which lay generally north of Aden, had nineteen separate 
chiefs of state. The fragmented Aden Protectorate was given 
some centralization by London, and the constant bloody
^Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 213. 
^Ibid., p. 218.
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feuding between the various chieftains was stopped by British 
colonial authority. After World War II the British attempt 
to create a single political structure out of the feuding 
Arab states met with brief success in the creation of the 
Federation of South Yemen in 1963, which did not include the 
crown colony of Aden. In 1967 Britain was pressured to with­
draw from Aden, and intense Arab nationalists now rule the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Nowhere is there any 
evidence of organic growth from a single nuclear core, but 
the well equipped seaport of Aden (1968, pop. 150,000) is 
definitely the contemporary as well as the original core of 
the new nation.
Persian (Arabian) Gulf States
All the Persian Gulf principalities including Kuwait, 
as well as the Sultanate of Oman outside the Gulf, were once 
British protectorates, and their modern survival can probably 
be attributed entirely to British protection in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. In all of these small states, if the 
core areas are to be sought, they will be found in the 
respective capital cities, some of which are no more than 
forlorn little coastal towns. While some of them control 
fabulous wealth from recent oil discoveries, others are as 
poor as they have been for centuries. Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Qatar are members of the United Nations, and in 1971 the 
sheikdoms of the former protectorate known as the Trucial
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States merged voluntarily in a new confederation called the 
Union of Arab Emirates.
Fertile Crescent
All of the present states in the Fertile Crescent
are an outgrowth of regional organization under the League
of Nations mandate system following the defeat of Turkey in
World War I. They are arbitrary states with no historical
organic growth but, instead, with arbitrary boundaries
created to fit the geographical framework of preconceived
ideas.  ^ Thus the core areas of these states are either
original or contemporary or both. Although the districts of
Damascus and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were, respectively,
a nuclear and an original core of the early Arab Empire, in
terms of the present state of Syria, Damascus (1968, pop.
789,840) is the original and contemporary core. Baghdad in
the Tigris-Euphrates Valley has a similar role in relation
to Iraq. The core area of Jordan around Ajnman (1967 ,
pep. 330,220), built on cither side of the small perennial
stream of Sell 'Amman, can only be regarded as a contemporary 
2
core. Not until 1921 was Amman made the headquarters of the 
state of Transjordan, a separate mandate carved out of Greater
^Pounds and Ball, "Core Areas and the Development of
the European States System," p. 24.
2
Jane M. Hacker, Modern Amman: A Social Study, ed.
John I. Clarke (Research Papers Series No. 3; Durham College
in the University of Durham: Department of Geography, 1960),
p. 5.
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Syria by Britain, in order to provide a throne for Abdullah 
ibn Hussein. Amman lacks long historical continuity as a 
populated urban center.^ The independence of Transjordan, 
later Jordan, came with the termination of the mandate in 
1946.
Because of its large Christian population, Lebanon 
was granted autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire in 
1861, and its territory was later expanded when it became a 
French mandate. Beirut, the capital city, together with a 
narrow coastal region adjacent to it, is the contemporary and 
original core of Lebanon.
Emergence of a Core for the Political 
Idea of One Arab State
For a long time the idea of one Arab state extending 
from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean was without the 
core necessary to success in its development. Egypt, which 
seemed likely to be a natural core for the Arab state because 
of its size, location, population, stability, relative secu­
rity, and intellectual leadership within the Arab World, for 
a long time did not even consider itself to be Arab.^ Issawi 
explained it like this:
For many years Egypt had been looked upon as the natural 
leader by many Arabs, but such sentiments had found 
little response in Egypt itself. Throughout its long 
history, Egypt always had a very sharply defined
^Ibid., p. 12.
^Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle 
East, p. 205.
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individuality and one which clearly marked it off from 
its neighbours.!
Anwar G. Chejne comes to a like conclusion, suggesting that
despite Egyptian leadership in the formation of the Arab
League in 1945, Egypt was not committed to a vigorous Pan-
Arab policy until 1954.  ^ Chejne provides ample evidence to
support his conclusion. As early as 1881 Zaghlul, who lived
until 1927, led a nationalist movement in Egypt to achieve
complete independence from the British and founded the Wafd
political party. Throughout his political career, however,
Zaghlul avoided identification with either Pan-Arabism or
Pan-Islamism. In 1918, when delegates from the Fertile
Crescent approached him at the Paris Peace Conference to unite
their efforts for independence, they were told by Zaghlul that
7
an Egyptian problem was not an Arab problem. This kind of 
separatist and isolationist sentiment lasted throughout the 
period between the First and the Second World War. Even at 
the time Egypt was playing a leading role in the founding of 
the Arab League in 1945, it was considered by many Arab 
leaders as only a nominal partner in the Pan-Arab movement.^
^Charles Issawi, "The United Arab Republic," Current 
History, XXXVI (February, 1959), p. 65.
2
Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan- 
Arabism," Middle East Journal, XI (Summer, 1957), pp. 253-268
^Ibid., p. 253.
"^ Ibid. , p. 254.
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The Egyptian separatist attitude, according to Chejne, 
was mainly due to three historical factors. First, although 
nominally under Turkish suzerainty, Egypt had considered 
itself a political unit separate from the Ottoman Empire 
beginning with the period of Muhammad Ali. During the modern 
colonial period, Egypt was under the control of Britain, and 
its political movement for independence was directed primarily 
against the British. The other Arab countries, except for 
the Persian Gulf protectorates, were under French, Italian, or 
Turkish domination up to the time of the First World War. 
Second, during the period of Ottoman rule the Arab countries 
under the Turkish domain had the freedom of unrestricted 
movement within the Arab province of the Empire, whereas 
Egyptians, under effective British control after 1882, did 
not enjoy that unrestricted movement to and from other Arab 
countries. Third, with the discovery of many ancient Phara­
onic relics after the invasion of Napoleon, the "Pharaonic 
movement," or Egyptology, came into existence.^ This 
cultural movement found deep roots in some intellectuals who 
looked back into their distant past with pride and inspira­
tion. To them Egypt was the first and last, and the word Arab 
was not infrequently used to denote backwardness.
Egyptian nationalism continued for some time even 
after the formation of the Arab League. Following Egypt's
^Ibid.
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defeat at the hands of the Israelis in the 1948 war, the 
First Secretary of the Arab League, Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam of 
Egypt, resigned from his post due to increasing pressure from 
the Egyptian isolationists. Although 'Azzam was an enthusi­
astic supporter of Pan-Arabism, when asked about different 
nationalisms, he said: "We are Egyptians first, Arabs second,
and Muslims t h i r d . A s  late as 1952 some Egyptians were
asking for liquidation of the Arab League and the withdrawal
2
of Egypt from it. It was only after the Baghdad Pact in 
1954, which put the hated British in a military partnership 
with an Arab state, that Egypt made Pan-Arabism its cause 
under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Even 
Nasser's speeches, according to Binder, were not addressed to 
Arab questions until 1955 when the controversy over Iraq's 
adherence to the Baghdad Pact broke out in full fury.^ With 
the new constitution of 1956 Egypt was finally clearly iden­
tified as an integral part of the greater Arab nation.
The process which brought Egyptians to think of them­
selves as Arab took a long time. During the decade of the 
1930's, when Arab nationalism was becoming a strong force in 
the Fertile Crescent Egypt, as we have seen, was still not
^Ibid., p. 254, quoting Sati' al-Husri, al-urubab 
awwalan (Beirut, 1956), p. 68.
^Ibid., p. 260.
^Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle 
East, p. 209.
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considered Arab. The idea of a single Arab state was without 
one vital component for its successful evolution--strong 
leadership from a distinct core area. Ever since Egyptians 
started thinking of themselves as an integral part of an Arab 
nation, in the mid-1950's, Egypt has been strongly inclined 
to function as a core for the political idea of one Arab 
state. As a logical consequence to this new situation, sev­
eral political unification attempts have been made in the 
Arab World during the past fifteen years.
In summary, for a long time the political idea of one 
Arab state did not have a core, i.e., the solid territorial 
base necessary to success. The Arab states which in 
chapter ii were included in the present political action area 
and the highly potential area of the unity idea, correspond 
approximately to that group of Arab states without nuclear 
core areas of their own. Exceptions include the Sudan and 
Egypt, the latter of which provides the only probable nucleus 
of sufficient strength and prestige for the idea of one Arab 
state to have much chance of success. The correlation just 
noted may be incidental but more likely it is not. It is 
assumed here that countries without nuclear cores, such as 
modern Libya, will be the most ready to accept political 
integration. The correlation reinforces the probability that 
the states within the highly potential area will become part 
of a greater Arab state earlier than will other parts of the 
Arab World.
CHAPTER V 
INTEGRATIVE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD
This chapter is concerned with the integrative forces 
in the Arab World working towards the fulfillment of the idea 
of one Arab nation-state. Two important unifying forces, the 
state-idea and the recognized core area, have already been 
dealt with in some detail in chapters iii and iv. Both of 
these forces will be reviewed here briefly in a somewhat dif­
ferent context before proceeding to an examination of three 
other integrative forces, the issue of Israel, the control 
of oil, and the development of international administrative 
structures which promote cooperation between Arab countries.
Many scholars of political integration, among them 
Bruce M. Russett and Ernst B. Haas, agree that the failure of 
the one Arab state idea to materialize is not a symptom of 
the lack of commitment on the part of the Arabs but rather a 
result of their inability to translate this commitment into 
tangible integrative economic and political institutions.^
Russett, International Regions and the International 
System: A Study in Political Ecology, p. l84, and Érnst B.
Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Uni­
versal Process," International Political Communities: 
Anthology (New YorFl Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), 
p. lit,
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Russett and Haas both made their observation in the mid­
sixties. Since then, many changes have occurred to speed the 
progress of the integration idea. The Federation of Arab 
Republics has been formed. Libya and Egypt have agreed to 
carry out a total merger sometime in 1973. The Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development has been established to aid in 
the economic development of the Arab countries and promote 
the success of the Arab Common Market. A further common mar­
ket agreement came into force on January 1, 1971, between 
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.  ^ All these integrative acts, however, 
still fall far short of transforming the Arab states into a 
single, cohesive, smooth-working political unit. Still, the 
course of events of the past few years do seem to have 
enhanced the prospect for more integration among the Arab 
states.
The State-Idea in Contemporary Arab Thought 
In his analysis of centripetal forces, Hartshorne 
cams tc the conclusion that of the various cohesive forces 
which help to form a nation-state and hold it together, the 
most important is the presence of a state-idea among the 
people, a widespread feeling for a national raison d'etre.
As he put it, "The basic centripetal force must be some con­
cept or idea justifying the existence of this particular 
state incorporating these particular regions; the state must
^Egypt and Iraq have established trade exchange coor­
dination bureaus to facilitate the trade between the two.
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have a raison d 'être--reason for being.Hartshor ne 's  
statement was basically directed towards explaining states 
already in existence, but its applicability to a nation-state 
in process of formation is obvious. The idea of one Arab 
nation-state, deeply engraved in the minds of many Arabs, is 
based on pride in their past glory, their former military 
successes, their common Arabic language, their past artistic 
and scientific achievements, and their common cultural herit­
age and religion. Although there are both Christian and 
Moslem Arabs, the overwhelming majority of the Arabs are 
Moslem, and this to some extent at least provides a common 
bond among them. Arab nationalism then is based on the real­
ity of Arab cultural unity, and the achievement of one Arab 
state forms one of the Arab nation's three basic objectives, 
the other two being freedom from foreign domination and more 
rapid socio-economic progress. The vigor of the state-idea 
has already been shown in the formation of the Arab League, 
the Federation of Arab Republics, and various other functional 
Arab organizations.
The Lower Nile Valley, an Emerging Core Area
The core area role of the Lower Nile Valley, centered 
on Cairo, a city of 4.5 million people, is now widely recog­
nized, and that area's dominance is real or implicit in
^Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political
Geography," p. 110,
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political, social and economic activities throughout the Arab 
World.^ Cairo is the first city of North Africa as well as 
of the Arab World. Although its pre-eminence as a regional 
air transport center may be challenged by Beirut, Cairo is a 
major focal point of international air communications in the 
Arab World.
The Egyptian broadcasting service centered in Cairo
is the most extensive establishment of its type in the Arab
World. It is a government monopoly which aims to implement
the socialist revolution which began in 1952 with the over-
throwal of the monarchy by a revolutionary junta. For more
than twenty years the broadcasting service has forcefully
presented an Arab point of view with regard to world issues 
2
in general. The service includes overseas transmission in 
six different languages. There is a variety of programs 
directed to the Arabs in general from the Voice of the Arabs, 
The Middle East Broadcasting Service, and Radio Cairo. Among 
these stations, the Voice of the Arabs, which began trans­
mission in 1953, probably has the widest following. As its 
name suggests, its programs are heavily oriented to the Arab 
issues. The Voice of the Arabs transmits daily for twenty- 
two hours and thirty minutes. It has served as the most
Ijohn A. Haupert, "The United Arab Republic," Focus 
on the Middle East, ed. Alice Taylor [New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 55.
^U.A.R.: The Year Book 1966 (Cairo: Information
Administration, 1966), pp. 2^4-258.
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effective single medium for cultivating Pan-Arab feelings 
among the Arab people.
In addition to the influence of the Egyptian broad­
casting services, some of the Cairo newspapers, like Al-Ahram 
(The Pyramid), with a circulation of about half a million; 
Al-Akbar (The News), with a circulation of 400,000; and 
A1 -Gomhouriya (The Republic), with a circulation of 80 ,000 , 
are read throughout the Arab World.^ Al-Ahram is by far the 
most influential of these newspapers. The Al-Ahram enter­
prise produces several other publications including 
A1-Iqtissadi (The Economist), an economic world affairs review 
with a circulation of 8,000 copies; Al-Siyassah al-Dawliyyah 
(International Politics), a quarterly modeled on the New York 
Council on Foreign Relations' Foreign Affairs, with a circula­
tion of 10,000 copies; and A1-Taliah (The Vanguard), a monthly
representing socialist ideology, with a circulation of 12,000 
2
copies. All of the above publications circulate among the 
political, academic, and social elites throughout the Arab 
World.
All newspapers in Egypt are government operated. The 
Arab News Agency, formerly under the direction of the Hulton 
Press Organization in London, has been placed under government
^The Europa Yearbook 1972: A World Survey, Vol. II
: Éuropa Publications Limited, 1072), p. 4*67.(London
World Magazine, XXIII (September-October, 197 2), pp. 4-91
2
Nancy B. Turck, "The Authoritative A1-Ahram," Aramco
144
control. The Middle East News Agency is under the supervi­
sion of the government of Egypt. This new agency was estab­
lished to perform public relations services in the Arab 
World, transmitting general news and Arab public opinion.
With a controlled press, the Egyptian government has been 
consistently cultivating the Pan-Arabist movement since 1952.
Egypt has some of the best institutions of higher 
education in the Arab World. Other Arab states send a large 
number of university students to those institutions. There 
are five large universities, three of them located in Cairo. 
These are Ain Shams University, Al-Azhar University,^ and 
Cairo University. The other two, Alexandria University and 
Assiut University, are also located in the Nile delta area. 
These five institutions have a combined enrollment of about
150,000 students, some 30,000 of whom come from other Arab 
countries. The government of Egypt spends a large sum of 
money to encourage non-Egyptian Arab students to enroll in 
Egyptian institutions. In 1964-65, for instance, the govern­
ment alloted $1,435,000 in scholarships and special grants
3
for them.
Al-Azhar, established in 970 A.D., is the most pres­
tigious center for Islamic studies in the Arab World and 
the oldest continuously operating university on earth. Houari 
Boumedienne, the present head of the state of Algeria, is a 
graduate of Al-Azhar University.
2
International Handbook of Universities (Paris : The
International Association of Universities, 1971).
T
Louis Barron, Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: 
Africa (New York: Harper $ feow, Worldmark Press, 1967),
p. 341.
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In addition to the international influence of Egypt 
in the fields of journalism, education, and broadcasting, 
thousands of Egyptian teachers and technicians are employed 
throughout the Arab World. In 1960, 106, and in 1961, 111, 
university professors from Egyptian universities were "on 
loan" to Morocco, Libya, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.^ 
In 1960, 3,000; in 1961, 3,520; and in 1964, 4,302 carefully 
selected teachers went out from Egypt to other Arab countries 
where the primary and the secondary curricula are almost 
identical and the same textbooks are used. At least some 
Egyptian teachers are serving in all the other Arab countries, 
without exception, and they are involved with all levels of 
instruction. Egyptian lawyers have written the civil codes 
of Syria and Iraq. Egyptian contracting companies have 
undertaken large scale public construction projects in Jordan. 
Egyptian agronomists and irrigation engineers have served in 
the Sudan. In short, Egyptian technical personnel are working 
in almost every Arab country.
Egypt is also the dominant social and cultural center 
of the Arab World. Most of the Arab films are made in the 
studios of Alexandria. Egypt has the only cinema institute 
in the Arab World which trains experts in the various 
branches of the film industry. With its broad range of edu­
cational and cultural resources, Egypt has an enormous
^Education in the Arab States (New York: Arab Infor­
mation Center, l966), p. 286.
146
advantage over the other Arab countries. It is not surpris­
ing, then, that educated Arabs everywhere maintain a high 
regard for Egypt and its cultural contributions. Bint 
al-Shati' cited by Paris and Husayn, emphasizes the regard of 
the Arabs for Egypt:
On the Persian Gulf, on the extreme east of the Arabian 
Peninsula, in al-Qatif, are active learned men and 
literators who look to Egypt, hail its name, and applaud 
its contribution in the arts and the sciences. They 
are especially proud, as stated by Hasan ibn-Ali 
abu-al-Su'ud, of the bonds of blood, language, and reli­
gion which exist between them. They esteem Egypt, and 
find in Egyptian culture a rich source of refreshment and 
light. The same idea was expressed by another learned 
man of al-Qatif, Muhammad Sa'id al-Shykh al-Khunayzi, 
when he stressed the importance of the link of thought 
and spirit which binds the learned men both, in spite of 
the vast deserts and seas which separate them.l
The Arab League is centered in Cairo, as are eighteen 
of the other Arab organizations listed later in this chapter. 
The lower Nile Valley is thus a kind of focus for the entire 
Pan-Arab movement, and Cairo can reasonably be called the 
capital of the Arab World, the heart of Arabism.
Israel--The Integrative Value nf a 
Common Hostility
Since the creation of Israel in 1948 the Arab govern­
ments have found a common cause in their desire to eliminate 
that Jewish state and regain Palestine as a home for the 
hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians now living in
^Faris and Husayn, p. 180, quoting Bint al-Shati', 
Ard al-Mujizat ( " I g r a ' N o .  104; Cairo: September, 1951),ppT -nrmr' '
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refugee camps. Distance from Palestine and different levels 
of involvement with the refugee problem make the Israel issue 
of varying urgency from country to country, but the Arab 
nations are nearly all in theoretical agreement on the desired 
solution to that problem. In order to develop the capacity 
to liberate Palestine, unity among Arabs has been recognized 
as needing high priority. It is common knowledge that, up to 
now, political differences among the Arab states have made 
their struggle against Israel ineffective. Despite variations 
in the intensity of feeling about the matter, Arab govern­
ments have been forced to take a common stand against Israel 
by the popularity of the cause among the Arab masses. Out of 
their common opposition to Israel, Arab governments have 
taken the following steps with varying degrees of participa­
tion and success: (1) non-recognition of Israel, (2) mainte­
nance of a "state of belligerency" within the limits allowed 
by the Armistice Agreements, (3) cooperation in military 
action against Israel, (4) diplomatic and economic boycott, 
and (5) denial of Arab waterways to Israeli shipping.^
Even before Israel came into existence, the Arabs 
tried to block the creation of a Jewish state. On Decem­
ber 2, 1945, the Arab League decided to boycott Jewish 
products produced in Palestine and established a special com­
mittee to supervise the boycott. With the announcement of the
^Fayez A. Sayegh, Palestine, Israel and Peace (New 
York: Arab Information Center, 1970], p. 191
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end of the Palestine mandate in 1948, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, with varying levels of mili­
tary involvement, intervened in an effort to destroy the new 
Jewish state but with no success. The lack of co-ordinated 
military action among the Arab leaders left Egypt fighting 
almost alone to a humiliating defeat. Egypt signed the 
General Armistice Agreement in 1949. Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria all followed Egypt's example by signing separate 
Armistice Agreements.^ Since they had no common border with 
Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not sign the agreement, 
considering it to be unnecessary.
The military defeat came as a great shock to all 
Arabs. Increasing numbers of educated Arabs started to reap­
praise their social, economic, and political condition as 
they sought an explanation for the obvious Arab weakness.
Some of them became very discontented with their findings on 
the state of social, economic and political life. In Syria 
there was a considerable agitation among the young army 
officers favoring greater Arab unity. By the end of March, 
1949, an anti-government riot had forced the Syrian govern­
ment to resign, and a segment of the army took control
For a detailed, reasonably impartial analysis of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, see Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli 
Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), and for
the documentary records of the dispute see Walter Laqueur, ed., 
The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle 
East Conflict [New York: The Citadel Press, 1969).
149
through a military coup. Abdullah, the King of Trans-Jordan, 
accused of being a traitor to the Arab cause, was assassinated 
on July, 1951. A year later, in July, 1952, a group of army 
officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy of 
Egypt. The idea of greater Arab unity found an increasing 
number of followers among Arab leaders and laymen alike.
After their unsuccessful military operation, the 
Arabs concentrated their efforts on an economic and diplo­
matic boycott of Israel. Iraq stopped pumping oil through 
the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline. Syria and Saudi Arabia likewise 
cooperated in preventing Arab oil from reaching Israel.
Israel was forced to bring oil for its own domestic consump­
tion from Venezuela, 5,000 miles away, at much higher costs. 
The Arab governments cut off all kinds of contact with Israel. 
They discouraged Western firms doing business with Israel by 
threatening to prevent them from carrying on any business 
within the Arab World. Very strict regulations concerning 
the boycott were agreed upon by the Arab states. Although 
not all the Arab governments enforced the boycott as strictly 
as possible, they complied with it sufficiently to make it a 
fairly successful undertaking. Israel could have been badly 
hurt by the Arab boycott, but massive financial aid from Jews 
all over the world and from certain western governments saved 
it from disaster.
The Arabs found justification for the boycott in the 
interpretation of the Armistice Agreements, emphasizing the
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following points: (1) the agreements were dictated exclu­
sively by military considerations, (2) the demarcation line 
established by the armistice was not to be construed as a 
political or territorial boundary that would affect in any 
way the rights and the claims of the Arabs in the final 
settlement between the two parties. The Arabs thus contended 
that the Armistice Agreement of 1949 ended only the military 
phase of the dispute, and technically the state of war con­
tinued to exist. Under this interpretation, Arabs justified 
their boycott of Israel, their refusal to let Israeli ship­
ping pass through Arab waterways, and their continuance of a 
"state of belligerency."
Along with their boycott of Israel following the 
armistice of 1949, the Arabs pushed toward developing a joint 
military organization. In 1950, the Arab League established 
a Joint Defense Council, consisting of all the foreign 
ministers and defense ministers of the Arab countries. In 
the same year, a Permanent Military Commission was formed to 
draft the joint defense plans to be submitted to the Defense 
Council for approval. The Commission consisted of military 
representatives from the general staffs of the Arab countries. 
These military organizations, however, continued to be inef­
fective because of some mutual distrust among the Arab 
leaders and marked differences in their political and eco­
nomic outlook. The Israeli invasion of the Sinai in 1956, in 
collaboration with Britain and France, following Egypt's take
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over of the Suez Canal did not prompt other Arab countries to 
send assistance. One of the consequences of this short-lived 
war was the phenomenal rise of Nasser as the most influential 
champion of the Pan-Arab unity idea. All over the Arab World 
Pan-Arab sentiments were strengthened. In 1958 Syria and 
Egypt voluntarily merged to form the United Arab Republic.
In the same year Pan-Arabists came into power in Iraq after 
overthrowing the conservative regime of the monarchy.
The hostilities between Arabs and Israelis continued. 
In late 1963, when the Israeli project to divert Jordan River 
water for irrigation in the Negev was coming to a rapid com­
pletion, some of the Arab governments decided to react. They 
realized that the Negev project would deny badly needed water 
supplies to Jordan and that by increasing its irrigation 
capacity, Israel would be able to absorb more immigrants, 
thus enabling the Jewish state to increase its military 
potential. The Arab political leaders held a summit meeting 
in January, 1964, and decided to help finance an Arab water 
diversion scheme of their own on the major tributary of the 
Jordan River which would deny water to Israel. At the same 
time they decided to create an Arab Unified Military Command 
to coordinate subsequent military action in case of an 
Israeli attack. At their summit conference in September, 
1964, the Arab leaders agreed to go ahead with the Yermak 
River diversion plan, with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria collab­
orating on the engineering work. This action naturally
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intensified the water dispute between the Arabs and the 
Israelis. Sabotage and guerrilla attacks on the part of 
Arabs, and military reprisals on the part of Israel, became 
everyday occurrences. Considering the dangerous situation, 
Egypt and Syria signed a defense pact in 1966. Some months 
later, in May, 1967, Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt 
despite King Husain's general distrust of the Egyptian 
regime. War broke out once more in June, 1967, over the 
question of Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba, and once 
again the Arabs went down to a humiliating defeat. Following 
its lightning six-day military success, Israel took control 
of more Arab lands, occupying the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Golan Heights, and creating many more refugees (Figure 18).
When the Arabs realized that direct military 
confrontation with Israel was not to their advantage, Pales­
tinian guerrilla organizations were encouraged as a substi­
tute.^ Among the many guerrilla organizations, A1-Fatah is 
the largest. The existence of so many separate organizations 
with the same purpose, that of "liberating Palestine," shows 
the lack of united action among the Arabs. In 1970 an attempt
At least eleven separate guerrilla organizations have 
been formed, including the Black September Movement whose 
existence came to be known only in 1972 after the Olympic 
tragedy in Munich. The other ten are, A1-Fatah, As Saiqah, 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular 
Front, the Palestine Arab Organization, the Action Group for 
the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Liberation Front, the 
Popular Liberation Forces, and the Popular Struggle Front.
See the New York Times, June, 12, 1972, p. 13.
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was made to reorganize all the liberation organizations and 
put them under a centralized command but with only moderate 
success.^ The support of the Arab masses, however, continued 
to strengthen the guerrilla movement. In Jordan, the increas­
ing role of the guerrillas seriously undermined the authority 
of King Husain. As a result, Husain took strong military 
action against the guerrillas in 1971, and completely elimi­
nated them as an organized force from his kingdom. Husain 
was able to take this action even though Palestinians consti­
tuted the majority of the population of Jordan because the 
well trained and well equipped Bedouin army is loyal to the 
monarchy and has a traditional dislike for the urban Pales­
tinians. The firm action of King Husain against the guerril­
las was condemned as treason throughout the Arab World. Syria 
even intervened militarily on behalf of the guerrillas in a 
brief encounter, backing away only because of a serious 
warning from the United States. Despite Husain's action and 
Israel's periodic military reprisals, guerrilla activities 
continue from Lebanon and Syria.
The Palestinian refugees continue to command an 
intense emotional support from the Arab masses of all the 
Arab countries. This emotional support for the Palestinians 
and equally emotional hatred of Israel is now becoming more 
and more a common experience and supplementary basis for Arab
^New York Times, June 13, 1970, p. 12.
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unity. Before the 1967 June War there were approximately
1,500,000 Palestinian refugees, of whom 1,300,000 were regis­
tered with the United Nations Refugee Works Agency. Their 
distribution among the neighboring countries was as follows: 
Jordan, 722,687; Egypt (Gaza Strip), 316,776; Lebanon,
160,723; and Syria, 144,390. After the June War, additional 
Arabs joined the ranks of the refugees. Over 250,000 natives 
of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, and the 
Golan Heights of Syria, areas newly occupied by Israel, plus 
about 150,000 Palestinian refugees who had been in camps in 
those areas, had left Israeli-held territories by December, 
1967.^ These figures do not include 300,000 Egyptians with 
homes on the west bank of the Suez Canal who were moved into 
safer locations. A substantial scattering of refugees over 
the Arab World spread the feeling of frustration and hatred 
for Israel directly to the Arab masses, putting increasing 
pressure on Arab governments to act in unison on issues 
concerning Israel. Their presence will continue to prolong 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, radicalizing and uniting Arabs more 
and more.
The Arab military defeat of 1967 was followed by 
significant political changes favorable to greater Arab unity, 
as happened after the previous two wars of 1948 and 1956.
Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, July 1966-30 June 1967 
GA, OR 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 13 (A/6713), Table 2, p. 60.
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Muammar Ghadhafi, the most ardent advocate of Arab unity since 
Nasser, led a successful military coup in Libya in 1969.
Since then he has worked towards Arab unity with the fervor 
of a zealot. He was the spearhead for and main architect of 
the Federation of Arab Republics formed in 1971.
Oil--OPEC and Efforts at Joint Economic Planning
Oil is a very cohesive factor of great political 
importance in the Arab World. Reasons for this importance, 
as listed by the Arab Organization for Standardization and 
Metrology, are four:
(1) Oil is the main source of natural income for Arab 
countries and it is the basic resource for their economi­
cal and social development. It is the main income for 
the execution of industrial and agricultural projects and 
for the expansion of services.
(2) Oil will introduce Arab countries to modern 
technology and science. If the Arabs will carry-out the 
oil industry correctly and efficiently, they will make up 
for the lost progress in these and other fields.
(3) Oil still maintains and will continue to maintain 
its international economic power for long periods as a 
main source of energy, lubricating oil, road bitumen, 
petrochemical derivatives and raw materials for Industry 
and Agriculture in the world. The Arabs must exploit this 
situation wisely, particularly that they have the main 
oil reserves.
(4) Oil is the Arabs' effective tool for economical 
and social freedom which are not less important than 
political freedom which cannot exist without them.l
Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology, 
"Economical Importance of Coordination and Unification of 
Standardization in the Field of Petroleum Products," Paper 
No. 82(A-1) from Seventh Arab Petroleum Congress, "Papers of 
the Seventh Arab Petroleum Congress Organized by the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, Kuwait, 
March 16-22nd, 1970," Vol. I: "Economics," p. 13.
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Besides the four reasons for the importance of oil 
listed above, a fifth could be added. The need to maximize 
income from oil through joint action on prices and procedures 
is an important cohesive force among the Arab states. The 
oil-producing countries of the Arab World all share the same 
interest in fighting against domination by foreign companies 
and strive to increase domestic control of production, 
refining, and marketing so as to acquire greater revenue from 
their mineral wealth.^ Out of this unity of interest the 
Arabs have developed a set of common attitudes toward the 
major oil companies--attitudes which have been successfully 
translated into concrete policies and specific demand by the 
Arab governments. These demands are listed by George 
Lenczowski as follows:
(1) Intermittent demands for an increase in the host 
countries' share in the profits of the companies. After their 
successful effort in the 1950's in forcing the oil companies 
to adopt a profit sharing formula, the producing conntrie? 
have been able through continuing negotiations to decrease 
further the margin of profit of the oil companies and so to 
gradually raise their own revenues.
There are several non-oil-producing Arab countries, 
among them Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco, 
although Syria has begun development of the recently discov­
ered Kartchouk field. Some of these non-producers, however, 
have oil pipelines which pass through their territories and 
provide a significant amount of revenue for their governments.
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(2) Demands for a guaranteed minimum rate of growth 
of oil production.
(3) Demands for the introduction of new concession 
patterns. Old concession patterns that were highly favorable 
to the oil companies have been revised and replaced by new 
ones which include the partnership concept and shortened 
concession periods. Joint operations have been extended 
beyond mere exploration and production.
(4) Determination to end the dominance of a few big 
international companies, mostly American and British-Dutch, 
by negotiating concessions with independent corporations and 
governments. More and more concessions are being granted to 
Italian, French, Soviet Russian and Japanese firms.
(5) Insistence on joint bargaining with the foreign 
oil interests. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960 to increase the bargaining 
power of the surplus oil producing states. Later Arab 
governments formed their own Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1962. By the summer of 1970, 
its membership included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Dubai. OAPEC amended its 
membership requirements on December 9, 1971, to permit entry 
by states with "important export revenues from oil," thus 
eliminating the earlier requirement that members' oil produc­
tion be their "principal and basic source" of revenue. Since
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then Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have been granted membership in 
OAPEC.
(6) Demands for a greater voice in the determination 
of posted prices. At present, fluctuations in the oil supply 
from the Arab countries, competition from non-Arab exporters 
such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, and the disruption 
of the supply route through the Suez Canal have intensified 
this demand.
(7) The creation of state-owned (i.e., national) oil 
companies to develop oil resources outside the old concession 
areas, either directly or in partnership with new foreign 
corporations. Iran made the first move in this direction by 
establishing the National Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Now 
other Arab countries have followed suit and have gone one 
step further by attempting to establish joint Arab companies.
(8) Pressures for greater attention by the oil 
concessionaires to develop petrochemical industries and for 
capturing and using more of the flared gas.
(9) More vigorous planning for the establishment of 
national tanker fleets .
(10) Substituting national for foreign agencies in 
the local distribution of oil products.^
George Lenczowski, "Multinational Oil Companies: A
Factor in Middle East International Relations," California 
Management Review, XIII (Winter, 1970), p. 39.
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The foreign oil companies have, on the one hand, 
provided a target for joint Arab governmental efforts, and on 
the other hand have, by their control of the oil, molded the 
attitudes of the Arab people into one single outlook towards 
them. Although Lenczowski talks about two different attitudes, 
the conservative attitude of the conservative regimes and the 
radical attitude of the radical regimes, the conservative 
attitude seems to be limited to those states with ruling 
royal families, whereas the radical attitude, characteristic 
of the socialist and republican regimes, seems to pervade the 
general population of all the Arab countries. The conservative 
outlook, according to conventional Western criteria, might 
be called a realistic and pragmatic approach. While desiring 
an increase in oil revenue, the conservative regimes want to 
continue a good relationship with the foreign oil companies. 
These governments are dependent on oil revenue not only 
economically, but also politically. They think that the 
international oil companies' stake in the petroleum industry 
is so great that the democratic governments of the Western 
world, both American and European, would assist them--should 
internal crises develop--in preserving the political status 
quo. This confidence gives them a sense of security against 
either subversion or revolution from the inside or foreign 
intervention from the outside. The attitude of the radical 
regimes, which is also shared by many politically conscious 
Arab people in the monarchial states, is that the foreign oil
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companies are not something desirable to be perpetuated
forever. This attitude, according to Lenczowski, is based on
the following circumstances:
the presence in the host country of a large alien 
personnel enjoying salaries and amenities much above the 
local average;
an undue weight held by a single foreign company in 
the country's economy;
an excessive portion of the national wealth "siphoned 
off" the country;
the companies' alleged insincerity in promoting native 
personnel to higher responsible positions;
their cold-heartedness in treatment of local labor; 
their alliance with reactionary elements in society; 
their alleged political interference.!
Valid or not, the reasons listed above represent the preju­
dices of the radical outlook, and these feelings seem to be 
shared by the great majority of the Arab people.
From recent developments, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that even between radical regimes and conservative 
regimes the common purpose has narrowed their differences of 
approach in dealing with the oil companies. Radical regimes 
have resorted to quick nationalization whereas the conserva­
tive regime? are seeking the same objective through a more 
gradual approach.
In 1961, Iraq nationalized the North Rumalia oil 
concession area formerly controlled by Western oil companies. 
In February, 1971, Algeria nationalized the holdings of all 
the French oil companies operating in Algeria, seizing 
51 per cent of their shares. Libya nationalized all the
^Ibid., p. 41,
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assets of the British Petroleum Company within its territory 
in December, 1971.^ In June, 1972, the Iraqi government 
nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company owned by a composite 
of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, Compagnie Française des 
Pétroles, British Petroleum Company, Mobil Oil Corporation, 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Exxon), and the Gulbenkian 
Foundation. Iraq took the action in response to IPC's deci­
sion, for market reasons, to lower the oil production which 
would have reduced Iraq's oil revenues. In appreciation for 
France's stand toward the Arab cause, Iraq kept the door open 
to France for negotiations over its share in IPC. The 
other ten OPEC members, seven of which are Arab countries, 
not only supported Iraq's nationalization but also threatened 
to cut their own oil production if Western oil companies took 
any legal retaliation such as an embargo to hamper the flow 
of Iraqi oil. Western oil companies, fearing the threatened 
production cutback by OPEC countries, refrained from imposing 
any embargo and agreed to limit their negotiation to the 
appropriate level of compensation. Several of the OAPEC 
countries agreed to give financial help to the Arab states 
adversely affected by the nationalization, Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon. The last two of these also nationalized the IPC
Libya took the action to retaliate against the 
British government's inaction which allowed Iran to take over 
two Persian Gulf islands. Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb, 
twenty-four hours before Britain's defense treaties with the 
Persian Gulf Emirates were scheduled to expire.
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pipelines and terminal installations on their territory.
Libya and Kuwait cut their oil production level, reasoning 
that lowering production would force acceptance of national­
ized Iraqi oil in the world market. The Eighth Arab Petro­
leum Congress held in Algiers in June, 1972, announced its 
full support of Iraqi nationalization and urged other Arab 
countries to take full control of the oil industry along the 
line of Algeria's example.
The conservative oil-producing countries, on the 
other hand are negotiating for part ownership of the oil 
companies operating in their territories. The growing energy 
demand and the increasing threat of nationalization, which 
was given an added credence by Iraq's recent action, have 
forced the Western oil companies to grant the Arab countries' 
demand for participation. It was reported on October 23, 
1972, that the Western oil companies consisting of British 
Petroleum Company, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Gulf 
Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Company, Participations 6 Explora­
tions Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell Group, Standard Oil 
Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
and Texaco Inc., have agreed to a 25 per cent participation 
demand which is to rise to 51 per cent by 1983.^ In a press 
interview, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian oil minister and 
the negotiator on behalf of the Arab countries, was reported
^The Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1972.
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to have said that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi 
would assume 25 per cent participation in all oil companies 
operating in their territories, effective on January 1,
1973.^ Yamani also said that whatever happened in the con­
tinuing negotiations, the demand for 25 per cent participa­
tion was not negotiable. If the signing of the agreement 
were delayed, according to Yamani, the participation would be 
retroactive. Iraq was also involved to some extent in the 
negotiations. Except for its already nationalized IPC, Iraq 
was reported as willing to go along with the participation 
agreement in regard to Basrah Petroleum which was still 
operating in the South Rumalia oil field. The 25 per cent 
participation agreements became effective on January 1, 1973.
Existing Functional Integration-- 
A Modest Beginning
The Arab League
During 1943, after the campaigns of World War II had 
moved out of North Africa into Europe, some Arab leaders 
assembled to explore the possibility of Arab unity with a 
view towards translating the popular yearning for a greater 
national expression into concrete political reality. In the 
deliberations, everyone agreed on the principle of unity but 
disagreed on the appropriate methods for achieving it. Addi­
tional meetings followed. According to the Arab States
^Ibid. , December 18, 1972 .
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Delegations Office Information Paper #1, Introducing the 
League of Arab States, "the idealistic concept of outright 
and immediate unity, championed by the pan-Arabists was not 
even seriously considered by the conferees at Alexandria and 
Cairo (1944-1945)."^ The Arab leaders instead chose limited 
functional unity as a goal and gradualism as a method. By 
adopting this course, the Arab leaders chose to include all 
the Arab states in a loose economic and political union, 
rather than to form a more binding compact and a more effec­
tive organization with fewer Arab states.
Thus was born the Arab League, with "the triumph of 
universalists, as far as the territorial scope was concerned, 
and of gradualists and moderates, as far as functional scope 
was concerned."^ The League charter does not, however, prevent 
or obstruct a more compact and effective unity between two or 
more willing parties holding membership in the League. The 
charter members of the Arab League when it was founded in 
1945 were: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Yemen (presently the Arab Republic of Yemen). Since 
then, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen have joined the League.
Research Department, Arab States Delegations Office, 
Information Paper #1: Introducing the League of Arab States
(ed. rev.; New York: Tke Information Center, July, 1962),
p. 8. (Mimeographed)
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 9.
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Although the Arab League was a partial implementation 
of the idea of one Arab nation-state, the League itself is 
only "a regional organization of sovereign states designed to 
strengthen the close ties linking those states, and to coor­
dinate their policies and activities and direct them towards 
the common good of all the Arab countries.”  ^ The League's 
announced goal is certainly not the creation of one Arab 
state, although this idea helped inspire it. But to its 
credit, it has worked to bring about limited functional unity
which ultimately will help to bring the one Arab state closer 
2
to reality.
The Council is the supreme body of the Arab League 
and is composed of representatives of all member states, each 
state having a single vote. The Council convenes in ordinary 
session twice a year, in March and October. It also convenes 
extraordinary sessions upon the request of the members. The 
main task of the Council is to see the realization of the goals 
of the League. The Permanent Committees are charged with the 
task of laying down the principles of agreement among the 
member states, and then presenting them to the Council prior 
to their submission to these states. The Secretariat is 
headed by the Secretary-General who prepares the draft of the
^Ibid.
2
For a detailed analysis of the working of the League 
see Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States: A Study
in the Dymanics of Regional Organization (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965).
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League's budget and submits it to the Council for approval. 
The Secretariat is responsible for implementing the various 
decisions and resolutions of the respective committees 
(Figure 19).
(Political, Cultural,
COUNCIL
DEPARTMENTS
SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY-
GENERAL
PERMANENT COMMITTEES
Economic, Social, Military, 
Legal Affairs, Information, 
Health, Communications, and 
Arab Human Rights)
(Economic, Political,
Cultural, Social and Labor 
Affairs, Petroleum, Finance, 
Palestine, Health, Press and 
Information, Secretariat, 
Communications, and Protocol)
Fig. 19.--Structure of the Arab League
In implementing the structure shown in Figure 19, a
considerable number of specific functional organizations have
been established by the League. These include the following:
Economic Council 
Council of Arab Economic Unity 
Joint Defense Council 
Permanent Military Commission 
Arab States Broadcasting Union 
Federation of Arab News Agencies
Arab Financial Institution for Economic Development
Arab Postal Union
Arab Telecommunications Union
Permanent Commission for the Problems of the Arab Gulf 
Emirates 
Arab Labour Organization
Arab Board for the Diversion of the Jordan River 
Arab Unified Military Command
Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology (ASMO)
Arab Council for Civil Aviation
Arab Air Carriers' Organization (AACO)
Arab Union of Automobile Clubs and Tourist Societies 
Arab Engineering Union 
Arab Cities Organization
Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences
168
Administrative Tribunal of the League
Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
Arab Regional Literacy Organization
Institute of Arab Research and Studies
Institute of Arabic Manuscripts
Permanent Bureau for Co-ordination of Arabization in the 
Arab World 
Museum of Arab Culture 
Bureau for Boycotting Israel
Pan-Arab Organization for Social Defence against Crime 
The International Arab Bureau for Defence against Crime 
The International Arab Bureau for Narcotics 
The International Arab Bureau for Police Dealing with 
Crime.1
This list of Arab organizations is impressive, but it 
has not brought actual, effective functional integration to 
the Arab states. The decisions and resolutions passed by 
these various organizations are not automatically binding on 
all the member states of the Arab League. They are binding 
only on the contracting member states. Even when a resolution 
is accepted by a member state, there is no international 
machinery for implementing it if the signatory government 
later chooses to ignore it. With such diverse and conflicting 
economic and political systems as still exist among the 
members, uoi: juauy resolutions are actually implemented. 
Nevertheless, the international organizations formed under the 
impetus of the Arab League do provide some important forums 
for consultation by the member states. Some of the functional 
organizations have even shown real signs of effectiveness.
This list of organizations is from The Europa 
Yearbook. 1972: A World Survey, Vol. I (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1972), pp. 112-113.
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as for instance, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, the 
Bureau for Boycotting Israel, and the Joint Defense Council.
Several annual conferences by Arab Lawyers, physicians, 
engineers, and educators have a profound influence in bringing 
the various Arab countries closer together. In the year 1969 
alone there were a total of fifteen meetings or conferences 
of various League-related organizations, and several other 
meetings of Arab political leaders.^
The Arab Common Market
During the 1950's and the 1960's, after several
decades of continued disintegration of Arab economic ties,
attempts were made by the Arab governments to increase inter-
Arab trade. Several bilateral and multilateral trade agree-
2
ments were signed. Within the framework of limited economic 
integration that has been achieved since 1950, only the multi­
lateral agreements contracted under the supervision of the 
Arab League will be mentioned here.
The Bureau for Boycotting Israel committee and the 
OAPEC committee each met twice. The Arab Economic Council, 
the Arab Economic Unity Council, the Arab League's Informa­
tion Committee, the Arab League's Council of Foreign Minis­
ters, the Arab League (as a whole), the Arab League Agricul­
tural Ministers, the Joint Defense Council, the Chiefs of 
Staff of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, the Arab Health 
Ministers (their First Conference), and Arab oil experts 
each met once in the year 1969. There was also that year a 
summit meeting of the Arab heads of state.
^A list of the bilateral trade agreements signed by 
the Arab countries between 1920 and 1963 is given in Alfred G, 
Musrey, An Arab Common Market: A Study in Inter-Arab Trade
Relations, 1920-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969) ,
ppl 130-151.
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In April, 1950, a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic 
Cooperation among the states of the Arab League was signed by 
Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and 
Yemen.1 As a direct consequence of this treaty, an agreement 
was reached to establish an Economic Council for the Arab 
States. Following its creation, the Economic Council organ­
ized two important conventions.
In September, 1953, delegates assembled at a Conven­
tion for the Facilitation of Trade Exchange and Regulation of 
Transit Trade among States of the Arab League. The conven­
tion concluded a treaty, signed by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, providing for; (1) the 
exemption from import duties of agricultural and livestock 
products as well as natural resources, provided their origin 
is in the contracting Arab states; (2) most-favored nation 
treatment among Arab countries in regard to import and export 
permits, and reduced tariff schedules on Arab industrial 
goods; and (3) the facilitation of transit across the terri­
tory of the signatory countries by every means of transport.
Document Number 43, "Treaty of Joint Defense and 
Economic Cooperation among the States of the Arab League," 
in Khalil, Vol. II: International Affairs, pp. 101-105.
2
Document Number 50, "Convention for the Facilitation 
of Trade Exchange and the Regulation of Transit Trade among 
States of the Arab League," in Khalil, Vol. II: International
Affairs, pp. 122-125.
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in accordance with the internal rules and regulations of the 
contracting state.^
Another convention held in 1953 concluded an agree­
ment for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions
7
and the Transfer of Capital among States of the Arab League," 
This agreement aims to facilitate the international transfer 
of capital by providing for the transferability of credit 
accounts involved in multilateral trade. The treaty was 
signed by the same six Arab states which ratified the trade 
treaty.
Several additional economic agreements followed these 
two. In 1957 the Arab Financial Institution for Economic 
Development was established to consolidate the existing 
economic ties and to accelerate the economic development of 
Arab countries. In 1962 the Arab Economic Unity Agreement 
was signed by Jordan, Tunisia, the Sudan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, and Kuwait.
The objective of this agreement was a remarkable one--to
Three lists of articles were annexed to the conven­
tion: (a) agricultural products and natural resources which
are exempted from import duties; (b) industrial products 
which are subject to a 25 per cent reduction in import duties; 
and (c) industrial products which are subject to a 50 per cent 
reduction in import duties. For the three lists, see Musrey, 
An Arab Common Market, pp. 156-168.
2
Document Number 51, "Convention for the Settlement 
of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer of 
Capital among States of the Arab League," in Khalil, Vol. II: 
International Affairs, pp. 125-127.
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establish a complete economic unity among the signatories.^
In order to achieve complete economic unity the contracting 
parties agreed to create a single customs unit under one 
unified administration with a common customs tariff and 
common customs laws and regulations, to unify import and 
export policies and regulations, to unify transport and 
transit regulations, and to pursue a common economic policy. 
To carry out the objectives of the Arab Economic Unity Agree­
ment, a Council of Arab Economic Unity was established in 
June, 1964.
A substantive step was taken by the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity in August, 1964, with the creation of an Arab 
Common Market. Its objectives as stated in the Arab Common 
Market Resolution were as follows:
1. The freedom of movement of persons and capital.
2. The freedom of exchange of domestic and foreign
goods and products.
3. The freedom of residence, work, employment, and 
exercise of economic activity.
4. The freedom of transport and transit and of the
use of the means of transportation and of the ports and
civil airports.J
^See the text of the Arab Economic Unity Agreement in 
ibid., pp. 169-177.
^In 1964 the Arab Common Market Resolution was rati­
fied by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria. Kuwait's 
National Assembly, however, voted in 1965 not to implement 
the terms of the agreement. The Sudan became a signatory of 
the agreement in 1968. Lebanon, with its free enterprise 
economy, is hesitant, but has expressed willingness to join 
in some other form of economic association.
^The full text of the Arab Common Market Resolution 
may be found in Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 178.
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The objectives of the Common Market were to be 
achieved in five successive stages starting January 1, 1965. 
Items on List A, specific agricultural products annexed to 
the Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and Regulating 
Transit between the States of the Arab League, were to be 
exempted from customs duties immediately, and the products 
not included on List A were to be subjected to a 20 per cent 
annual reduction in five successive years. The products 
contained in Lists B and C were to be subjected to an immedi­
ate 35 per cent reduction followed by a 10 per cent annual 
reduction. The final 5 per cent reduction was to take place 
on July 1, 1971 (Table 2}.
In the spirit of the Arab Common Market Resolution, 
there has, since 1965, been a significant reduction of 
tariffs on industrial products; dues and other administrative 
restrictions on agricultural, animal, and natural wealth 
products have been removed; and the list of products exempt 
from customs tariffs has increased to more than 570 items.
The goal of complete economic unity, however, is still to be 
achieved. A provision was included in the Common Market 
Resolution for the contracting parties to retain the right to 
reserve, with justifiable reasons, certain of their products 
from exemptions or reductions in the customs duties and other 
duties, as well as from the removal of administrative 
restrictions. Under this provision, the Arab governments have
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exercised a great deal of discretion in selecting the items
to be included at each stage of tariff reduction.
TABLE 2
RATE OF REDUCTION IN THE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND OTHER
DUTIES ON THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
CONTAINED IN LISTS "B" AND "C"
Date of 
Reduction List B List C
1/1/1965 35% 60%
1/1/1966 45% 70%
1/1/1967 55% 80%
1/1/1968 65% 90%
1/1/1969 75% 100%
1/1/1970 85% •
1/1/1971 95% •
7/1/1971 100% •
Source: Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 182
fAnnendix I . Arab Common Market Resolution!
Political instability within the Arab states, occa­
sional conflict among some of them, and the scarcely compati­
ble economic systems of the socialist and non-socialist 
economies of the Arab states have greatly slowed the process 
of economic integration. Thus, July, 1971, did not, as 
anticipated, see the complete abolition of tariffs among the 
Arab Common Market countries. Intra-Arab trade, during the
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period of tariff reduction, even failed to show a marked 
increase.
Complete economic unity, then, even among the Arab 
Common Market signatories, remains unfulfilled. Although 
full economic integration is still far from achieved, the 
effort to achieve it continues. In August, 1970, the Arab 
Economic Unity Council adopted a resolution favoring an 
agreement on the free movement of capital, formation of an 
Arab Investment Company, establishment of a Union of Arab 
Airline Companies, and co-ordination in the production and 
marketing of pharmaceutical products. In May, 1971, Jordan, 
Kuwait, the Sudan, Syria, and Egypt signed an agreement setting 
up an Arab Establishment for Investment Insurance to be based 
in Kuwait with a capital of 10 million Kuwaiti dinars.^ In 
August, 1971, the member states of the Arab Economic Unity 
Council decided that in 1975 they will start co-ordinating 
economic and social development plans. The Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, with a starting capital of 
100 million Kuwaiti dinars, became operational in February, 
1972. The Arab countries participating in this fund are 
Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, the Sudan, Libya,
Besides these multilateral agreements, a number of 
belateral and trilateral agreements between Arab states have 
been signed.
176
Lebanon, and South Yemen.^ Hard currency earnings by the 
OAPEC countries are at such a level that a considerable 
expansion of the fund may be anticipated.
The contributions from the participating countries 
are as follows: Kuwait, 30 million dinars; Egypt, 7 million
dinars; Iraq, 5 million dinars; Syria, 2 million dinars; 
Algeria, 2 million dinars; Jordan, 1 million dinars; the 
Sudan, 1 million dinars; Libya, 1 million dinars; Lebanon,
600,000 dinars; and South Yemen, 10,000 dinars. "Middle East 
in Transition," New Outlook, XIV (September, 1971), p. 52.
CHAPTER VI 
DIVISIVE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD
The preceding three chapters have analyzed respec­
tively the idea of one Arab state, the core area situation 
within the Arab World, and the cohesive forces at work 
within that region. On examining these aspects alone, it 
would seem that the Pan-Arab idea is moving toward fulfill­
ment. Certainly the present Federation of Arab Republics, 
which involves a functional unity of Egypt, Libya, and Syria, 
could be taken as partial fulfillment of that goal. Complete 
fulfillment of the unity idea is still hindered, however, 
by the strong divisive forces operating in the Arab World. 
Even within the present political Federation of Arab Repub­
lics, the functional integration has not kept pace. The 
divisive forces that are obstructing the idea of Arab unity 
can be grouped under four main headings--geopolitical and 
spatial factors, factors deriving from the presence of non- 
Arab minorities, political factors, and economic factors.
Geopolitical and Spatial Factors Hindering the 
Political Idea of One Arab State
Geopolitical and spatial factors hindering the devel­
opment of the idea of one Arab state are the following:
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external (i.e., big power) strategic considerations within 
the Arab World, the overall low population density and the 
vast expanses of desert separating populated areas, the 
developing local loyalties and rigidities which follow 
achievement of national sovereignty, and the particularly 
acerbic discontiguity of the political area of the idea caused 
by the establishment of Israel.
Strategic considerations
The strategic importance of the Arab World lies 
primarily in its position as a crossroads controlling impor­
tant intercontinental corridors of air and sea transport, in 
the availability within it of several major airfields and 
naval bases capable of supporting global military operations, 
and in the presence of huge reserves of oil. The strategic 
position occupied by the Arab people has led the world's 
great powers into contention for influence and control of the 
area. This contention has adversely affected realization of 
the political idea of one Arab state, and has tended to 
divide the region into antagonistic spheres of influence.
Following the end of World War II the Arab World, 
particularly the Middle East portion of it, was widely 
regarded as one of the most important strategic areas in the 
world. A passage from John C. Campbell's Defense of the 
Middle East argues the point:
"So far as the sheer value of territory is concerned 
there is no more strategically important area in the
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world.,.." These frequently quoted words of General 
Dwight Eisenhower with reference to the Middle East were 
spoken in 1951. It is a conclusion which would seem to 
be the lesson of history. Over the centuries the great 
powers o£ the world have sought to establish themselves 
in this critically situated zone astride the communica­
tions linking three continents and two oceans. In and 
across it France, Britain and Russia struggled for posi­
tions of vantage throughout the 19th century. It was in 
the Middle East that the Western Allies in World War I 
first cracked the resistance of the Central Powers and 
opened the way for Germany's ultimate defeat. It was by 
holding the Middle East in World War II that they opened 
a vital supply route to Russia, prevented a junction of 
German and Japanese forces, and made possible the assault 
on Europe from the south. Its role in any future war 
between the West and the Soviet Union would seem to be 
crucial.^
This view was also supported by some of the general geopolit­
ical ideas prevalent at the time. The conflict between the 
Communist nations on one hand and the United States and its 
allies on the other was often viewed as a struggle between 
the "Heartland" and the "Rimlands."^ The Soviet Union and 
China were seen as dominating the Heartland in the Eurasian 
land mass, where it was surrounded by non-Communist power, 
controlling the coastal areas, or Rimlands. Specific 
examples of tne interest of the large powers in the region 
during the period are: the Soviet desire for a share in the
John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East:
Problems of American Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
I960) , p . 167, quoting U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, United States 
Foreign-Aid Programs in Europe, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
July 7-23, 1951 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1951) , p. 277.
n
Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality 
(New York: Holt, 1942), and Nicholas 5pykman, The Geography
of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944).
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defense of the Turkish Straits, British and American concern 
with the outcome of the civil war in Greece, the Truman 
Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey, the British sponsorship 
of the Baghdad Pact, the British and French intervention along 
with Israel following the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal, 
the American intervention in Lebanon, and the Russian offer 
of military and economic assistance to Egypt.
By the 1960's the geopolitical situation had changed 
somewhat. Soviet Russia was no longer contained within the 
bounds of Mackinder's Heartland and had made a significant 
penetration of the Rimlands. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had 
become friendly partners of Russia, and their airports and 
naval bases had become available for Soviet use. From the 
point of view of the United States and its allies, the devel­
opment of intercontinental missiles and nuclear-powered 
submarines lessened the necessity of having as many advanced 
air and naval bases on the immediate periphery of Communist 
Russia. Changing military technology does not mean, however, 
that the Middle East region has lost its political, economic, 
or even military importance for either of the great powers.
Analyzing the global strategic situation of the early 
1960's, Saul Bernard Cohen referred to the Middle East as the 
"Shatterbelt," a term more often applied to east central 
Europe. The Shatterbelt, according to him, is a "large, 
strategically located region that is occupied by a number of 
conflicting states and is caught between conflicting
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interests of the Great P o w e r s . C o h e n  excludes the Maglireb, 
i.e., Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, from his Shatterbelt, 
preferring to include northwestern Africa within the same 
geopolitical region as Maritime Europe. Combining the Maghreb 
and Maritime Europe as one geopolitical region now seems no 
longer in accord with reality. There is a common sharing of 
the Mediterranean Sea, and there remain substantial trade 
ties, particularly between the Maghreb states and France.
The Maghreb, however, is still an underdeveloped area, like 
some of the eastern Arab states rich in oil and other mineral 
resources, but largely dependent for its development on the 
capital and managerial skills of the industrial countries and 
with a modest level of general maritime trade. Furthermore, 
the Maghreb is contiguous to the Arab states of Cohen's 
Shatterbelt, has quite similar political, social, and cultural 
characteristics, and is an area of comparable interest to the 
great powers. To this writer it seems appropriate to include 
all the Arab World in the Shatterbelt concept. In order to 
justify this designation, the Arab states do not have to be 
in conflict among themselves. It is sufficient that they 
occupy a region of contention between the two antagonistic 
great powers or power-blocs.
The nuclear era has no doubt seen some lessening of 
the military-strategic importance of the Arab World, but
^Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a 
World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), p . 2 29 .
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economically the region possesses even more importance today 
to the great powers than it had ten or twenty years ago.
The economic importance of the Arab lands to the world as 
a whole lies primarily in their control of vast oil reserves 
which appear essential to the survival of the industrial 
nations of the Free World during the balance of the twentieth 
century. Of the total estimated oil reserves of the world,
54 3,000,000,000 barrels, the Arab World alone accounts for 
32 2,000,000,000 barrels, 59 per cent of the total.^ Of the 
Free World average daily production of 45,000,000 barrels in 
1970, non-Communist Europe produced only 322,000 barrels 
and the United States only 9,610,000 barrels. In the year 
1970 the Arab World countries produced an average of 
15,000,000 barrels per day, or almost 40 per cent of all 
Free World production. With the exception of Canada, the 
only major country in the industrialized Free World which 
does not import most of its oil is the United States. In 
1972, because of looming shortages, the United States was 
importing about 25 per cent of its total consumption. 
According to Otto N. Miller, chairman and chief executive 
of the Standard Oil Company of California, United States 
imports are expected to increase to around 50 per cent of 
consumption within ten years. On the basis of present
p. 50 .
^"World Trend," World Oil, CLXXIII (August, 1971), 
^The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1972.
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data, according to a recent article in the Wall Street 
Journal, the declining reserves of the forty-eight contiguous 
states of the United States have a life span of perhaps 
twelve years. It is estimated that even including the North 
Slope oil of Alaska, the nation in 1980 will still be produc­
ing at about the 1970 rate. A rapidly increasing dependence 
on foreign imports seems virtually certain.^ Recently, in 
the face of decreasing home production, the United States 
Government lifted the oil import level in order to stabilize 
the domestic price and assure an adequate supply.
The dependence of West European countries on imported 
oil, particularly oil from the Arab World, for their economic 
survival may be illustrated by the example of France. In 
recent years more than three-fourths of France's oil supply 
has come from the Arab World (Table 3) .
The Western World as a whole is dependent on Arab oil 
for most of its present oil supply. Experts do not see any 
feasible substitute for oil for at least another ten or 
fifteen years and possibly not until after the year 2000. By 
1980 the world oil demand is estimated to rise from the 
present forty-five million barrels per day to about eighty 
million barrels per day. To meet this demand an additional
^Ray Vicker, "Coming Conflicts over Arab Oil," The 
Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1972.
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fourteen or fifteen million barrels per day will have to be 
supplied by the Arab World.^
TABLE 3
SOURCES OF FRENCH OIL IMPORTS IN 1966-1967 
[Figures in Thousands of Tons)
Sources 1966 1967 (Jan.-June)
Algeria 19,180 10,237
Iraq 10,581 4,029
Kuwait 8,335 4,997
Libya 7,572 4,095
Qatar 1,852 722
South Arabia 3,046 2,076
Other Arab countries 3,454 1,800
Total Arab World 53,820 29,956
Total sources 68,662 35,973
Source: New Outlook: Middle East Monthly, II (Feb-
To satisfy their need for oil, the Western World 
countries have a huge private and public investment in petro­
leum exploration, drilling, marketing, refining, and trans­
portation. Table 4 illustrates the size of the Western 
World's economic stake in the oil industry in countries out­
side the Western World. Nearly 82 per cent of the OPEC
^Oil and Gas Journal, LXX (April 24, 1972), p. 38.
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countries' oil production is owned by the eight big Western 
oil companies listed in the table. Only Iran, Indonesia, and 
Venezuela are non-Arab OPEC countries.
TABLE 4
WESTERN OIL COMPANIES' SHARE OF 
OPEC PRODUCTION, 1970
Company Percentage
Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon) 18.3
British Petroleum 15.5
Royal Dutch/Shell 11.5
Gulf 9 . 5
Texaco 8.7
Standard Oil of California 8.1
Mobil 5. 3
Compagnie Française des Pétroles 5.0
Total 81.9
Source: "Is a Cartel Next for Oilmen?" Business
Week, January, 1971, p. 70.
In 1971, among the international oil companies. 
Standard of New Jersey (Exxon) made a net income of 
$1,516,600,000; Royal Dutch/Shell, $847,000,000; Mobil, 
$540,800,000; Texaco, $903,900,000; Gulf, $561,400,000; 
Standard Oil of California, $511,000,000; and British
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Petroleum, $357,000,000;^ Half of the oil distributed on the 
world market is produced and sold by the American firms. 
Two-thirds of this is extracted by American companies opera- 
ting in the Middle East and North Africa.
What goes on in the Arab World then is vital to the 
strategic military and economic interests of the Western 
World. Campbell, on viewing the recent trend toward closer 
ties between Soviet Russia and the Arab countries , cautions 
of the possible consequences:
Should the trend continue . . . , it would be a 
catastrophe for the United States and the Western World. 
The whole uncommitted world would see the writing on the 
wall. NATO would be outflanked. Once in control of 
Middle Eastern oil, Moscow would have its grip on Europe's 
jugular vein. It could hardly be long before our European 
allies would be forced to consider accommodation on-Soviet 
terms which would leave the United States isolated.
In spite of warnings from Campbell and other Western 
analysts, Russian influence in the Arab World has continued 
to increase, with only minor setbacks. To be sure, most of 
the Russian military personnel assigned there as advisers 
were ousted from Egypt in August, 1972. The ouster has been 
interpreted in part as Egyptian retaliation for Russia's 
refusal to supply certain long-range offensive weapons, and
^"The Middle East Squeeze on the Oil Giants," 
Business Week, July, 1972, p. 54.
^"Middle East in Transition," New Outlook, XII 
(January, 1969), p. 61.
^Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 161-162.
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in part as an expression of Egypt's earnest expectation that 
the ouster of Russians will prompt the United States to 
pressure Israel to come to some sort of permanent territo­
rial settlement. No prompt settlement was forthcoming, 
however, to the utter disappointment of Egypt. Neither was 
Egypt successful in obtaining the needed military equipment 
from the Western World. Little choice was left for Egypt but 
to start mending its relations with Russia. In the past 
several months Egypt has been doing just that. The August, 
1972, ouster of Russian military advisers from Egypt could 
have been a major setback for Soviet-Egyptian relations, but 
conditions subsequent to the event have turned it into a 
minor one.
The Soviet Union, with its multi-pronged attack 
including military assistance, economic assistance, diplo­
matic pressure, a strong naval presence, and, most recently, 
its offer of a market for Arab oil, has penetrated the Arab 
World far more deeply than it had in 1968 when Campbell made 
the statement must quoted. The latest move of the U.S.S.R., 
offering another outlet for Arab oil, may well have far- 
reaching consequences. It could greatly accelerate the 
process of nationalizing Western operations, because the need 
to have assured markets for the oil has been the biggest 
deterrent to Arab nationalization in the past. Nationaliza­
tion, a process which has now begun [chapter v), may be
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expected to lead to sharply higher fuel costs for the oil
consumers in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States,
In recent years, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, the Sudan,
Syria, and both Yemens have received economic and military
assistance from the U.S.S.R.^ A 1972 tabulation of Soviet
aid shows about one hundred projects under way in Egypt,
eighty in Algeria, seventy in Iraq, fifty in Syria, and forty 
2
in South Yemen. In May, 1972, the U.S.S.R. strengthened its 
ties with Syria by signing a new military treaty, and with 
Iraq by signing a fifteen-year treaty of friendship. Some­
what earlier, in May, 1971, the Soviets signed a similar 
treaty with Egypt. Only Algeria among the major Soviet aid 
recipients, has rebuffed any binding treaty with the U.S.S.R. 
Nonetheless, Algeria too leans more towards the East than the 
West.
In the past the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Middle East 
and North African oil was viewed by the Western World as only 
a negative one: to hamper the delivery of Arab oil to the
Western World. The Soviets could then utilize their dominance 
for their own political ends in the region.^ The Soviet 
Union for many years has regarded the Western presence in the
Morocco also has received token amounts of Soviet 
aid, but it is accepted to satisfy the leftist element inside 
the country rather than for any other purpose.
^The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1972.
^Mordehai Nahumi, "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the 
Middle East," New Outlook, XI [September, 1968), p. 10.
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Arab World, particularly Western military bases there, as a 
threat to the vulnerable Soviet Moslem borderlands.^ Now the 
situation has changed. Commenting on some of the recent 
Soviet agreements with Arab World countries, Mordehai Nahumi 
states :
The U.S.S.R.'s oil needs will increase as it goes 
deeper into the automobile age; its large distances are 
liable to lead it to prefer to import oil for certain 
regions while exporting her own oil and oil products from 
other places. The U.S.S.R., like France, is interested 
today in sharing in the distribution . . .  of oil. This 
undoubtedly, is a source of growing conflict between _ 
America (and England) and the Soviet Union in the region.
On examining the great power competition for influence 
in the Arab World, one has to recognize a present division of 
the Arab countries into three groups. One group, consisting 
of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen is dependent on the 
U.S.S.R.'s supply of military equipment. Another group, con­
sisting of Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, and the Union of Arab Emirates, is 
similarly dependent on the United States and other Western 
countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France. The 
remaining Arab countries do not fit in either group. Algeria 
and Libya are not committed to the Soviet Union by a treaty, 
as are Egypt, Iraq and Syria, but they are extremely opposed 
to United States, British, and West German support for
1
Geoffrey Wheeler, "Soviet and Chinese in the Middle 
East," The World Today, XXII (February, 1966), p. 76.
^Nahumi, "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle 
East," p. 12,
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Israel. The Sudan is considered anti-Soviet because of its 
rebuff to the Communist coup of 1971, but it is still hardly 
on friendly terms with the United States. Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Qatar maintain friendly relations with the Western 
countries.
Natural and man-made barriers 
to Arab world unity
Richard Hartshorne once asserted that: "Of human
barriers, the most common is the absence of humans."^ The 
Arab World includes vast voids where few or no people live.
The extent of the empty or near-empty space in the Arab World 
can be visualized by the armchair traveler with a cursory 
look at the map (Figures 20 and 21). More than 80 per cent of 
the land area of the Arab World has a density of less than 
five persons per square mile. Large portions of that land 
area receive four inches or less of precipitation per year 
and are almost without natural vegetation. The start natural 
barriers within the Arab World, however, have never been 
completely effective as a means of separation. On the con­
trary, widespread nomadism was a form of adjustment to the 
environment. The mobility of the nomads created instability 
in the Arab World, and there were periodic invasions through­
out history until political boundaries firmly dividing the 
Arabs into several units were finally drawn by European
^Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political
Geography," p. 107.
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powers within the past century. A major consequence of the 
unrestricted movement of the people in the past was the spread 
of the Arabic language throughout what we now call the Arab 
World.
In the modern period, the number of nomads and the 
range of their migrations have been drastically curtailed by 
the settlement policies of the responsible governments. 
Political boundaries have taken on cultural, economic, and 
legal meaning, and Arab nomadism is now inadequate to produce 
the harmonizing and unifying effect it had in the past (See 
Figure 22 and Table 5 for the areas of nomadism and their 
distribution by states).
The political area of the idea of one Arab nation­
state extends approximately 4,000 miles from east to west and
2,000 miles from north to south. Within this tremendous area, 
the distance factor is a very significant hindrance to commu­
nication and contact. The frequency and density of transac­
tions --visits, messages, or interactions of any kind diminish 
with distance. The political significance of such transac­
tions on the formation of political attitudes has been noted 
by Karl Deutsch, Edward Soja, and a number of other writers.^ 
While Cairo has become a major focal center for the Arab
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives 
(New York: Alfred A. KnopFj 1969), and Edward Soja, The
Geography of Modernization in Kenva: A Spatial Analysis of
Social, Economic^ and Political Cnange (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University ï’ress, 1968).
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TABLE 5
NOMADISM IN THE ARAB WORLD'
Country
Total
Population
Number of 
Nomads
Algeria 12 ,943 ,000 135,000^
Egypt 31,500,000 SO ,000^
Iraq 8,500,000 300,000^
Jordan 2,100,000 25,000^
Libya 1,802,000 255,000^
Morocco 14,580,000 20,000^
Saudi Arabia 7 ,000 ,000 100,000^
Sudan 14,770,000 260,000®
Syria 5,652,000 350,000®
Tunisia 4,660,000 3,000^
The number of nomads shown should be considered an 
àppxüAimacion, since no official count is available.
^UNESCO, Nomades et Nomadisme au Sahara (Paris,
1963), p. 22.
^W. B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Social and Regional
Geography (London; Methuen ^ Co. ,' Ltd. , l97l), p . 103.
d.,
pp. 1-12
Taylor, ed.. Focus on the Middle East, p. 102. 
'Arab News and Views, XV (August-September, 1969),
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World, the frequency of transactions between Cairo and the 
other Arab communities obviously diminishes with distance.
The presence of several existing political units 
within the political area of the idea is obviously a further 
obstacle to unity of either thought or action. Jean Gottmann 
and Boyd Shafer have discussed in convincing detail the role 
of human ingenuity and common cultural experience in building 
political consciousness.  ^ Each political unit tends to cre­
ate its own symbols, or iconography, in the form of, for 
example, patriotic slogans, a national flag, and a national 
anthem. These symbols reflect pride in past glory, histori­
cal or religious events, national heroes, and prominent 
cultural figures. Once the iconography is created, it 
resists change. Because of their characteristic youth as 
political entities, the Arab countries demonstrate their 
iconography mainly in their national flags--which came to 
exist, however, only in the twentieth century. For the most 
part, Arab iconography, based on pride in past Arab glory, 
the Prophet Mohammed, the Koran, and the Arabic language, is 
shared by all Arabs. Even the symbols used for the national 
flags arc the same in two of the Arab countries, Iraq and 
Syria (Figure 23). Egypt's flag has two stars and Libya's 
has none--otherwise these two are identical with the flags of
Jean Gottmann, La politique des états et leur 
rëographie (Paris; Librairie Armand Colin, 1952), and Shafer, 
JationalTsm: Myth and Reality.
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Syria and Iraq. The national flags of the Sudan, Yemen, and 
South Yemen also bear a notable similarity to the four others 
just mentioned. The flags of all of the countries that are 
within the political action area and the highly potential area 
as defined in this study, except for the flags of Jordan and 
Lebanon, could be assimilated into one with only minor 
modifications.
National boundaries not only hinder international 
movement and encourage separate systems of iconography, they 
also tend to create what Rejai and Enloe have called "state- 
nations" instead of nation-states.^ These writers see the 
developing countries within spatial frameworks left by the 
colonial powers as states with fixed political boundaries 
where the process of nation-building is having to take place 
after the establishment of the state. In most of the Euro­
pean countries, the nation preceded and helped to create the 
state, whereas in the developing countries more typically the 
state has preceded and is creating the nation.
Some elaboration of this distinction is perhaps in 
order. Most of the developing countries were once under 
colonial rule, and their present political boundaries were 
drawn by the colonial powers. The boundary lines were either
Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States 
and State-Nations," International Studies. Quarterly, XIII,
No. 2 (1969), pp. 140-158, and Rupert Emerson, "The Problem 
of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nation: The
Situation of Africa," Comparative Politics., II (April, 1969), 
pp. 305-310.
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internal administrative boundaries of convenience, or they 
were compromise lines separating spheres of imperial influ­
ence. The removal of colonial rule left many of the develop­
ing countries a citizenry consisting of heterogeneous cultural 
elements. Even where the population was relatively homogene­
ous, it was still politically undeveloped and disorganized.
The new and often inexperienced national leaders have had a 
formidable task in trying to integrate the population success­
fully into cohesive nation-states.
In the process of creating a state-nation, separate 
administrative, legislative, judicial, and military personnel 
are a necessity. There develops a group of elites with vested 
interests in maintaining the state, who recognize that polit­
ical integration with other states would raise the possibil­
ity of losing their newly acquired positions of privilege. 
Individuals in the elite groups tend to resist political 
integration unless they see a hope for even greater personal 
opportunity within the larger unit.
One of the reasons given by Tibawi for the breakdown 
of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 was the opposi­
tion of the Syrian elites to the intended land reform pro­
gram.^ Although this program was meant to bring about a more 
uniform system of land ownership throughout the new United
'"A. L. 'I'ibawi, A Modern History of Syria including 
Lebanon and Palestine (Hew York: 3tl Martin's Press, i960) ,
p. idV.
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Arab Republic, and so to be an important step in promoting a 
real integration between the two countries, it threatened to 
undercut the economic power of the Syrian elites who ulti­
mately broke the union.
Thus, it is often from the top that the sense of 
nationalism is cultivated, and the feeling for it has had to 
infiltrate downward instead of through the reverse process as 
in the case of many of the European countries. Independent 
native rulers have literally undertaken to create their own 
nation. In the process of creating a nation, the leadership 
has had to adopt a pattern of administrative structure, a 
national educational system, a common body of law, a common 
language, and a unique set of patriotic symbols in order to 
justify a state-nation as an entity distinct from others. 
Quite understandably, the independent Arab leaders have 
emphasized and sometimes magnified the distinctive character 
of their respective states. To illustrate, one might call 
attention to the rise in the early 1950's of Pharaonism in 
Egypt and of Phoenicianism in Lebanon. In the fashion just 
described, some Arab leaders may have created strong state- 
nations which will not easily open themselves to the 
political idea of one Arab state.
Man-made or natural barriers to movement can be 
largely overcome, however, as they have been in the interior 
southwest of the United States by providing adequate means of 
transport and communication. The existing system of
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circulation in the Arab World is still rudimentary and inade­
quate to support a greatly expanded interchange of goods, 
messages, and people. Large areas of the Arab World are 
still empty of any modern means of transportation. Consider­
ing Egypt the heart of the Arab World, the Maghreb is almost 
detached from it. There is only a single two-lane road 
linking the core areas of North Africa. Equally tenuous is 
the linkage between Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
Fertile Crescent because of Israel's interruption of the land 
continuity. In addition to the inadequate transportation 
links between the Egyptian heart of the Arab World and the 
other Arab countries, there is a critical inadequacy of 
transportation facilities within most of the Arab states as 
well (Figure 24) .
Discontiguity created by 
the presence of Israel
The coming into existence of the state of Israel by a 
United Nations Assembly resolution in 1947, and its de facro 
enlargement by military action in 1949 and 1967, has broken 
the contiguity of the political area of the Arab unity idea 
into two parts, one being the Arab states of North Africa 
and the other consisting of the Arab states of Asia. This 
break in contiguity of the Arab land space is a handicap to 
the successful political and functional integration of exist­
ing Arab countries. It is particularly so because of the 
continuing regional hostility and the essentially non-Arab
Fig.24
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nature of the Israeli state. From antiquity the interconti­
nental land bridge of the Sinai Peninsula has served as the 
main route for Arab invasions and caravan travel between the 
Asian and North African settlements. If it had not been for 
this land continuity, the North African states would quite 
probably never have been Arabized. For the past quarter of 
a century the Sinai link has been severed completely by 
Israel, and there is no prospect of re-establishing this link 
in the near future.
The general question must be raised as to whether or 
not an Arab state separated into two parts by a small but 
powerful and hostile country could successfully overcome the 
political and functional problems which would result from its 
geographical discontiguity. In the world of 1973, apart from 
certain island-based nation-states, there is only one major 
state still in existence whose land continuity is signifi­
cantly interrupted. The American state of Alaska is separated 
by Canada from the rest of continental and contiguous United 
States. This situation is tolerable because of existing 
friendly relations between the United States and Canada, and 
because of the very sparse population and undeveloped nature 
of Alaska. Different conditions prevail at the Sinai discon­
tinuity. Israel, as was mentioned, is powerful and hostile, 
and the two separated groups of Arab states contain densely 
populated areas with developed administrative systems of 
their own. The recent demise of East Pakistan and the
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emergence of an independent Bangladesh, in part as a conse­
quence of geographic separation, raise further doubts as to 
the chance for survival of one state whose continuity of 
territory is interrupted by a hostile and powerful foreign 
state.
It is not uncommon to encounter the comment of a 
Western observer that the only element of unity among the 
Arab states is their common opposition to Israel. It is quite 
true that opposition to Israel does provide a popular politi­
cal cause around which the Arabs can rally. Thus, while 
Israel has given the Arabs a common political cause, its 
existence serves to break the political area of the idea, an 
interruption which could continue to be significant in the 
long run.
However desirable--and it is desirable--territorial 
land contiguity is not absolutely essential for the survival 
of a state. Navigable waterways can provide an acceptable 
mode of movement between the parts of a political area.
Japan, Denmark, and Italy are all successfully unified nations. 
The Philippines and Indonesia, each with thousands of islands 
within its national political area, have recently evolved 
into nation-states. The Arab World could do the same. It is 
even possible that the Arabs will be able to bring about some 
kind of land contiguity, either by destroying Israel, which 
seems highly unlikely, or by negotiating a treaty with Israel 
which would provide for unrestricted movement along a corridor
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through Israel's territory, in return for recognizing Israel's 
right to exist and acknowledging firm boundaries. At present, 
of course, Arab-Israeli relations are at an impasse and, 
until this has been broken, none of the possible solutions 
suggested here can be realized.
Minorities in the Existing Arab States 
Few if any areas as large as the Arab World are with­
out linguistic and religious minorities. The Arab World has 
its share, although these minorities are small in relation to 
the whole. According to A. H. Hourani, to be in the minority 
in the Arab World means to be one who is not a Sunni Moslem 
in religion,1 or one who does not have Arabic for his native 
language, or one who is neither Arabic speaking nor Sunni 
Moslem (See Figure 25 for Hourani's list of minorities in the 
Arab World). This study, in view of contemporary political 
attitudes in the region, considers an Arabic-speaking person, 
brought up in Arab lands, as an Arab irrespective of his 
religious affiliation. Therefore, only the linguistic or
Islam is divided into numerous sects and subsects,
Shia and Sunni Moslems being the two major divisions. Sunni 
Moslems are in a majority in the Arab World as a whole. Shia 
Moslems constitute a majority in Iraq, provided the Kurds, 
who are mainly Sunnis, are excluded. Shias believe that suc­
cession ought to remain hereditary within the family of 
Mohammed and recognize Ali, the Prophet's nephew, as the 
rightful Caliph. Ali was murdered by the Sunnis who believe 
the succession should have been elective. Since this seventh 
century split, Shias have felt persecuted by the Sunni majority,
2
A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1947), p. T.
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Fig. 25
MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD
A. Sunni Moslems, but not Arabic - speaking ;
(1) Kurds
(2) Turcomans
(3) Caucasians: Circassians
Chechens
B. Arabic-speaking, but not Sunni Moslems:
I. Heterodox Moslems:
(1) Shias
(2) Alawis
(3) Ismailis
(4) Druzes
11. Christians :
(1) Greek Orthodox
(2) Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites)
(3) Coptic Orthodox
(4) Nestorians (Assyrians)
(5) Roman Catholics of the Latin rite
(6) Maronites
(7) Greek Catholics
(8) Coptic Catholics
(9) Syrian Catholics
(10) Chaldean Catholics
(11) ProtestàuLs; Anglicans
Presbyterians, etc.
III. Jews and semi-Judaic Sects:
(1) Rabbanite
(2) Karaites
(3) Samaritans
IV. Other religions:
(1) Yazidis
(2) Mandaeans
(3) Shabak
(4) Baha'is
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Fig. 25.--Continued
C. Neither Arabic-speaking nor
(1) Persian-speaking:
(2) Kurdish-speaking:
Source
(3) Syriac-speaking:
(4)
Sunni Moslems:
Shias
Baha'is
Jews
Yazidis
Shabak
Alawis
Syrian Orthodox 
Syrian Catholics 
Jews
Nestorians (Assyrians) 
Chaldaean Catholics 
Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) 
Syrian Catholics
Armenian Orthodox (Grego-
Catholics
Protestants
Armenian-speaking :
rians)
Armenian 
Armenian
(5) Hebrew-speaking: Jews
(6) Jews speaking various European languages:
Yiddish 
Spanish 
Italian, etc.
A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: 
Oxford University Press, 194/), pp. 1-2. Tn this 
list of minorities, the North African Arab countries 
are not included.
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other national minorities are considered to be antithetic to 
the political idea of one Arab state. In reality, some reli­
gious minorities such as the Maronites (Christian Arabs) in 
Lebanon and the Druzes have resisted Arab political and 
cultural assimilation.
Linguistic minorities
Fortunately for the Arab unity movemement there are 
not many important enclaves of non-Arabic-speaking people in 
the Arab World. Commenting on the enclaves in the eastern 
Arab countries, Longrigg writes:
In all the range of the (eastern) Arab countries 
(excluding, therefore, the southern Sudan) the sole 
considerable enclaves of non-Arab-speaking peoples are 
those of the north Iraqi Kurds and Turkomans, the 
recently-intruded Jews of Israel, and, at the extreme 
southwestern fringe, the partly-Arab bilingual grazing 
tribes of the central Sudan, the African-type Nubas of 
Kordofan, and the Nubians of the Middle-Nile banks. 
Elsewhere Arabic speech and consciousness is practically 
universal.1
In the western Arab countries, except among a few isolated 
pockets of Berber population, Arabic speech and consciousness 
are practically universal (Figure 26). With regard to the 
Berber peoples of Morocco and their place in Moroccan life, 
Legum writes :
The Berbers can hardly be considered to have a 
minority status in Morocco, and thus their position does 
not require discussion under this heading. The fate of 
Berber culture, the nature of rural administration and 
participation, are issues in contemporary Morocco; but 
the membership of Berbers in the national community is
^Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 98.
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not. This is so, of course, in virtue of their sharing 
in a wider Muslim culture, rather than through being the 
descendants of the country's proto-population.1
Frank Ralph Golino makes a similar statement about the 
Berbers and other minorities of Libya; "Despite the particu­
larism represented by the Berber, Tuareg and Tibu, however, 
Arabic represents the dominant cultural linguistic element in 
the pattern of Libyan national identity formation," The 
Berber people in Tunisia are fully Arabized. They have been 
completely assimilated culturally and linguistically into the 
Arab identity. The same can be said with reasonable accuracy 
of the Berber population of the central and western Maghreb. 
Even though the Berber tongue is still spoken by a large 
portion of the population in Morocco (35 per cent) and in 
Algeria (30 per cent), the Berbers in these two countries are 
mostly bilingual and do not represent a significant cultural 
or political minority.
In the eastern Arab countries there are only small 
numbers of resident Europeans. The European settlers (mainly 
French, Spanish, and Italian) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Libya since independence have emigrated to a point where 
they are not significant politically today. Until the inde­
pendence movements of the 1950's, the Europeans in the
^Legum (ed.), Africa, pp. 44-45.
2
Frank Ralph Golino, "Patterns of Libyan National 
Identity," The Middle East Journal, XXIV (Summer, 1970), 
p. 345.
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Maghreb numbered about two million. Today, they are estima­
ted to number fewer than 500,000. Excluded from considera­
tion here are the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which 
together contain another 150,000 Europeans.^
The actual number of French people in North Africa 
has diminished considerably since independence, but their 
cultural influence has not decreased as rapidly. When civil 
war broke out in 1954, Algeria had 1,200,000 French among its 
population, most of whom had come to think of themselves as 
Algerians. The French element at the time constituted 10 per 
cent of the entire Algerian population. Some writers have 
speculated that there might have been no rebellion had the 
requirements for full French citizenship not been somewhat 
discriminatory toward Algerian Moslems.^ The speculation is 
indicative of how far Algerians had and have been assimilated 
into French culture. The French cultural impact in Algeria is 
such that French-speaking Arabs there--in the opinion of many 
writers --will find it hard to identify with the political 
idea of one Arab state for a long time to come.
Religious minorities
Among the Christian communities in the Arab World, 
the Maronites of Lebanon are probably the most important
^Stecl (ed.), North Africa, p. 25. 
^Ibid., p . 18.
^Ibid.
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because of their strong resistance to assimilation. The 
Maronites, who number about 650,000, constitute the largest 
single community in Lebanon. They are the only Christians in 
the Middle East who have managed to preserve an autonomous 
Christian life and resist the tendency to social assimila­
tion.^ They are French educated, prominent in every sphere 
of national life, and perhaps the most westward-leaning 
cultural group in all of the Middle East.
In the history of Islam the development of a new sect 
has often been a convenient vehicle for mounting political 
power. Therefore, the presence of different sects within 
Islam has commonly reflected political differences in a given 
Arab community. This was particularly true in the past, but 
it is evident even today. Among the Middle Eastern religious 
minorities are the Shias of Iraq; the Druzes in Lebanon, a 
heretical sect of Ismaili Moslems who several centuries ago 
took on tinges of Christianity; the Zaidis, a Shia offshoot 
of some prominence in Yemen; and the Alawis, another Shia 
derivative, numbering about 300,000 and found mostly in north­
western Syria. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia are a recent 
addition to the list of religious minorities. Often called 
the "Puritans of Islam," the Wahhabis, after two centuries of 
rather obscure existence as a desert group, became prominent
^Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p. 66. 
^Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 107.
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under the leadership of King Saud of Arabia in the early 
twentieth century.
In spite of their internal differences, the various 
communities of Islam tend to view the world in terms of 
Moslem versus non-Moslem. Since all the Moslems, irrespec­
tive of their sectarian affiliations, are Arabs in the Arab 
World, they do not present an unsurmountable danger to the 
idea of Pan-Arab unity.
The indigeneous Jewish population, once found in 
almost every town in the Arab World, has decreased to near 
insignificance since the creation of Israel. Although they 
existed since ancient times, the Jewish communities of Iraq 
(numbering over 100,000 before 1948) and Yemen (50,000) have 
dwindled to a few thousands in each country, and the Jews of 
Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (formerly at least 100,000) have 
been reduced by more than four-fifths.^ Before the Second 
World War, half a million indigeneous Jews lived in the
northwest African countries. Today their number has dimin-
2
ished to less than 120,000.
Some of the minorities listed by Hourani (Figure 25) 
are not politically significant in considering the Pan-Arab 
idea for one or more of the three following reasons:
(1) They are not by nature antagonistic to the majority, that
^Steel (ed.). North Africa, p. 25.
2
Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 109.
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is, the Sunni Arabs; (2) they are not concentrated in a 
certain geographic location in sufficient numbers to consti­
tute a significant threat to the majority; and (3) their 
numerical strength is small and scattered. Discussing the 
problems of minorities in the Arab World, Hourani wrote in 
1947:
The Copts, the Greek Orthodox Christians and the 
heterodox Moslems are already a long way on the road to 
assimilation, and will go further if the majority allows 
them. The Kurds, Turcomans and Circassians of Syria also 
may be expected to become Arabized in course of time as 
so many of their fellow-nationals have done in the past. 
It seems probable that the Armenian question will be 
solved by emigration of the majority of Armenians to the 
U.S.S.R. There remain two communities which are likely 
to resist assimilation: the Maronites in Lebanon and the
Kurds in Iraq. Will their problem be solved by the grant 
of autonomy?!
The question Hourani asked a quarter of a century ago still 
remains a valid one. The Kurds of Iraq, like the Southern 
(non-Moslem) Sudanese, have forced their government after 
long guerilla warfare to give them a measure of autonomy.
But the minority problem still exists, and the assimilation 
question remains. Will these groups be satisfied with their 
present degree of autonomy, or will they insist on even more? 
Still another future possibility is a decision of the respon­
sible governments to attempt forced assimilation.
Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p. 122.
Besides the Maronites and the Kurds, there is another minority 
which the writer does not mention, the Southern Sudanese com­
munity, which presents a real problem of assimilation.
215
Divisive Political Factors
Since the modern movement for Arab political unifica­
tion began, in the early 1920's, there have been dynastic 
rivalries between the Hashemites and the Saudis, and impor­
tant differences in point of view between the independent and 
one-time colonial Arab states. The European colonial design 
to create and perpetuate divisions within the Arab World long 
frustrated the Arab nationalists' efforts. Neither of these 
divisive factors is important today. All of the Arab states 
including the former British protectorates on the Persian 
Gufl have become independent, and dynastic rivalries between 
the Hashemites and the Saudis have virtually disappeared. 
Foreign powers, now without legal authority, are less effec­
tive in their effort to control or influence the Arab coun­
tries, and their methods have changed from military action to 
diplomacy and subtle--or not so subtle--economic pressure. 
However, a new divisive political factor has appeared to 
replace the old ones, political differences among the Arab 
states themselves.
Today the nation-states of the Arab World can be 
separated into two contrasting and sometimes conflicting 
camps, the monarchial Arab states and the republican Arab 
states (Figure 27). The monarchial states are invariably 
conservative, anti-socialist, and pro-Western in outlook, 
whereas the republican Arab states are mainly pro-communist 
or leftist, socialist, and revolutionary. Only a few Arab
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A.R.E.l A A A A
Bahrain A A A A
Iraq A A A A
Jordan A A A A
Kuwait A A A
Lebanon A A A
Libya A A A
Morocco A A A A
Qatar A A A A
Sudan A A A
Sau. Ar. A A A A
Sultanate 
of Oman A A A A
Syria A A A A
Tunisia A A A
U.A.E.Z A A A A
Yemen, P.D.R. A A A A
Yemen, Rep. of A A A
Arab Republic of Egypt. 
^Union of Arab Emirates.
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States like Lebanon, Kuwait, and Tusisia do not fit clearly 
in either of these two camps. Lebanon and Tunisia, unlike 
the other republican states, are usually quite pro-Western in 
their attitude, while Kuwait, although a shiekdom, tends to 
be progressive in its economic policies.
The two Arab camps can be further subdivided into 
subcamps. The republican states can reasonably be grouped 
according to the degree of their socialist commitments, their 
pro-communist or leftist leanings, and their revolutionary 
fervor. Similarly, the monarchial states can be divided 
according to the degree of their conservative social and 
political attitudes, the extent of their anti-socialist 
administrative measures, and the intensity of their pro- 
Western policies. No close examination is needed to see that 
Iraq and Egypt, both socialist states, have their differences. 
Sill other differences separate the Hashemites of Jordan and 
the Saudis of Saudi Arabia, in spite of their common monar­
chial system. Let the political scientist specify the degree 
of difference among the two major political groups. It is 
sufficient here to point out that there are differences even 
among countries within the same political camp.
The philosophical diversity of the Arab states is 
highly significant in the evaluation of the short range pros­
pect for the unity idea. One political philosophy cannot 
coexist with another that is in sharp contrast to it within 
the same political unit. The monarchial states are
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fundamentally different in their internal operation from the 
republican states. There is no political system known today 
which can reconcile and unify these contradictory systems 
into a single viable political unit.
Examining the historical trend of the twentieth 
century, it seems likely that sooner or later the stern and 
autocratic monarchial system, as it prevails today in Jordan, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Coastal States, will 
undergo change. There is little contemporary evidence from 
any part of the world to suggest that republican states will 
revert back to monarchies. Spain may be about to return to a 
monarchial system, but it is not changing from a republican 
socialist pattern. The republican states in the Arab World 
tend to encourage any movement within the monarchial states 
which might eliminate the throne. Consequently, the monar­
chial states are afraid of the republican states and their 
talk of one all-encompassing Arab state. They do whatever 
they can to delay or discredit the Pan-Arab movement because 
the continuity in power of their own regimes depends on the 
failure of the one Arab state idea. Conflict between the two 
philosophical camps now characterizes the politics of the 
Arab World, seriously hindering what in this study has been 
called simply the "idea of Arab unity."
To show how the separation of the Arab states into 
two rival political camps works to obstruct the idea, some 
events of recent years should be recalled. In 1958 the
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United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt was formed. In 
response, the two existing Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and 
Iraq formed the Arab Union, a kind of dual alliance as a 
counter to the merger of the two republican states. A mili­
tary coup toppled the Hashemite monarch of Iraq later in 
1958, and this was the end of the Arab Union. King Husain of 
Jordan, fearing a coup in his country, charged that Egypt was 
plotting against him and called for British help. Britain 
immediately responded by landing troops in Jordan to help 
protect the throne of Husain whose own military force had 
been essentially a British creation. In 1961 the union 
between Syria and Egypt broke down, in part, according to 
A. L. Tibawi, as a result of the complicity of Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia.^
In 1962 the Imam of Yemen was deposed and apparently 
assassinated by a republican coup. The coup initiated a 
civil war between the royalists supporting the Imam's heir, 
Mohamad al-Badr, and the republicans, a war which lasted 
until 1967. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
supporting the royalist side, and Egypt, aiding the republi­
can side, fought each other by proxy, furnishing the belliger­
ents troops, planes, and other military equipment.
After the War of June, 1967, the conservative oil- 
producing states voted to end the selective embargo on oil
^Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria, p. 109.
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exports to Western markets, preferring instead to compensate 
Egypt with the rough financial equivalent of its lost canal 
dues. They rejected the alternative course proposed by Iraq 
which had been to stop all exports of Arab oil for three 
months.1 Implementation of the Iraqi proposal would have 
badly hurt the NATO allies of the United States. It was 
undoubtedly the pro-Western attitude of the conservative Arab 
states which led them to back away from the Iraqi proposal.
The conference of the Arab ministers which assembled 
in Cairo in May, 1968, decided to establish an Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development with an initial capital of
fifty million Kuwaiti dinars. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and
2Tunisia refused to participate.
In March, 1972, King Husain of Jordan proposed the 
reshaping of his domain into a federal state, the United Arab 
Kingdom, with two autonomous regions, one on either side of 
the Jordan River.^ The proposal was made without any previ­
ous consultation with the Palestinian Arabs of the We?t Bank 
or with other concerned Arab governments. Naturally, King 
Husain's action was interpreted by the Palestinians as a move 
to counter their revolutionary ambitions, and by the existing
^J. E. Hartshorn, "Oil and the Middle East War," The 
World Today, XXIV (April, 1968), p. 153.
^New Outlook, XI (July-August, 1968), p. 73.
^The Daily Star (Beirut), Thursday, March 16, 1972,
p. 1.
221
revolutionary governments as a covert reactionary move to 
make peace with Israel at the cost of the Arab cause. It is 
well known that without military and economic support, such 
as is presently given by the United Kingdom and the United 
States, Jordan could not survive for long. The complete 
dependence of Jordan on Western assistance and Husain's fre­
quent conciliatory gestures toward Israel are regarded by the 
revolutionary Arab states as a shameful and even traitorous 
obstacle to the cause of Arab unity. A cartoon published in 
one of the Cairo newspapers clearly sums up the Arab revolu­
tionary states' view of Jordan and its principal supporter, 
the United States (Figure 28). In November, 1972, there was 
an unsuccessful coup in Jordan. The government of Jordan 
accused Libya of master-minding and financing it.
Along with the conflicting political systems of the 
Arab states, the internal political instability so character­
istic of many of them greatly hinders progress towards the 
Arab unity idea. Internal political instability is clearly 
manifest in the frequency of military coups. Only a few of 
the Arab states have not experienced a military coup at least 
once since their independence. Tunisia and Lebanon among the 
republican states are the only ones which have not experienced 
military coups. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf principal­
ities among the monarchial states have remained fairly stable, 
disregarding the occasional forced transfer of power among 
their own royal family members. Most of the Arab states,
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thon, have experienced military coups, coup attempts, or 
threats of coups.
Fig. 28.--Arab political cartoon
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(Don't try to break the Arab Federation-- 
the only thing that will break is the tool you 
are using ! !)
Source: Arab Youth (Cairo), May 1, 1972, p. 2,
Since its independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced 
sixteen successful or abortive coups, the latest in July, 
1908. Syria has been equally afflicted, with a total of 
eighteen coups or coup attempts since independence in 1946. 
The latest military coup in Syria occurred in March, 1969.
On March 11, 1970, the General Command of the National Liber­
ation Front of South Yemen announced that a reactionary coup
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d ’état was imminent and accused the United States and Britain 
of instigating it. Since Nasser's death, in September, 1970, 
Egypt has been politically shaky. The first major action of 
Nasser's successor was to imprison all of his possible rivals, 
-accusing them of plotting against him. In January, 1971, 
Moroccan officials reported uncovering a plot by non-Moroccan 
Arab elements to overthrow the government. A few months 
later, in July, 1971, an attempted coup again failed to top­
ple the Moroccan monarch. In August, 1971, the Sudan went 
through a quick succession of coup and counter coup, which 
events deterred the Sudan from joining the Federation of Arab 
Republics as had been planned. In November, 1972, the King 
of Jordan was alerted to a coup plot and successfully broke 
it up.
In summary, it seems clear that most Arab countries 
have so far failed to develop political institutions capable 
of solving problems of political succession in a peaceful 
way. All too often Arab leaders are either planning a coup 
or fending off one, thereby wasting energy and money which 
otherwise could be used to strengthen Arab unity and economic 
development. Probably the political differences between the 
Arab states and the internal instability which characterizes 
so many of them are the two most important obstacles to the 
rapid success of the one Arab state idea.
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Divisive Economic Factors
The legacy of 
historical disunity
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the close of 
World War I was followed by the division of the Turkish Arab 
lands into several political units. Iraq, Palestine, and 
Transjordan came under British administration in accordance 
with the League of Nations mandate system, while Lebanon and 
Syria became French mandates. Egypt, which had become a 
British protectorate in 1914, was declared independent in 
1922, although military rights were retained by Britain at 
Alexandria and Suez. Yemen also became independent after the 
First World War. Saudi Arabia, as we know it today, came into 
existence in the 1920's. Kuwait, once nominally part of the 
Ottoman Empire, became a British protectorate in 1899. The 
Maghreb, progressively occupied by European powers after the 
French occupation of Algiers in 1830, was integrated for 
several decades into the economy of France and Spain.
The modern colonizaLion of rhe Arab World brought 
about separate customs territories with different units of 
currency. It did not, however, significantly alter inter- 
Arab trade relations during the period of the 1920's when 
inter-Arab trade still constituted a substantial portion of 
the total trade of most of the Arab countries.^ The economic 
ties between the Arab countries were given recognition by the
^Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 15
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mandate system, under which trade preferences were forbidden. 
Thus, until about 1930, the League of Nations maintained a 
semblance of an Arab regional market, at least in the eastern 
Mediterranean area.
Economic disintegration followed, however, in the 
1930's. The Arab countries under the occupation of the man­
datory powers, France and Britain, followed most of the 
Western states in the adoption of a high tariff policy.
Under the competitive international tariff system that 
evolved during the 1930's no attempts were made to maintain 
the regional economic ties which had prevailed in the Arab 
World. No new preferential treatment was devised to serve 
the Arab countries or help bind them together. The only free 
trade relations in the Arab World during the 1930's were 
between Egypt and the Sudan (under the Anglo-Egyptian condo­
minium) , between Lebanon and Syria (under the French mandate), 
and between Transjordan and Palestine (under the British 
mandate).
During World War II some Arabs got a glimpse of the 
workings of a regional economy through observing the opera­
tion of the British-directed Middle East Supply Center, which 
was mainly designed to maintain the Allies' war effort in the 
area. This war-induced respite from commercial competition 
did not last, however, and when the war was over the economic 
disintegration of the Arab lands continued. In the early 
post-war period, with the exception of the founding of the
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Arab League, there was a virtual absence of either bilateral 
or multilateral agreements among the Arab states. A signifi­
cant exception was the operation of a customs union between 
Syria and Lebanon during the early years of their independence, 
but even this was terminated in 1951.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's a system of 
protective tariffs and import licenses characterized the 
regional trading scene. The Arab countries during this 
period were completely tied to the economies of the former 
mandatory powers. A series of devaluations of British and 
French currency tended to reduce the trade among the Arab 
states. By 1951, nearly all of the Arab countries were func­
tioning as separate political and economic entities vis-à-vis 
each other. The only preferential trade ties that survived 
were between Egypt and the Sudan, and these were terminated 
in 1957 after the Sudan's independence.
Recent inter-Arab trade-- 
competition and complementarity
The fact that the Arab states have predominantly 
competitive rather than complementary economies has led a 
number of scholars to argue that successful political integra­
tion is not possible among the Arab states. This line of 
argument is based on the assumption that political unifica­
tion can not succeed without economic integration, and that 
economic integration is not possible without complementary 
economies. If we examine the above assumption critically.
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however, we find at least some evidence that political unifi­
cation is possible without complementary economies in under­
developed areas, although perhaps not in highly industrial 
areas.
Underdeveloped countries are generally characterized 
by self-sufficient subsistence economies and a pattern of raw 
material exports supported by capital investment of outside 
interests. The countries commonly compete with each other in 
the world market with their surpluses of agricultural, forest, 
and mineral products. The existence of competitive economies, 
however, is not necessarily a divisive factor. The Organiza­
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, an association of 
unlike cultural and political systems bound by the common 
desire to export oil at maximum prices, is sufficient proof 
that underdeveloped states can unite in safeguarding their 
joint interests.^ Even the European Common Market, compris­
ing a group of highly industrial countries, was formed to 
help avoid unnecessary competition among the member countries 
and not primarily as a result of complementary economies.
It is true, of course, that greater economic interde­
pendence among the Arab countries would be a very favorable 
factor for the success of the idea of one Arab state. The 
present extent of trade among the Arab states is certainly
OPEC was formed in 1960 with a charter membership of 
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
Its membership has subsequently been expanded to include Abu 
Dhabi, Indonesia, Libya, and Qatar.
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less than what could be called functional integration 
(Table 6 and Figure 29), In 1969, only Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had 
trade with other Arab countries amounting to more than 20 per 
cent of each one's total foreign trade. In all of the other 
Arab countries, inter-Arab trade in 1969 amounted to less 
than 10 per cent of their respective totals. Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia had less than 6 per cent of their trade 
with other Arab countries. Even Egypt and Libya, two of the 
three members of the recently formed Federation of Arab 
Republics, had trade with other Arab countries amounting to 
less than 7 per cent of their individual total trade. As 
shown by the statistics compiled for the period since 1962, 
trade among all of the Arab countries has remained relatively 
small (Table 6), Particularly disappointing to the support­
ers of the Arab unity idea is the fact that during the past 
decade there has been no consistent pattern of increasing 
trade among Arab countries. Saudi Arabia's trade with the 
rest of the Arab World has consistently decreased. In con­
trast, the six members of the European Common Market in 1966 
had from 31 to 56 per cent of their individual trade with 
other members of the bloc.^
The small amount of existing trade among the Arab 
states, and the absence of increasing inter-Arab trade is
^"Common Market Statistics," Common Market, VI 
(February, 1966), p. 44.
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TABLE 6
INTER-ARAB TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 
OF CERTAIN ARAB STATES, 1962--1969%
Year
uuuuLry
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Algeria 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
Iraq 3 4 4 4 4 4 6 7
Jordan 22 27 23 25 28 26 27 29
Kuwait 13 10 11 10 10 10 12 11
Lebanon 23 25 24 23 22 28 29 26
Libya 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Morocco 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
Saudi Arabia 17 17 16 11 11 10 10 9
Sudan 8 5 7 7 . 7 7 6 7
Syria 18 21 24 24 29 22 24 20
Tunisia 2 3 6 5 4 3 5 5
U.A.R. 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 6
Yemen
(P.D.R.) 26 23 22 14 14 25 20 26
Compiled from; Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics, 1966 and 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1968,
1971). Comparable trade figures for the Republic of Yemen, 
the Sultanate of Oman, and the Persian Gulf States seem not 
to be available.
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Fig. 29
INTER-ARAB TRADE 
(as a percentage of total trade of the Arab countries)
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largely due to the lack of regional economic specialization. 
Tables 7 and 8 show that the principal imports and exports of 
the Arab countries tend to be similar rather than complemen­
tary. Most of the Arab countries primarily export oil or 
agricultural products, items destined for industrial countries 
because of the lack of effective demand in the Arab World.
At the same time, the industrial goods needed by the Arab 
states have to come largely from outside the region, because 
the Arab countries, with the partial exception of Egypt, have 
not reached the stage of being able to produce them. However, 
with an increasing level of industrialization, the regional 
economic specialization among the Arab countries could be 
greatly increased.
Besides the small amount of trade between the Arab 
countries and the lack of a noticeable trend for this trade 
to increase, there is still, from the point of view of the 
Pan-Arab movement, an undesirable residue from the colonial 
period. That is, many of the Arab countries are still to a 
substantial extent tied by trade to the former imperial 
powers. In 1969, France continued to absorb more than 50 per 
cent of Algeria's total export trade, more than 40 per cent 
of Morocco's, and approximately 30 per cent of that of Tuni­
sia. Similarly, Italy was still the single biggest trading 
partner of Libya, accounting for more than 30 per cent of 
that country's total trade in 1969.
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Although there is no definite trend toward increasing 
trade among the Arab countries, substantial changes are tak­
ing place in their trading patterns. Trade with the U.S.S.R, 
is increasing steadily, while trade with the Western world, 
including the United States, is decreasing at almost the same 
rate. In the case of Egypt and Syria, the U,S.S,R, has 
largely displaced the United States and the United Kingdom.
It has recently become the biggest trading partner of these 
recently merged Arab states, accounting in 1969 for 25 per 
cent and 14 per cent respectively of their total foreign 
trade.^ The foreign trade of Iraq shows a similar trend 
away from the West. The North Rumalia petroleum concession 
area was nationalized by the Iraqi government in 1961. 
Recently developed by the U.S.S.R., it went into production 
in April, 1972. The first cargo of oil from this field, 
amounting to 157,000 barrels, was hauled to market by Russian 
tanker. A fifteen-year friendship treaty between Iraq and 
the U.S.S.R. was signed in May, 1972. Later in the same 
month, the Iraqi government nationalized the Iraq Petroleum 
Company owned by tlie Western oil companies. Other Arab 
countries showed only minor changes in their trade pattern 
between 1962 and 1969, except for Saudi Arabia's increasing 
trade with Japan.
^Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969.
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Although the inter-Arab trade is small in general, 
and has not shown an increasing trend, one can identify two 
major groups of Arab countries within which there is a signif­
icant amount of intra-group trade (Table 9). These trading 
groups seem to have developed as a response to proximity.
The first group consists of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The second cluster includes 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Other Arab countries which do 
not fit in the above groups, such as the Sudan and Libya, have 
significant trade with only a few Arab countries. The Sudan, 
however, has a fairly important trade with Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. Libya trades mainly with Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. 
Only Egypt of all the Arab countries, has some trade with each 
of the other Arab states. Table 9 clearly shows that the 
existing economic interdependence among Arab countries is 
slight. Since the volume of trade between countries is an 
important indicator of the degree of economic interdependence, 
as well as an indicator of potential economic integration, 
real economic integration of all the Arab countries seems 
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. There is progress 
toward integration, however, within the two trading groups 
just mentioned. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria fall 
within the same trading group, and they are also the countries 
of the high potential political action area and the present 
political action area. By way of Egypt, Libya and the Sudan 
maintain a considerable trade with this group. Hence,
TABLE 9
TOTAL VAl.UE OF TRADE BETWEEN ARAB COUNTRIES--1969 
(Figures in Millions of U.S. Dollars)^
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Algeria
Egypt 9.5
Iraq • • 17.5
Jordan 4.5 5.5
Kuwait 5.0 12.5 6.5
Lebanon 1.0 12.0 34.0 17.0 21.0
Libya 1.5 3.0 8.5
Morocco 25.5 0.2 0.1 0 . 3 1.0
Sau. Ar. 5.5 1.7 15.0 11.0 61.5 0.0
Sudan 19.5 0.6 0.6 2.5 7.5
Syria 11.0 29.5 15. 5 7.5 46.5 0.7 11.0 0.4
Tunisia 6.5 0.5 , , 0 . 0 0.4 13.0 1.8 Q . 0
Yemen
(FDR) 1.5 3.5 2.0 0 . 0 15.0 0 . 2 0.0 0.0 1.4 0 . 2 0 . 2 •
IsJ
Lh)0\
^Calculated from: 
United Nations, 1971).
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 (New York:
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expansion of the present Federation of Arab Republics within 
the high potential political action area seems quite possible. 
There is also a move on the part of Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia, the Maghreb countries, towards creating some kind of 
economic community.
Different economic systems
The existence of different economic systems among the 
Arab countries is one of the primary obstacles to their eco­
nomic and/or political integration. Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, 
Syria, and Libya have socialist economies involving owner­
ship, control, or regulation by the state of various sectors 
of the economy. Egypt has been in the process of converting 
its former capitalist economy to a socialist economy since 
the second half of the 1950's. Today virtually all aspects 
of its economy, including manufacturing industries, public 
transportation, foreign trade, banks, insurance companies, 
and even agriculture, are owned and operated, or are very 
closely coulioiled, by rhe government. The central adminis­
tration has also taken over most of the wholesale and retail 
trade tlirougli government-controlled co-operatives and 
government-owned department stores. Pricing of both domestic 
products and export products is controlled by the government. 
In Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, similar socialistic meas­
ures are being undertaken by the regimes in power.
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In contrast to the predominantly socialist economies 
of several of the Arab countries are the economies of the 
remaining Arab states, ranging from the laissez-faire economy 
of Lebanon to private enterprise economies with varying 
amounts of state participation. Recognizing the variety of 
economies existing among the Arab states, Alfred G. Musrey 
analyzes the difficulty of economic integration in this way;
Since planned trade through state agencies acting 
within the framework of an over-all economic plan has 
replaced, or is gradually replacing, tariffs and speci­
fied quantitative restrictions as the regulator of access 
to and of export from the socialist countries, reductions 
in or the removal of such artificial restrictions by 
these couii-ries have and could have a very limited effect 
on facilitating access to their markets. Moreover, 
restrictions on the use of foreign capital in these coun­
tries and governmental ownership and control at the pro­
duction, wholesale, and retail levels have constituted 
and could constitute further inhibitions, as could the 
price structures gradually evolving within these coun­
tries that reflect to a large extent fixed prices.
On the other hand, unlimited access to and egress 
from the markets of the socialist countries, as advocated 
by the private enterprise countries, would be incompat­
ible with the economic planning involved in pursuing a 
policy of socialism. For the socialist countries to per­
mit private companies to establish agencies in the social­
ist countries and freely import and sell their products 
would be tantamount, to discarding over-all economic 
planning.1
Different levels of 
economic development
Unequal industrial development among the Arab 
countries has created fears among government and business 
leaders in the less-developed Arab states that integration.
^Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 119.
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economic and/or political, would bring a further concentra­
tion of the major industries in the more - advanced Arab 
states. Because of these fears, justified or unjustified, 
even if integration would offer a larger market for their 
products, the less industrialized Arab countries have not 
been willing to abolish custom duties or offer tariff 
reciprocity.
Tariffs as the main source 
of government revenuT
The unwillingness of most Arab governments to abolish 
tariffs in order to promote greater trade among themselves 
arises in part from fear of dominance by more-advanced Arab 
countries, but it is mainly due to a heavy dependence on 
tariffs as a source of government revenue. The fear of domi­
nance by stronger trading partners is particularly evident 
in the case of the oil-poor Arab countries. During the 1960's 
excise taxes and customs duties were responsible for about 
40 to 60 per cent of the revenue available for the ordinary 
budgets of most Arab countries. Direct taxes provided only 
about 10 to 12 per cent. Customs duties in many cases were 
the most important single source of revenue, accounting for 
approximately 20 to 40 per cent of the total revenue avail­
able for ordinary budget expenditures. Because of this heavy 
reliance on the revenues from tariffs, and the reluctance to 
impose stiff property or personal and corporate income taxes.
240
Arab governments have been very hesitant about negotiation of 
substantial tariff reductions, even among themselves.
The shortage of convertible 
currencies--an obstacle 
to economic integration
Apart from their heavy dependence on revenue from 
tariffs, most Arab countries, excluding such oil-rich ones as 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, have limited access to con­
vertible currencies. According to Musrey, the shortage of 
convertible currencies impedes economic integration in the 
following way:
In order to increase their supplies of such curren­
cies, most of these countries have applied prescription 
of currency requirements to their most important exports, 
as well as to products in short supply domestically, 
necessitating payment in a convertible currency. Con­
versely, in order to conserve and allocate these foreign 
exchange earnings, most of these countries have applied 
rather comprehensive systems of quantitative controls to 
imports and other current transactions, as well as to 
capital movements. For balance-of-payments purposes, 
many articles have been prohibited from importation or 
have been subject to restrictive quotas or licensing.
Due in part to these import and export controls, the Arab 
countries have found it exceedingly difficult to increase 
their trade with eacli other.-
^Ibid., p . 122
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The idea of one Arab nation-state began to emerge as 
a political force during the early twentieth century in the 
Fertile Crescent in the course of the struggle for independ­
ence from Ottoman rule. Later, after the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire following World War I, the idea took deeper 
roots among Arabs during the struggle for independence from 
the European colonial powers.
Much to the disappointment of Arab nationalists, when 
the Ottoman Empire dissolved in the 1920's the dream of one 
Arab nation-state was not realized. Instead, the colonial 
powers succeeded in dividing the Arab domain of the Ottoman 
Empire into several political units, hence obstructing ful­
fillment of the unity idea. Administration of the North 
African Arab regions had been taken over somewhat earlier by 
the European powers, Morocco by France and Spain, Algeria and 
Tunisia by France, Libya by Italy, and Egypt and the Sudan by 
the United Kingdom. The presence of several colonial masters 
and a number of colonized political units prevented the inde­
pendence struggle from emerging into a united and co-ordinated 
movement among all Arabs. Each political unit struggled on
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its own to achieve independence with little or no coordina­
tion of action among Arabs of different colonial affiliations. 
Only in the mid-1950's did the already independent Arab 
states, particularly Egypt, through the Arab League and on 
their own, start assisting those countries still under colo­
nial rule in their struggle for independence.
In the 1920's the political disintegration of the 
Arab movement was almost complete. This political disinte­
gration of the early post-war period was followed by the 
economic disintegration of the 1930's. Increasingly, the 
economies of the colonized Arab territories became tied to 
those of their masters. Inter-Arab trade declined, making 
increasingly difficult the restoration of the closer economic 
relationship which had existed in the past.
The political and economic disintegration of the 
1920's and 1930's under colonial rule was not the only obsta­
cle to the Arab unity idea. Other hindrances to the idea 
included the contrast in political outlook between the colo­
nial Arab regions and the independent Arab states, the dynas­
tic rivalries between the Hashemites and the Saudis in Arabia 
and the Fertile Crescent, the lack of a powerful core area to 
disseminate the idea among Arabs due to the fact that Egypt 
still was not considered Arab, controversies about what 
should constitute the Arab nation and where its frontiers 
lay, and the persistent contradiction between universalistic 
Islam and particularistic Arab nationalism.
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The idea did not die, however. Instead, it gained 
added vitality and became a viable political force during the 
1940's, During this decade all of the Fertile Crescent coun­
tries except Iraq, whose official sovereignty dates from 
1932, gained their independence, and the League of Arab 
States was organized. The controversy about the definition 
of the Arab nation and its frontiers was on its way to reso­
lution. Comprehensive Arab unity became a clear-cut goal of 
the Pan-Arabists, irrespective of the country to which they 
belonged or the political party with which they were affilia­
ted. However, all the developments that took place in the 
Middle East in the 1940's were not favorable to the unity 
idea. The state of Israel was created in 1948, and its crea­
tion gave birth to one of the most difficult and explosive 
international problems of this century. Dynastic rivalries 
continued among the independent Arab states. These states 
and the colonial Arab territories continued to diverge in 
their economic and political outlook.
In the 1950's Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia 
achieved independence. Immediately after independence, how­
ever, the new local rulers, with their vested royal interests, 
often seemed little concerned about anything beyond enjoying 
their thrones and the accompanying privileges and perquisites. 
A certain amount of lip service was paid to the idea of one 
Arab nation-state, but there was little tangible action to 
back it up. Egypt and Iraq overthrew their monarchs and
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joined Syria and Lebanon in becoming republican states.
Egypt by the late 1950's had accepted itself as an integral 
part of a greater Arab nation. This acceptance made a power­
ful core, the Lower Nile Valley centered on Cairo, available 
for propagandizing and cultivating the idea among other 
Arabs. Communication media like the Voice of the Arabs and 
the Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, vigorously promoted the Pan- 
Arab idea. The idea was given an added potency throughout 
the Arab World by the charismatic leadership of Nasser.
Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958 and, 
although the U.A.R. broke down in 1961, the unity idea 
remained a viable force.
The decade of the 1950’s saw some decline in the 
dynastic rivalries, and by the 1960's these had virtually 
disappeared. Attempts were being made, mostly under the 
impetus of the Arab League, to restore some of the past 
inter-Arab trade and to encourage a free trade relationship. 
Awareness of the need for Arab unity and regional economic 
development was on the increase. The economic disruption of 
the last several decades, however, was still much In evidence. 
The division between the republican, socialist, and pro­
communist Arab states on the one hand, and the monarchial, 
conservative, pro-Western Arab states sharpened. Political 
instability was characteristic of many of the Arab governments, 
and a lack of organizational experience on either the national 
or international level plagued them all. The idea of the
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Maghreb as a separate entity started to develop, and was par­
ticularly apparent at the 1958 Tangier Conference.
During the 1960's Yemen became a republican state, as 
did Algeria and South Yemen when they rid themselves of impe­
rial authority. The Arab Common Market was established in 
1964 and, although its development has been slow, the legal 
structure is in place. The humiliating defeat of Arabs in 
the June war of 1967, and the loss of much Soviet-supplied 
military equipment, brought even the conservative oil-rich 
Arab countries to assist in the rescue of the devastated 
economies of the Arab states most affected. The Palestine 
liberation movement, supported by various guerrilla groups, 
became an active political cause which commanded widespread 
support among many of the Arab countries. Most significant 
of all, probably, was the growing power of oil. Oil became 
perhaps the most important element in Arab life, for the 
revenues from it provided a means of bringing social, eco­
nomic, and political change to the whole Arab World. The 
geological accident of its presence put into the Arabs’ hands 
a political-economic weapon to use against anybody who would 
oppose their causes. Recognition of the power of joint action 
in their policy on oil concessions, oil pricing, transporta­
tion and refining facilities, and oil marketing is a powerful 
cohesive force among Arab countries now, and it may be an 
even more powerful force in the near future.
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Although political differences among some of the Arab 
states continued through the 1960's, there was favorable 
movement toward the unity idea. The republican and socialist 
states of Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and the Sudan moved 
closer in their formulation of both internal and external 
policies, raising the possibility of some kind of federation 
among them.
The early 1970's finally saw the achievement of 
independence from colonial rule for all the Arab states. The 
Federation of Arab Republics, linking Egypt, Libya, and Syria 
was established in 1971, raising the possibility that this 
federation might emerge as the nucleus for a single Arab 
nation-state. A Union of Arab Emirates, still a rather 
loose-knit confederation, was formed by several of the former 
British protectorates on the Persian Gulf, although Bahrain 
and Qatar chose to remain on their own as sovereign states 
with separate UN membership.
The idea of one Arab state is applicable to the whole 
Arab World in the sense that the people are aware of their 
common belonging to an Arab community, and they all express 
the desire and the need for Arab unity. On closer examina­
tion, however, only in the territories of Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria has the idea of one Arab state become an accomplished 
fact. Thus, the territories of the new Federation of Arab 
Republics can be termed the "field" of the one Arab state 
idea in the terminology of Stephen B. Jones and the "political
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action area" in terms of the Cohen and Rosenthal analysis. 
According to Deutsch's definition of political integration as 
an "Amalgamated Security Community," the territories of Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria have not become completely that, but they 
are moving towards it. With regard to the Arab community as 
a whole, there is still no all-Arab "Pluralistic Security 
Community." Syria, in June, 1971, attacked Jordan, but 
backed away after a strong warning from the United States. 
Yemen and South Yemen fought a brief but bloody war in Octo­
ber, 1972. Until recently, the Sudan and Iraq were beset 
with civil strife. Nevertheless, it can be said that the 
Arab community as a whole is moving towards Deutsch's Plural­
istic Security Community through the functional-organizational 
structures of the Arab League.
Since Egypt accepted itself as an integral part of 
the larger Arab nation in the 1950's, the core area of the 
Lower Nile Valley, focused in Cairo, has provided cultural, 
political, and social leadership for the Arab World. Through 
the efforts of this core, the cultivation of the Pan-Arab 
idea among the Arab masses has finally become effective. The 
youthfulness of the independent Arab states and their still 
rather limited local iconography make it possible for the 
Pan-Arab idea to become a political reality in a wide region. 
Many Arab students in the United States known to the writer 
are planning to return to the Arab World to seek employment 
but not necessarily to the specific lands of their birth.
248
Through various social, cultural, economic, and 
political organizations already established by the Arab 
states, including the Federation of Arab Republics, the move­
ment of goods and people, in the judgment of the writer, will 
continue to increase throughout their extent, bringing a 
greater degree of functional integration to them. In the 
process, the idea of one Arab state v/ill gain added vitality. 
The unity idea continues to gain ground among the Arab masses, 
based in part on their common hatred of Israel and the con­
tinuing plight of the Palestinian refugees. Oil is increas­
ingly providing a common interest for all the Arab states, 
conservative and socialist alike, in their attempt to gain 
control of their own resources and in their fight for the 
maximization of the oil revenue. If internal political sta­
bility can be achieved by the three republican states 
involved, the present Arab federation could rapidly develop 
into a strong cohesive unit, Iraq and the Sudan will then be 
likely candidates for joining the Federation. Even the con 
servative monarchial states will have to reckon with the 
unity idea, imposing fewer hindrances to it, if not actually 
assisting in its progress.
Some conclusions that can be drawn from this study of 
the idea of one Arab nation-state are the following:
1. It is clear that any reference to the success or 
failure of the one Arab nation-state idea must take into 
account its entire political area rather than the political
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action area alone. There is little or no prospect for a 
single Arab nation-state reaching from the Persian Gulf to 
the Atlantic Ocean in the near future.
The political area of the one Arab state idea can be 
visualized in schematic fashion as shown in Figure 30. The 
Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria constitute the political action area of a still evolv­
ing single Arab state. Although the Federation has only 
three Arab units at present, its future prospect for func­
tioning as a nucleus of a still larger Arab federation cannot 
be minimized. To some extent the Sudan, and Iraq in particu­
lar, within the high potential political action area, having 
granted autonomy to their troubled minority peoples, and thus 
having established some internal stability, may well be on 
their way to joining the new Federation. Two other Arab 
countries of the high potential political action area, Jordan 
and Lebanon, will remain outside the Federation until their 
economic and political systems become compatible with those 
of the socialist Arab republics of the Federation. The 
chances for a further merger with the countries of the low 
potential action area remain negligible as long as the social, 
economic, and political systems of Saudi Arabia and the smaller 
Persian Gulf principalities maintain their present contrasts 
and tensions. The lowest potential political action area, 
consisting of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, may never join 
the Federation. There is a possibility that Chad and, in
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particular, Mauritania, both with a high percentage of Arabic­
speaking people, may some day join the Arab League and become 
part of the Arab World.
2. There is an evident trend toward regional federa­
tions within the political area of the Pan-Arab idea. The 
Maghreb countries, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which 
regard themselves as separate entities, are moving towards 
their own regional federation, although at an exceedingly 
slow pace. The recent formation of the Union of Arab Emir­
ates and consideration of a united Yemen, to include both the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Republic of 
Yemen, are other examples of the trend toward regional feder­
ations within the political area of the idea.
3. The Arab-Israeli conflict should also be viewed 
as an attempt on the part of Arabs to achieve their cherished 
dream of one Arab state without interruption of its political 
area. This drive for territorial contiguity and integrity 
helps to understand whv. among other reasons, Arabs oppose 
the existence of Israel so tenaciously.
4. Lastly, it can be concluded that even with vari­
ous regional federations within its political area, and with 
many strong disruptive forces still at work, the idea of one 
Arab nation-state is a viable force. This force will con­
tinue to shape political and economic events among the Arab 
states, and thereby to influence the political geography of 
the Arab World.
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